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CEO political ideology and management earnings forecast 
Md Noman Hossain1    Ahmed Elnahas2 Lei Gao3,4 
 
Abstract 
Republican CEOs are more likely to issue earnings forecasts and to issue forecasts that are 
more accurate and timely. Republican CEOs favor range and less optimistic forecasts, convey 
more negative news, and have more positive earnings surprises. We address endogeneity using 
propensity score matching and difference-in-difference estimates. Our results are robust to 
controlling for CEO characteristics, incentives, overconfidence, and managerial ability, and are 
stronger for firms with a high level of institutional ownership and litigation risk. The preference 
for threat and ambiguity avoidance of conservative CEOs seem to outweigh the tendency to 
seize on information associated with their authoritarian personalities.  
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Over the last few years, the U.S. is experiencing an unprecedented degree of political 
polarization. Pew research center documents that between 1994 and 2017 the average 
partisan gap has increased from 15 to 36 percentage points.5 A recent Gallup report shows 
that political identity defines our views of a wide variety of aspects of life, which often are 
not directly related to politics (Newport (2019)). Political ideology seems to affect a broad 
spectrum of our life choices, ranging from what we eat (Boeuf (2019)) to our perception of 
climate change (Hu et al. (2017)). Consistent with these findings, Forbes (2017) argues that, 
for many, political ideology is becoming an official religion.6 
Recently, financial economists investigate the effect of managers’ political ideology 
on their corporate policies. Researchers show that Republican -more conservative- CEOs 
have a more conservative investment and financial policies (e.g., Hong and Kostovetsky 
(2012); Di Giuli and Kostovetsky (2014); Hutton, Jiang, and Kumar (2014); Francis, Hasan, 
Sun, and Wu (2016); Elnahs and Kim (2017)), are less likely to engage in earnings 
management, pay lower audit fees, and have a higher financial reporting quality (Deng, Ho, 
and Li (2018); Dong, Li, Xie, and Zhang (2018)). These findings lend support to the 
behavioral consistency principle.7,8 However, the actual effect of CEO political ideology 
might be undermined in these papers because financial and investment policies can be 
persistent and are typically subject to less managerial discretion (Fee, Hadlock, and Pierce 
(2013)).9  
 
5 A summary of Pew’s report can be found on the following link: https://www.people-press.org/2017/10/05/the-
partisan-divide-on-political-values-grows-even-wider/  
6 See more details at  https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnhart/2017/11/30/is-ideology-becoming-americas-
official-religion/#ce0893a164b3 
7 Similarly, Wintoki and Xi (2019) document that mutual fund managers allocate assets to firms whose executives 
and directors share a similar political partisan affiliation. 
8 The attention that researchers pay to CEO political ideology as a personal trait stems from the fact that personal 
political ideology is established in early adulthood and becomes relatively consistent over time (Green, Palmquist, 
and Schickler (2004); Jost and Amodio (2012)). Further, the measurement of political ideology based on a CEO’s 
donations is self-revealing and hence is subject to less measurement error. 
9 Several empirical studies show that firms slowly adjust their capital structure over multiple years (See, for 
example, Flannery and Rangan, 2006); Harford, Klasa, and Walcott, 2009). 
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Voluntary disclosure, which is subject to a higher degree of managerial discretion (e.g., 
Houston, Lev, and Tucker (2010); Cheng, Luo, and Yue (2013)), is then a much cleaner 
environment to investigate the impact of CEO political ideology on corporate policy choices.10  
Managers can utilize their full discretion over management earnings forecasts (MEF) to alter 
investor expectations about the future stock price and reduce information asymmetry (e.g., 
Coller and Yohn (1997); Brown and Hillegeist (2007)), reduce the cost of capital (e.g., 
Sengupta (1998); Francis, Nanda, and Olsson (2008); Baginski and Rakow (2012)), increase 
analyst following (e.g., Healy, Hutton, and Palepu (1999); Ajinkya, Bhojraj, and Sengupta 
(2005)), and increase a firm’s reputation about accurate and transparent reporting (e.g., 
Williams (1996); Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005)). In this paper, we examine the 
association between CEO conservative political ideology and MEF.  
Conservatism is defined by Wilson (1973) as “resistance to change and the tendency to 
prefer safe, traditional, and conventional forms of institutions and behavior.” Since the early 
1950s, political conservatism has been studied by political scientists (e.g., Huntington (1957)); 
Historians (Kolko (1963)); Sociologists (Lo and Schwartz (1998)); Philosophers (Eagleton 
(1991)), among others. Throughout these decades of research, several theoretical frameworks 
have emerged to explain the psychology of politically conservative individuals (Jost et al. 
(2003)). First, Personality theories associate political conservatism with authoritarianism and 
intolerance of ambiguity (Peterson, Doty, and Winter (1993)). Second, Epistemic and 
Existential need theories postulate that conservatives have a higher need for closure, desire for 
security and stability, and preference for threat and change avoidance (Jost, Kruglanski, and 
Simon (1999); Higgins (1997)). Lastly, sociopolitical theories argue that conservatives have a 
higher preference for social dominance and system justification (Sidanius and Pratto (1999)). 
These theories have interesting implications with regard to conservative CEOs’ 
attitudes towards transparency and management earnings forecast. On the one hand, by 
definition, individuals with a high need for closure do not have a high preference for 
information disclosure. Further, when it is not met by actual earnings, MEF can increase the 
 
10 Management earnings forecasts are defined as voluntary managerial dislosures predicting earnings prior to the 
actual earnings reporting date (King, Pownall, and Waymire (1990)). 
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possibility of litigation (Francis, Philbrick, and Schipper (1994)) as well as CEO turnover 
(Healy and Palepu (2001); Lee, Matsunaga, and Park (2012)). Consequently, transparency and 
high-quality disclosure can represent a threat to individuals with authoritarian personalities. As 
a result, the authoritarian nature and need for closure of politically conservative CEOs can 
foster their tendency to seize on information (Jost et al. (2003)). We refer to this effect as the 
Authoritarian effect.  
On the other hand, prior research shows that high-quality MEF has several significant 
benefits to firms as well as CEOs. At the firm-level, high-quality MEF increases the firm value 
and reduces firm risk (Trueman (1986); Foerster, Sapp, and Shi (2010)), information 
asymmetry (Coller and Yohn (1997); Verrecchia (2001)), cost of capital (Leuz and Verrecchia 
(2000)), share price volatility (Graham et al. (2005); Billings, Jennings, and Lev (2015)), and 
the likelihood of litigation (Skinner (1994), (1997)). At a CEO level, high-quality MEF 
enhances managers’ reputation (Graham et al. (2005)) and reduces career penalties in the form 
of bonus cuts, fewer stock grants, and forced turnover (Brochet, Faurel, and McVay (2011); 
Mergenthaler, Rajgopal, and Srinivasan (2012); Lee et al. (2012)). As a result, the ambiguity 
intolerance, desire for security (including job and financial security), and preference for threat 
avoidance of politically conservative CEOs can lead them to adopt a more transparent and 
higher quality disclosure policies. We refer to this effect as the precautionary effect.  
Hence, Republican CEOs' attitude towards MEF is determined by their perceived (1) 
benefits achieved by satisfying their authoritarian needs through seizing on information, and 
(2) losses prevented by precautionary adopting high-quality disclosure policies. Political 
conservatives have always been described by personality theoreticians (see for example 
(Adorno et al. (1950); Altemeyer (1998)) as more sensitive to the threat of loss and are 
generally more motivated by negatively framed outcomes (potential losses) than by positively 
framed outcomes (potential gains) (Jost et al. (2003)). Consequently, we expect Republican 
CEOs to be more motivated by the Precautionary effect than by the Authoritarian effect, 
leading them to adopt more transparent disclosure policies. 
Conservative CEOs' preference for more transparent MEF was apparent when Hewlett 
Packard’s (HP) Democrat CEO Lewis E. Platt was succeeded by the renowned Republican 
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Carly Fiorina in 1999. HP’s management earnings forecast experienced a drastic change upon 
this move from a Democrat to a Republican CEO. Specifically, while Mr. Platt had an average 
forecast issue, frequency, and accuracy of 0.143, 1.00, and 1.00, respectively, Mrs. Fiorina had 
significantly higher forecast issue, frequency, and accuracy of 0.60, 3.33 and 2.43, respectively. 
In this paper, we present evidence that HP is not a unique example; instead, it is just the tip of 
the iceberg. 
Following Hutton et al. (2014), among others, we use CEOs’ personal political 
donations to a candidate or a party committee to measure their political ideology.11 Using a 
sample covering the period 1993-2016, we examine the effect of CEO political ideology on (I) 
a manager’s preference for forecast issuance and frequency, (II) a manager’s preference for 
forecast horizon and range, (III) MEF credibility including forecast bias and accuracy, the 
likelihood of missing their own forecasts, and the likelihood of releasing bad news vs. good 
news, and (IV) MEF surprises (the likelihood of having positive, negative, or neutral earnings 
surprise).  
First, we test the effect of CEO political ideology on the likelihood and frequency of 
MEF. We find that, on average, Republican CEOs are approximately 13 percent more likely to 
issue forecasts than non-Republican CEOs. Moreover, on average, Republican CEOs disclose 
16.5 percent more forecasts compared to non-Republican CEOs. Second, we test the effect of 
CEOs' political ideology on the earnings forecasts horizon and forecast range. Prior studies 
argue that point forecasts require greater managerial certainty compared to range forecasts 
(Hughes and Pae (2004)). Similarly, Hribar and Yang (2016) find a negative relationship 
between managers' overconfidence and the width of the range forecasts. Our results indicate 
that Republican CEOs are more likely to issue range forecasts and issue forecasts in a timely 
fashion, which is consistent with their conservative nature (Hutton et al. (2014)). For instance, 
Republican CEOs issue 12.7 percent more range estimates than non-Republican CEOs. 
Further, Republican CEOs have an average forecast horizon that is approximately 11 percent 
longer than that of non-Republican CEOs. 
 
11 See, for example, Hong and Kostovetsky (2012), Francis et al. (2016), Elnahas and Kim (2017), and 
Bhandari, Golden, and Thevenot (2018). 
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Third, we test the effect of CEO political ideology on the credibility of management 
earnings forecasts. We find that Republican CEOs are less likely to miss their own forecasts 
and have a lower degree of forecasting bias. For instance, on average, Republican CEOs are 
14.3 percent less likely to issue optimistically biased forecasts and 14.2 percent less likely to 
miss forecasts in any given year as compared to other CEOs. Moreover, we find a positive 
relation between CEO Republican ideology and forecast accuracy. For instance, forecasts made 
by Republican CEOs are, on average, 8.7 percent more accurate than those made by CEOs with 
other political ideologies. Skinner (1994) argues that managers disclose bad news forecasts to 
deter future litigation. Moreover, Field, Lowry, and Shu (2005) rule out the alternative 
possibility that preemptive bad-news forecasts may trigger litigation. Hutton, Jiang, and Kumar 
(2015) find that Republican managers are less likely to be the subject of litigation related to 
securities fraud. Our results show that Republican CEOs are more likely to disclose bad news 
forecasts than good news forecasts. Lastly, we test the effect of CEO political ideology on 
earnings surprises. Skinner and Sloan (2002) argue that small negative earnings surprises could 
cause a significant stock price decline, whereas (Bartov, Givoly, and Hayn (2002); Kasznik 
and McNichols (2002)) document that stock price increases significantly due to a small positive 
earnings surprise. Our evidence shows that firms with Republican CEOs are more likely to 
have positive earnings surprises than negative earnings surprises. Our results are robust to 
controlling for other determinants of MEF, and overall, provide evidence that Republican 
CEOs are more likely to disseminate private information and have a higher preference for a 
low information asymmetry environment.  
We conduct several tests to address the endogeneity concern in our baseline results. 
First, we use the propensity score matching technique and the difference-in-difference (DID) 
regression around CEO turnover events to address the possibility that certain types of firms 
and industries hire CEOs with a similar political ideology to implement their desired corporate 
policies. Second, we address the possibility that our baseline results are affected by omitting 
CEO characteristics, incentives, and overconfidence. Specifically, we control for a CEO pay-
performance sensitivity (Delta) and CEO risk-taking incentive (Vega), CEO tenure, role 
duality, CEO age, and CEO overconfidence based on the moneyness of a CEO vested options. 
Third, to address the possible error in measurement bias in our baseline measures of CEO 
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political ideology (which follow Bhandari et al. (2018); Hong and Kostovetsky (2012)), we 
construct alternative measures of CEO political ideology similar to Hutton et al. (2014) and 
Elnahas and Kim (2017).  
In order to directly test our conjecture that Republican CEOs favor higher quality MEF 
to avoid litigation and other disciplinary actions (The Precautionary effect), we conduct cross-
section tests using subsamples of firms with high and low levels of institutional ownership and 
litigation risk. The results of these tests lend strong support to our precautionary explanation. 
For example, Republican CEOs are 17.7% more likely to issue forecasts than non-Republican 
CEOs in firms with a high level of institutional ownership, while they are only 9.7% more 
likely to do so in firms with a low level of institutional ownership. Similarly, the accuracy of 
forecasts of Republican CEOs is 20.6% higher than that of non-Republican CEOs in firms with 
a high level of litigation risk, while it is only 5.4% higher in firms with a low level of litigation 
risk.  
We perform a battery of additional robustness tests. For example, we find support for 
our main findings when using political ideology measures for Democratic CEOs. To address 
the coverage issue of the guidance database, we exclude firms that have never issued earnings 
forecasts during our sample period and find similar results to our baseline regression.12 Further, 
we test the robustness of our results to the use of several alternative measures of CEO political 
ideology based on an election year, cycle, and CEO tenure. Following Malmendier and Tate 
(2005); Campbell et al. (2011), we also control for Net_buyer as an alternative measure of CEO 
overconfidence. We also run multiple subsample tests that exclude CEOs who never donated 
during the sampler period, include firm-years with the CEO's donation years only, and exclude 
CEO turnover years and first three years of CEO tenure.13  
This study makes several contributions to the literature. In a broader sense, it 
contributes to the literature on the effect of cultural aspects on corporate decision making (e.g., 
 
12 Furthermore, we run a robustness test by including only firm-year observations in which a firm issues guidance 
and find support for our main findings. These results are available in the internet appendix.  
13 We exclude CEO turnover years and the first three years of CEO tenure to address the possibility that forecast 
issued during the CEO turnover years could be biased or inaccurate or a new CEO might require some time to 
imprint her/his ideology into corporate policy choices. These robustness tests are available in the internet 
appendix. 
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Han et al. (2010); Kanagaretnam, Lim, and Lobo (2011); Li et al. (2013); Ahern, Daminelli, 
and Fracassi (2015); Boubakri and Saffar (2016)). More specifically, it contributes to the recent 
stream of research which investigates the effect of CEO political ideology on a firm’s policy 
choices. Prior studies in this arena mostly focus on firms' investment and financial policies. For 
instance, Hutton et al. (2014) find that Republican managers pursue more conservative 
corporate policies such as lower debt, lower R&D expenditures, and less risky investment 
policies. Similarly, Elnahas and Kim (2017) find that Republican CEOs are less likely to 
engage in M&A activities and avoid diversification. Francis et al. (2016) find that Republican 
managers are less likely to engage in corporate tax avoidance. Hong and Kostovetsky (2012) 
find that mutual fund managers who make political donations to Democrats are less likely to 
invest in socially irresponsible firms. Studying the impact of CEO political ideology on MEF 
is subject to less confounding effects because, unlike investment and financial policies which 
can be persistent and thus have lower managerial discretion (Fee et al. (2013)), MEF is 
voluntary and is subject to a higher degree of managerial discretion (e.g., King et al. (1990); 
Houston et al. (2010); Cheng et al. (2013)). Thus, MEF is possibly a cleaner context to 
investigate how CEOs' personality traits translate into their corporate decision-making process. 
Further, this study contributes to the literature on understanding the determinants of 
MEF and the association between CEO personal characteristics and MEF. Hribar and Yang 
(2016) find that CEO overconfidence increases forecast issuance and optimism and reduce 
forecast precision. Similarly, Bamber, Jiang, and Wang (2010) find that managers with finance 
and accounting background and those with military experience show conservative earnings 
forecasts and prefer a more precise disclosure style. Further, Jiang, Kumar, and Law (2016) 
find that conservative analysts issue more frequent and accurate forecasts and produce better 
quality research. Our study extends this literature and presents evidence that Republican CEOs 
reduce information asymmetry through issuing more frequent, more accurate, and less biased 
forecasts.  
 The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on 
behavioral consistency, CEO political ideology, and management earnings forecasts. Section 
3 describes our data and the construction of our measures of CEO political ideology. Section 4 
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presents the empirical results and discusses their interpretation. Section 5 reports the robustness 
tests, and section 6 presents the concluding remarks. 
2. Literature review 
 Researchers in sociology and behavior psychology have studied the implications of 
the behavioral consistency theory, which argues that people behave consistently across 
different domains. For example, Epstein (1979); Funder and Colvin (1991); Sherman, Nave, 
and Funder (2010) argue that individuals show consistent behavioral patterns across different 
areas. More recently, researchers in financial economics investigate whether the behavioral 
consistency theory can help understand various corporate decisions. For instance, Cronqvist, 
Makhija, and Yonker (2012) find consistent patterns between a firm’s leverage choice and 
the CEO's personal leverage choice. Similarly, Chyz (2013) argues that executives’ 
propensity for personal tax evasion is positively related to corporate tax sheltering. 
Biggerstaff, Cicero, and Puckett (2015) find that CEOs who are personally benefiting from 
options backdating are more engaged in corporate misconduct.  
Prior literature also suggests that CEOs' personal conservatism and risk-taking 
behavior are reflected in corporate decision-making. For instance, Graham, Harvey, and Puri 
(2013) show that CEOs' optimism and risk-aversion affect their firms’ financial policies. 
Further, Benmelech and Frydman (2015) show that military CEOs are more conservative and 
behave more ethically. Similarly, Cain and McKeon (2016) argue that pilot CEOs are 
associated with higher equity return volatility, higher leverage, and higher acquisition 
activity. Davidson, Dey, and Smith (2015) also find that CEOs’ off-the-job behavior is 
positively related to their corporate behavior. In sum, managers' personality traits remain 
consistent across different domains and consequently influence their corporate policy choices. 
Recently, research in corporate finance paid particular attention to understanding managers’ 
political ideology and its possible impact on their corporate decisions. 
2.1. Political ideology, personality traits, and corporate policies 
The significant attention that researchers in corporate finance pay to CEO political 
ideology is possibly because, unlike other personal traits, a person’s political orientation tends 
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to be stable and consistent over time.14 For example, Alford, Funk, and Hibbing (2005) and 
Hatemi et al. (2009) argue that genes play a crucial role in shaping political attitudes and 
ideologies, and the strength of an individual’s party identification.15 More importantly, Green 
et al. (2004) and Jost and Amodio (2012) argue that political ideology is established in early 
adulthood and becomes relatively consistent over time.  
Another possible explanation of the attention paid by researchers in corporate finance 
to the use of CEO political ideology is the increasing polarization of the political environment 
in the U.S. 16 For example, Bobbio (1996); Evans (2003); Abramowitz and Saunders (2005, 
2008) argue that American politics became more polarized over time. This political 
environment has triggered several studies aiming at understanding the differences between 
the two dominating political orientations in the U.S., namely Republicans and Democrats. 
Those studies find stark ideological and psychological differences between liberals and 
conservatives. For instance, Conover and Feldman (1981) argue that the main difference 
between these two political ideologies is the degree of openness to change. Similarly, Gillies 
and Campbell (1985); McAllister and Anderson (1991); Jost et al. (2003) argue that 
conservatives avoid ambiguity, uncertainty, and complexity. Further, Wilson (1973); 
Glasgow, Cartier, and Wilson (1985) show that conservatives seek familiarity, safety, and are 
more resistant to change.17 Other studies also show that conservatives prefer to punish 
violators of social norms and prevent free riders (Skitka and Tetlock (1993)), value job 
security rather than task variety (Atieh, Brief, and Vollrath (1987)), fear loses and value 
financial security (Jost et al. (2003)), value property rights, and show more respect for 
authority and preference for preserving the status quo (e.g., McClosky and Zaller (1984); 
Murtha and Lenway (1994); Roe (2003); Detomasi (2008)). 
Several recent studies investigate whether the above personality differences between 
conservatives and liberals translate into their firms’ corporate decisions. For instance, studies 
 
14 If political ideology was shaped by social attributes and was subject to changes over time, then studying the 
translation of political ideologies into corporate policy choices will be potentially troublesome. 
15 Similarly, Bouchard Jr, and McGue (2003) argue that virtually all individual’s psychological differences are 
moderate to substantially heritable. 
16 literature often substitute “liberalism” and “conservatism” for “liberal” and “conservative” or “left” and “right” 
or “democratic” and “republican”. 
17 Similar results are reported by Kam and Simas (2010) who show that conservatives have higher degree of risk 
aversion. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3637608
11 
 
show that Republican managers prefer less risky investment and financial policies, are less 
likely to engage in mergers and acquisitions, avoid high information asymmetry acquisitions, 
and are less likely to engage in corporate tax avoidance (Hutton et al. (2014); Francis et al. 
(2016); Elnahas and Kim (2017)). In contrast, Democratic managers are more likely to invest 
in corporate social responsibility (CSR) and less likely to invest in socially irresponsible firms 
(Hong and Kostovetsky (2012); Di Giuli and Kostovetsky (2014)). Furthermore, Hutton et al. 
(2015) find that Democratic managers are more likely to face litigation on securities fraud 
and intellectual property rights violations, whereas Republican managers are more likely to 
face civil rights, labor, and environmental litigation.18 Lastly, Lee, Jeon, and Seok (2018) 
argue that Republican CEOs hold more outside directorship regardless of the political regime, 
whereas Borghesi and Chang (2018) argue that Democratic CEOs accept less compensation 
than Republican CEOs.  
The abovementioned body of the literature investigates the association between CEO 
political ideology and firm investment and financial policies. Although CEOs certainly have 
a significant impact on firms' investment and financial policies, they do not have full 
autonomy over such policies due to several organizational considerations. For instance, Fee 
et al. (2013) argue that firms' investment and financing decisions are persistent and more 
likely to be determined by a firm’s past policies and firm culture and, thus, are subject to a 
low degree of managerial discretion. Moreover, investment and financial policies that largely 
deviate from value maximization are usually challenged by the market for corporate control.  
In contrast, management earnings forecasts are voluntary, and managers have 
substantial autonomy on whether, when, and how to issue earnings forecasts (King et al. 
(1990); Cheng et al. (2013)). For instance, managers can temporarily stop issuing earnings 
forecasts if they fail to meet analysts’ forecasts, and resume issuance when they feel confident 
about meeting analyst forecasts (Houston et al. (2010)). Similarly, managers increase 
disclosure and bad news forecast before insider purchase and equity offerings, strategically 
 
18 Political ideology may affect decisions of other decision makers too. For example, Jiang et al. (2016) argue that 
conservative analysts produce more accurate earnings forecast, issue more frequent forecast updates, are less 
likely to deviate from benchmarks, and produce better quality research. Furthermore, Gupta and Wowak (2017) 
show that conservative boards pay CEOs more and emphasize more on firms’ recent performance when design 
CEOs' compensation. 
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choose forecast precision, voluntarily disclose bad news forecasts, and tactically avoid 
negative earnings surprises (Skinner (1994); Lang and Lundholm (2000); Matsumoto (2002);  
Cheng and Lo (2006); Cheng et al. (2013)). Thus, the management earnings forecast provides 
an ideal setting to test how managers' personality traits affect corporate policies. Republican 
(Democratic) CEOs might be faced with several limitations in infusing their conservative 
(liberal) ideologies into their firms' investment and financial policies, and thus they have a 
better avenue to exercise their personal political preferences in voluntary disclosure decisions. 
2.2. Management Earnings Forecast 
The extant literature highlights several firm-level and CEO-level characteristics as the 
main determinants of the likelihood of issuance and the properties of management earnings 
forecast. At the firm level, researchers show that MEF depends on firms' legal and regulatory 
environment, investor demand, firm-specific litigation risk, volatility, and managerial 
incentives. For instance, investors tend to prefer investing in firms that have better disclosure 
policies and lower information asymmetry because such firms enjoy higher liquidity, lower 
cost of capital, and lower agency problems (e.g., Diamond and Verrecchia (1991); Leuz and 
Verrecchia (2000); Verrecchia (2001); Ajinkya et al. (2005)). Moreover, firms with higher 
R&D expenditures are less likely to issue forecasts (Rogers and Stocken (2005); Wang 
(2007)). Similarly, firms with higher volatility issues forecast less often, whereas more 
profitable firms issue forecasts more frequently (Waymire (1985); Miller (2002)). Waymire 
(1985) argues that firms with more volatile earnings issue forecast later in the year, thus 
forecast timeliness also reflects firms' earnings variability. Skinner (1994, 1997) argue that 
firms voluntarily disclose bad news forecast to avoid subsequent litigation. Similarly, firms 
with higher ex-ante litigation risk and bad news are more likely to issue forecasts (Cao and 
Narayanamoorthy (2011); Houston et al. (2019)). 
At the CEO level, researchers show that MEF is affected by a CEO’s compensation 
design, ability, overconfidence, and career concern. For example, Aboody and Kasznik 
(2000) argue that CEOs opportunistically time voluntary disclosure to maximize the value of 
their stock options compensation. Similarly, Nagar, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003) find that 
stock-based incentives increase management earnings forecast frequency and reduce 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3637608
13 
 
disclosure agency problems.  Moreover, Baginski et al. (2018) argue that managers' severance 
pay and stock options portfolio increase their earnings forecast accuracy. Baik, Farber, and 
Lee (2011) find that CEO ability is positively associated with the forecast issue, frequency, 
and forecast accuracy. Further, Hribar and Yang (2016) argue that CEO overconfidence 
increases forecast issuance and optimism and more likely to miss their own forecast 
subsequently. Similarly, Hughes and Pae (2004); Hribar and Yang (2016) argue that point 
forecasts reflect greater managerial certainty compared to range forecasts and reflect 
managerial overconfidence.   
Prior literature also recognizes the role that a CEO’s career concern can play in 
shaping MEF. Pae, Song, and Yi (2016) find that CEOs with more significant career concerns 
are more likely to provide downward earnings guidance and less likely to beat market 
expectations. Similarly, manager’s career penalties such as bonus cuts, fewer stock grants, 
and forced turnover can affect their earnings forecasts decisions (Brochet et al. (2011); 
Mergenthaler et al. (2012)). Moreover, Lee et al. (2012) find a positive relation between CEO 
turnover and management earnings forecasts errors. Prior studies also find associations 
between management earnings forecast and board structure, ownership, outside director’s 
equity compensation, CEO integrity, and CEO centrality (Donnelly and Mulcahy (2008); 
Mande and Son (2012); Jia (2013); Kim et al. (2019)). 
Due to the high level of autonomy that CEOs have over voluntary disclosure, we 
expect disclosure to be significantly affected by the CEO's personal preferences. Our earlier 
discussion shows that conservative individuals (Republicans) have less tolerance for 
ambiguity, uncertainty, and complexity, value job security, and have a higher fear of losses. 
These traits suggest that Republican CEOs would be more likely to disseminate precise and 
unbiased information. We expect conservative CEOs to utilize management earnings 
forecasts as a mechanism to alter investors' earnings expectations, reduce future litigation 
concerns, and establish their reputation with regard to transparent and accurate reporting. \ 
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3. Data and Sample Selection 
3.1. Data 
We start with an initial sample of CEOs from the Compustat Executive Compensation 
(ExecuComp) database that covers firms in the S&P 1500 index from 1993 to 2016. We 
exclude financial firms (SIC between 6000 and 6999) and firms in the utility industry (SIC 
between 4900 and 4999). Then, we merge CEOs' data with their individual donations data 
obtained from the Federal Election Commission (FEC). The FEC publishes several types of 
files to identify donors of political contribution amounts exceeding $200. The individual’s 
contribution files contain information on the contributor’s name, city, state, zip code, 
employer, and occupation, as well as transaction date, amount, and unique committee ID. The 
committee files contain a committee ID, name, type, party affiliation, city, state, zip code, 
and candidate ID.19  
CEOs and other corporate managers can contribute to the political parties through 
their company’s Political Action Committees (PACs), or directly by making individual 
contributions. Since PACs can contribute to multiple parties simultaneously (Cooper, Gulen, 
and Ovtchinnikov (2010)), we focus on individual political contributions to a candidate or a 
party committee for measuring a CEO’s political ideology. We identify the political 
contribution of CEOs using their contributions to Republican and Democratic-affiliated 
Senate, House, presidential candidates, and political party committees.20 To identify a CEO’s 
contribution to a political party, we link contributor’s name, occupation, employer, and 
transaction date provided by the FEC with the executive’s name, company name, and fiscal 
year from the ExecuComp database.  
Our management earnings per share (EPS) forecasts data comes from I/B/E/S. We 
obtain actual earnings data from the I/B/E/S actuals file to ensure consistency between 
 
19 A committee is formed by a candidate or a political party to collect funds and contributions from individuals. 
20 Details of the campaign contribution data are available at the Federal Election Commission (FEC)- 
https://www.fec.gov//. We focus on the CEOs individual level campaign contribution rather than at the firm level 
for two reasons: (1) firms may contribute to exploit the political favors to maximize shareholders’ benefits (Blau, 
Brough, and Thomas (2013)) whereas individuals’ contributions mainly reflect their personal political preference 
(2) to exploit political benefits, firms typically contribute to both parties and/or their contribution may vary 
depending on the congress majority in each election cycle, whereas individuals’ contributions mostly remain 
consistent across election cycles and they are mostly directed toward only one party. 
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management earnings forecasts and EPS realization. Following Baik et al. (2011); Lee et al. 
(2012); Hribar and Yang (2016), we exclude qualitative forecasts since we do not have a well-
defined criterion to identify whether such forecasts were missed. We also exclude earnings 
preannouncements (i.e., management forecasts that are issued after the fiscal year-end but 
before the actual earnings announcements (Skinner (1997); Ajinkya et al. (2005); Rogers and 
Stocken (2005); Houston et al. (2019)). Following prior literature, we restrict our analyses to 
the annual EPS forecasts (Baik et al. (2011); Hribar and Yang (2016)). 
Lastly, we acquire data on firm-level characteristics from Compustat, stock return data 
from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), and institutional ownership data from 
the Thomson-Reuters Institutional Holdings (13F). Combining these datasets results in a final 
sample of 33,951 unique firm-year observations for the period 1993-2016. 
3.2. Measures of CEO Political Ideology 
The recent literature that investigates the association between CEO political ideology 
and corporate decisions provides varying measures for a CEO’s political ideology.21 We 
follow Bhandari et al. (2018) in constructing our first measure of a CEO’s political ideology, 
Rep_dum, which is an indicator variable that equals one if a CEO donated more to the 
Republican party than to the Democratic party during her/his entire tenure, and zero 
otherwise. This is a long-term and robust measure of a CEO’s political ideology since it 
considers the total contribution of her/his entire tenure. Our second measure of CEO political 
ideology, Rep_Index is similar to that in Hong and Kostovetsky (2012) and is calculated as 
the percentage of a CEO’s support for the Republican Party calculated as the number of cycles 
in which a CEO donates exclusively to the Republican party divided by her/his number of 
donation cycles in the sample period. This measure is based on the two-year election cycle, 
and a higher percentage shows strong Republican affiliation. 
To mitigate the noise and biases in specific measures of CEO political ideology and 
to guarantee the comparability of our measures and those employed in the prior literature, we 
conduct a battery of robustness checks using several additional measures of CEO political 
 
21 See, for example, Hong and Kostovetsky (2012); Hutton et al. (2014); Unsal, Hassan, and Zirek (2016); Francis 
et al. (2016); Elnahas and Kim (2017); Bhandari et al. (2018). 
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ideology. For example, following Hutton et al. (2014), we use Rep_dumcycle, which is an 
indicator variable that equals one if all donations of a CEO in an election cycle are directed 
to the Republican Party (nothing to Democratic) and 0 otherwise and Rep_indexcycle, which is 
an index calculated as total donations to the Republican party minus total donations to the 
Democratic party divided by total donations to both parties in each election cycle. Further, 
following Elnahas and Kim (2017), we use Rep_dumtenure, which is an indicator variable that 
equals one if all donations of a CEO during her/his entire tenure are directed to the Republican 
Party, and 0 otherwise. Lastly, we check the robustness of our results to the use of two 
different measures of Democratic Party affiliation; Dem_dum, which is an indicator variable 
that equals one if a CEO donated more to the Democratic party than to the Republican party 
during her/his entire tenure, and zero otherwise; and Dem_Index, which is the percentage of 
a CEO’s support for the Democratic Party calculated as the number of cycles in which a CEO 
donates exclusively to the Democratic party divided by her/his number of donation cycles in 
the sample period.22 
3.3. Measures of Voluntary Disclosure 
Following prior literature, we estimate several variables that capture the likelihood as 
well as different properties of management earnings forecast (MEF). First, to estimate the 
likelihood of MEF, we use Issue which is an indicator variable that equals one if a firm makes 
at least one annual earnings forecast in a fiscal year, and zero otherwise, and Frequency which 
is the total number of annual earnings forecasts made by a firm in a fiscal year (Ajinkya et al. 
(2005); Baik et al. (2011); Houston et al. (2019)). Second, to measure the timeliness of forecast 
issuance, we use Ln(Horizon) which is the natural logarithm of one plus the average horizon 
of annual earnings forecasts made by a firm in a fiscal year (Baik et al. (2011); Houston et al. 
(2019)). To measure the likelihood of issuing range instead of point forecasts, we use Range, 
which is an indicator variable of range estimates (Hribar and Yang (2016)). Forecast_Miss is 
an indicator variable that equals one if a firm misses at least one forecast in a year and zero 
otherwise (Hribar and Yang (2016)). OptBias is an indicator variable that equals one if the 
 
22 A detailed description of these variables is available on Appendix A. Further, in addition to the measures of 
CEO political ideology reported in the paper, our internet appendix report results using additional measures of 
Republican Party affiliation, Democratic Party affiliation, and political neutrality.  
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average Bias in a year is positive and zero otherwise (Ajinkya et al. (2005)). Accuracy is the 
average Forecast accuracy for all annual earnings forecasts made by a firm in a fiscal year 
(Houston et al. (2019)). Next, we measure the nature of the news in MEF. Bad_News is an 
indicator variable that equals one if forecast news is negative and 0 otherwise. Good_News is 
an indicator variable equals to one if forecast news is non-negative, and zero otherwise (Rogers 
and Stocken (2005); Rogers and Van Buskirk (2013); Hilary, Hsu, and Wang (2014)). Lastly, 
we measure the direction of the earnings surprise. Positive_Surprise is an indicator variable 
that equals one if an earnings surprise is greater than 0.0001, and zero otherwise. 
Negative_Surprise is an indicator variable that equals one if an earnings surprise is less than -
0.0001, and zero otherwise. Neutral_Surprise is an indicator variable that equals one if an 
earnings surprise is between 0.0001 and -0.0001 and 0 otherwise (Rogers and Van Buskirk 
(2013)).23 Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for our measures of CEO political ideology, 
measures of MEF, and the control variables used in our baseline models. 
[Please insert Table 1 here] 
Statistics reported in Table 1 show that the mean value of Rep_Dum is 0.229, indicating 
that around 23 percent of CEOs make more contributions to the Republican party than to the 
Democratic party during their entire tenure. The mean value of Rep_Index is 0.169, indicating 
that in around 17 percent of cycles, CEOs exclusively donate to the Republican party. These 
statistics are consistent with those reported by Bhandari et al. (2018); Hutton et al. (2014); 
Hong and Kostovetsky (2012). The mean value of Issue is 0.35 which indicates that, on 
average, firms have a 35 percent likelihood of issuing at least one annual earnings forecast in 
a fiscal year whereas the mean value of Frequency is 1.55 which indicates that, on average, 
firms issue approximately 1.55 forecasts each fiscal year. The mean values of Issue and 
Frequency are comparable with (Baik et al. (2011); Hribar and Yang (2016); Houston et al. 
(2019)). The mean value of Ln(Horizon) is 1.83 which means, on average, firms in our sample 
announce their earnings forecasts 68 days prior to the forecast period end date and the mean 
values of forecasts accuracy is 1.04 which are comparable with (Houston et al. (2019)).24 Firms 
 
23 A more detailed description of the calculation of these variables is on the appendix. 
24 The mean value of horizon (in terms of days) is 68 days.  
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in our sample, on average, have a 19% probability of missing at least one earnings forecast, 
and 14.3% of sample firms in our sample issue optimistically biased forecasts. On average, 
53%, 36.8%, and 10.2% of sample firms issue Positive_Surprise, Negative_Surprise, and 
Neutral_Surprise, respectively, which is consistent with Rogers and Van Buskirk (2013). 
Further, statistics in Table 1 shows that, on average, institutional investors own about 54.2% 
of outstanding shares, 24% of firms are subject to increased litigation, and 20.3% of firms have 
issued equity in a year.25 We present Pearson correlation coefficients in Table 2. 
 [Please insert Table 2 here] 
Statistics in Table 2 show a positive correlation between measures of Republican 
ideology and measures of the likelihood of MEF (Issue and Frequency), indicates that 
Republican CEOs are more likely to share information with the market compared to non-
Republican CEOs. Similarly, there is a positive correlation between measures of Republican 
ideology and Accuracy, indicating that Republican CEOs make more accurate forecasts. 
Further, there is a negative correlation between Republican ideology measures on the one hand 
and Forecast_Miss and OptBias, on the other hand, indicating that Republican CEOs are less 
likely to miss earnings forecasts and make less biased forecasts, respectively. Consistent with 
prior research, Republican ideology is negatively correlated with RD and Volatility and 
positively correlated with ROA (Hutton et al. (2014)). Further, we report a positive correlation 
between firm size and Issue, Frequency, Ln(Horizon), and Accuracy on the one hand, and a 
negative correlation between firm size and Forecast_Miss and OptBias on the other hand. 
These correlations are consistent with the idea that larger firms issue more forecasts, have more 
forecast accuracy, and have less forecasting biases ((Kasznik and Lev (1995); Ajinkya et al. 




25 The mean values of firm characteristics are comparable with prior studies. See, for example, (Kasznik and Lev 
(1995); Lang and Lundholm (1996); Bamber and Cheon (1998); Kasznik (1999); Rogers and Stocken (2005); 
Ajinkya et al. (2005); Baik et al. (2011); Hutton, Lee, and Shu (2012); Hribar and Yang (2016) Houston et al. 
(2019)).  
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4. Analysis and results 
4.1. Baseline regression model 
To formally test the association between CEO political ideology and management 
earnings forecasts, we estimate the following regression model: 
𝑀𝐸𝐹𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖𝑡 + Ɛ𝑖𝑡 (1)
 
where 𝑀𝐸𝐹𝑖𝑡 is the management earnings forecast likelihood and properties for firm i 
in year t, 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑛 is the measures of a CEO’s Republican ideology. In estimating equation 
(1), we use our main proxies for CEO Republican ideology, Rep_dum, and Rep_Index.
26 γ is a 
vector of control variables. In all our models, we include a set of dummy variables to capture 
year and industry fixed effects to control for time-varying unobservable industry characteristics 
and robust standard errors to control for unobserved heterogeneity that is not captured by 
control variables. Following the MEF literature, we control for firm size (Ln(assets)) since 
prior research finds a positive relation between firm size and management earnings forecasts 
(Kasznik and Lev (1995); Lang and Lundholm (1996); Ajinkya et al. (2005)). We control for 
market-to-book ratio (MB) to capture the impact of growth and proprietary costs on MEF 
(Bamber and Cheon (1998); Ajinkya et al. (2005)). We also control for Leverage because 
higher debt potentially improves a firm’s information environment due to the scrutiny and 
monitoring by debt holders (Hutton et al. (2012); Houston et al. (2019)). Our model also 
controls for the intensity of investment in research and development (RD) because R&D 
intensive firms operate in an uncertain environment with high proprietary costs and information 
asymmetry, predicting a negative association between voluntary disclosures and R&D 
investment (Kasznik (1999); Jones (2007)). Further, we control for return on assets (ROA) 
because firms with poor performance are less likely to issue forecasts (Miller (2002); Barua, 
Legoria, and Moffitt (2006)), volatility because prior studies find a negative relation between 
the level of volatility and management earnings forecasts due to higher inherent uncertainty 
(Waymire (1985); Hui, Matsunaga, and Morse (2009); Houston et al. (2019)). We also control 
for analyst following, Ln(Analyst) because prior research finds a positive relationship between 
 
26 We use an OLS regression model for continuous earnings forecasts measures and a logit regression model for 
binary earnings forecasts measures. 
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the number of analysts following a firm and MEF (Lang and Lundholm (1996); Baginski and 
Hassell (1997); Ajinkya et al. (2005); Gu and Wang (2005)), institutional ownership 
(Instit_Own) because institutional owners demand more information and can also improve the 
accuracy and precision of forecasts (Ajinkya et al. (2005)), Litigation because prior research 
finds a negative relation between the likelihood of litigation and MEF that is made in good 
faith (Francis et al. (1994); Matsumoto (2002); Frankel, Johnson, and Nelson (2002)). We 
control for News because prior studies find a negative association between the sign of earnings 
change and MEF (Baginski, Hassell, and Kimbrough (2002); Rogers, Skinner, and Van 
Buskirk (2009)). A potential explanation is that firms are more likely to issue bad news 
forecasts than good news forecasts to deter future litigation (Skinner (1994)). We control for 
Equity_Issue and Acquisition since firms may provide biased disclosure to reduce information 
asymmetry when undergoing significant events, such as mergers and acquisitions or accessing 
capital markets (Hribar and Yang (2016)). Lastly, we control for Industry_Conc because firms 
in highly competitive industries may issue more pessimistic forecasts specifically when 
investors have difficulty identifying the forecast bias (Bamber and Cheon (1998); Rogers and 
Stocken (2005); Hutton et al. (2012)).  
 4.2. CEO political ideology and the likelihood and frequency of MEF 
In this section, we test our first conjecture that firms with Republican CEOs issue more 
earnings forecasts than firms with non-Republican CEOs. Table 3 presents the results of the 
association between CEO political ideology and the likelihood and frequency of management 
earnings forecasts. 
[Please insert Table 3 here] 
 Models (1) and (2) in Table 3 present results of the logistic regression models at which 
the dependent variable is the likelihood of MEF (Issue), while models (3) and (4) present results 
of the OLS regression models at which the dependent variable is the frequency of MEF 
(Frequency). CEO Republican ideology is measured using Rep_Dum and Rep_Index in models 
(1) and (3), and (2) and (4), respectively. Coefficient estimates of the Republican ideology 
measures in the models of the determinants of Issue (models (1) and (2)) are consistent with 
our conjecture. There is a positive and statistically significant association between CEO 
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Republican ideology and the likelihood of MEF. For instance, the coefficient estimates of 
Rep_Dum in the model (1) is 0.128, indicating that Republican CEOs are around 13% more 
likely to issue earnings forecast at any given year as compared to non-Republican CEOs. Our 
results also report a positive association between CEO Republican ideology and the frequency 
of MEF. For instance, the coefficient estimates of Rep_Dum in the model (3) is 0.165, 
indicating that Republican CEOs disclose 16.5 percent more forecasts compared to non-
Republican CEOs. Similar results are reported using our alternative measure of CEO 
Republican ideology (Rep_Index) in models (2) and (4).  
The coefficient estimates of other determinants of MEF likelihood and frequency are 
largely consistent with prior literature. For instance, our results report a positive association 
between firm size (Ln(assets) and the frequency of MEF (Houston et al. (2019)).27 The negative 
coefficient of RD indicates that R&D intensive firms make fewer MEF (Kasznik (1999); Jones 
(2007)). Further, we report a positive coefficient of ROA, which lends support to the idea that 
firms with excellent performance make more MEF (Miller (2002); Barua et al. (2006)). Our 
results also indicate that there is a positive association between MEF and the number of analysts 
(Gu and Wang (2005)),28 and a negative association between MEF and Volatility (Houston et 
al. (2019)).29 Lastly, due to their large holdings, institutional investors demand firms release 
more information (Ajinkya et al. (2005)). Consistent with this idea, we find a positive 
association between Instit_Own and the likelihood and frequency of management earnings 
forecasts. Overall, our findings support the conjecture that firms run by Republican CEOs 
disclose more information.  
4.3. CEO political ideology and forecast horizon and range 
In this section, we test the association between CEO political ideology on the one hand 
and the MEF horizon and the likelihood of issuing a range forecast on the other hand. We 
conjecture that, because of their conservatism, Republican CEOs might prefer range over point 
 
27 Similar results are also reported in Kasznik and Lev (1995); Lang and Lundholm (1996); Ajinkya et al. (2005). 
28 Similar results are reported in Lang and Lundholm (1996); Baginski and Hassell (1997) Ajinkya et al. (2005). 
29 Similar results are reported in Waymire (1985); Hui et al. (2009). 
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estimates and might issue forecasts with a longer horizon. The results of these tests are reported 
in columns (5)-(8) in Table 3.  
The dependent variable in the logistic regression models (5) and (6) in Table 3 is Range, 
while the dependent variable in the OLS regression models (7) and (8) is Ln(Horizon).  CEO 
Republican ideology is measured using Rep_Dum and Rep_Index in models (5) and (7), and 
(6) and (8), respectively. Our results show a positive association between CEO Republican 
ideology and forecast range and horizon. For instance, the coefficient estimates of Rep_Dum 
in the model (5) is 0.127, indicating that firms run by Republican CEOs issue 12.7% more 
range estimates than firms with non-Republican CEOs. Similarly, the average horizon of 
forecasts made by Republican CEOs is around 11% longer than the horizon of forecasts made 
by other CEOs. Put differently, given that the average forecast horizon in our sample is 68 
days, the horizon of forecasts made by Republican CEOs is around 7-8 days longer than the 
horizon of forecasts made by other CEOs. These results do not change when using the 
Rep_Index as an alternative measure of CEO Republican ideology. Our results also show that 
larger firms issue fewer range forecasts and have a longer forecast horizon than smaller firms. 
Further, on the one hand, forecast horizon and the likelihood to issue range forecasts are higher 
for firms that are more levered, more profitable, followed by more analysts, have more 
institutional ownership, and that experience acquisition during the year. On the other hand, 
forecast horizon and the likelihood to issue range forecasts are lower for firms that have higher 
R&D intensity, higher volatility, have a positive change in EPS (News), and experience an 
equity issuance during the year. These results are, in general, consistent with the prior literature 
on the determinants of MEF horizon and range (Waymire (1985); Baik et al. (2011); Hribar 
and Yang (2016); Houston et al. (2019)). The positive association between Republican 
ideology and forecast Range and Horizon lends strong support to our conjecture that the 
conservative nature of Republican CEOs can translate into the properties of their MEF.    
4.4. CEO political ideology and the credibility of earnings forecast. 
In this section, we test the association between CEO political ideology and several 
properties of MEF. This group of forecast properties can together be seen as a proxy for the 
credibility of MEF. Conservative CEOs are expected to try to avoid negative earnings surprises, 
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reduce information asymmetry, and reduce the risk of litigation by issuing more accurate and 
less biased forecasts. To formally test this conjecture, we first test the association between CEO 
Republican ideology and forecast bias, miss, and accuracy. The results of this test are reported 
in Table 4. 
[Please insert Table 4 here] 
Models (1)-(2), and (3)-(4) in Table 4 report results of the logistic regression models at 
which OptBias, Forecast_Miss is the dependent variable, respectively, while models (5) and 
(6) report results of the OLS regression models at which the dependent variable is Accuracy. 
The key measure of Republican ideology in models (1), (3), and (5) is Rep_Dum and in models 
(2), (4), and (6) is Rep_Index. We find a negative and statistically significant association 
between proxies of Republican ideology and OptBias as well as Forecast_Miss on the one hand 
and a statistically positive association with Accuracy on the other hand. Republican CEOs are 
less likely to issue optimistically biased forecasts and less likely to miss their own earnings 
forecasts. Specifically, on average, firms run by Republican CEOs are 14.3% less likely to 
issue optimistically biased forecasts and 14.2% less likely to miss forecasts in any given year 
as compared to other CEOs. The conservative nature and preference for low information 
asymmetry environment of Republican CEOs seem to reduce their tendency to issue overly 
optimistic forecasts and to miss earnings forecasts.  
Moreover, the coefficient estimates of Rep_Dum in the model (5) of Table 4 is positive 
and statistically significant. In addition to issuing less optimistic forecasts and missing less 
forecast, Republican CEOs seem to issue more accurate forecasts. Specifically, forecasts made 
by Republican CEOs are, on average, 8.7% more accurate than those made by CEOs with other 
political ideologies. The coefficients of control variables are also consistent with prior studies. 
For example, firm size, MB, ROA, analyst following, institutional ownership, litigation 
environment, News, and industry competition are negatively associated with forecast bias and 
forecast miss and positively associated with forecast accuracy. In contrast, leverage, R&D 
intensity, volatility, and equity issuance are positively associated with forecast bias and forecast 
miss and negatively associated with forecast accuracy.    
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Next, we examine the association between CEO political ideology and the earnings 
forecasts news. Specifically, we differentiate between bad news forecasts and good news 
forecasts and examine how CEO political ideology affects the issuance of bad vs. good news 
forecasts. The results of these tests are presented in columns (1)-(4) in Table 5. 
[Please insert Table 5 here] 
The key independent variable in models (1) and (3) is Rep_Dum, and in models (2) and 
(4) is Rep_Index. Our findings suggest that Republican CEOs are more likely to issue bad news 
forecasts compared to CEOs with other political ideologies. Specifically, on average, firms 
with Republican CEOs have around 13% more bad news forecasts than firms with non-
Republican CEOs. However, the coefficient estimates of Rep_Dum on good news forecasts 
(models (3) and (4)) are positive but not significant, indicating that a CEO’s political ideology 
is not associated with the likelihood of issuing good news forecasts.30 
 These findings are consistent with the notion that Republican managers voluntarily 
disclose bad news forecasts to reduce future litigation in case of large stock price decline 
(Skinner (1994)). Moreover, we find that the coefficient of litigation is positively and 
significantly associated with bad news forecasts. We also find that firm size, ROA, analyst 
following, institutional ownership, News, acquisition, and industry competition are positively 
associated with bad news forecast, whereas RD and volatility are negatively associated.  
4.5. CEO political ideology and earnings surprise 
Prior studies provide evidence that managers sometimes take actions to avoid negative 
earnings surprises because such surprises can have a significant negative impact on stock prices 
(Brown et al. (1987)). Further, Skinner and Sloan (2002) show that market response to negative 
earnings surprises is much stronger than its response to positive earnings surprises. Matsumoto 
(2002) argues that managers voluntarily disclose bad news forecasts or forecasts that are lower 
than expected to guide the analysts' forecasts downward to avoid missing expectations at the 
earnings announcement. Our prior results show that Republican CEOs are more likely to issue 
 
30 We test the estimates of positive versus negative news forecasts using the Seemingly Unrelated bivariate probit 
regression (SUR) model and find similar results. These results are available upon request. 
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bad news forecasts. Consequently, we predict that firms run by Republican CEOs would be 
more (less) likely to experience positive (negative) earnings surprises as compared to firms run 
by non-Republican CEOs. Results of testing this conjecture are reported in columns (5)-(10) 
in Table 5.  
The dependent variable in the logistic regression models (5)-(6), (7)-(8), and (9)-(10) in 
Table 5 is Positive_Surprise, Negative_Surprise, and Neutral_Surprise, respectively. The key 
independent variable in models (5), (7), and (9) is Rep_Dum and in models (6), (8), and (10) is 
Rep_Index. Consistent with our prediction, we find that firms run by Republican CEOs are 
more likely to experience positive earnings surprises and less likely to experience negative 
earnings surprises. Specifically, coefficient estimates of Rep_Dum in models (5) ((7)) indicate 
that firms with Republican CEOs are 5.8% (9%) more (less) likely to have positive (negative) 
earnings surprises than firms with non-Republican CEOs. However, we do not find a 
significant association between CEO Republican ideology and the likelihood of having neutral 
earnings surprises. We also find that RD, ROA, analysts following, institutional ownership, 
News is positively associated with positive earnings surprises and negatively associated with 
negative earnings surprises. In contrast, firm size, leverage, volatility is negatively associated 
with the positive earnings surprise and positively associated with the negative earnings 
surprises. The results of this test lend additional support to our previous test, which shows that 
Republican CEOS are more likely to make bad news forecasts. It seems that Republican CEOs 
tend to impose downward pressure on analysts’ forecasts leading to a higher probability of 
experiencing positive earnings surprises.  
5. CEO political ideology and MEF. Identification and endogeneity issues 
Our baseline findings show a strong association between CEO political ideology and 
the likelihood and properties of management earnings forecasts. However, an alternative 
explanation of our findings could be driven by endogenous firm-CEO matching. For instance, 
firms with higher disclosure quality may appoint a Republican CEO, and/or a Republican CEO 
might tend to move to a firm which has higher disclosure quality environment. Similarly, 
directors and top executives may prefer to hire a CEO who shares their political affiliation, 
and/or a CEO might prefer to work in a company whose directors and top executives share 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3637608
26 
 
her/his political affiliation. For instance, Wintoki and Xi (2019) show that fund managers prefer 
to allocate assets to firms managed by executives and directors with whom they share a similar 
political affiliation. More recently, Twitter CEO and co-founder Jack Dorsey, who exclusively 
donates to Democrats,31 was in a severe threat to lose his position after the well-known 
Republican activist investor, Elliot Management Corporation, purchase a sizable stake in 
Twitter.32  However, Khanna, Kim, and Lu (2015) argue that such a connection increases the 
risk of corporate fraud and reduces CEO dismissal upon the discovery of such frauds. Lee, Lee, 
and Nagarajan (2014) proposed a “bird of a feather” theory and show that the alignment in 
political orientation between CEO and independent directors is associated with lower firm 
valuations, lower operating profitability, and increased internal agency conflicts such as lower 
turnover for poorly performing CEOs and lower pay-performance sensitivity.  
To address such biases arising from the endogenous firm-CEO matching, we conduct 
multiple causality tests using the propensity score matching (PSM) and the difference-in-
difference (DID) regression.33 To further address the omitted variable bias concerns, we 
conduct additional tests that control for CEO characteristics, incentives, and overconfidence. 
Lastly, to address the possible error in measurement issues with our baseline proxy for CEO 
political ideology, we use several alternative measures of political ideology following Hutton 
et al. (2014) and Elnahas and Kim (2017). 
      5.1. Propensity Score Matching (PSM). 
 In this section, we use the propensity score matching (PSM) technique to construct a 
treatment group of firms with Republican CEOs and a control group of firms with non-
Republican CEOs. Specifically, Treatment group is identified using Rep_dumcycle which is an 
indicator variable that equals one if all donations of a CEO in an election cycle are directed to 
 
31 See more details at https://nypost.com/2018/08/04/how-twitter-is-fueling-the-democratic-agenda//. Last 
accessed on May 07, 2020. 
32 See more details at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-02-29/singer-s-elliott-is-said-to-seek-to-
replace-twitter-ceo-dorsey. Last accessed on May 07, 2020. 
33 In our prior tests, we controlled for various firm and CEO characteristics, year, and industry fixed effects. 
Moreover, we also controlled for state fixed effects, run subsample tests excluding CEO turnover years and 
excluding the first 3 years of CEO tenure, and change-on-change regression. These results are available on the 
internet appendix. 
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the Republican Party (nothing to Democratic) and Control group is a matching sample of firms 
which CEOs donated to other parties or never donated. We carefully match the Treatment and 
Control groups on multiple firm characteristics as well as year and industry to mitigate the 
endogeneity issue. Table 6 presents our PSM results. 
[Pease insert table 6 here] 
  Panel A in Table 6 presents results for the diagnostic-differences in means of firm 
characteristics between Treatment and Control groups. Reported t-stats show that there are no 
significant differences in firm characteristics between the Treatment and Control groups. Panel 
B and C in Table 8 present the results for the models of the association between management 
earnings forecasts and CEO political ideology from the matched firm-years. Our findings 
indicate that Rep_dumcycle is positively associated with forecast issue, frequency, range, 
horizon, accuracy, bad news, positive earnings surprise, and negatively associated with forecast 
miss, bias, and negative earnings surprise. Overall, even though our matched sample size drops 
to 9,578 firm-years, the effect of CEO political ideology on management earnings forecast 
properties is qualitatively similar to that reported in our baseline models.34  
        5.2. Management earnings forecasts around CEO Turnover: A DID test 
 To better establish the causal relationship between CEO political ideology and 
management earnings forecast, we exploit the difference-in-difference (DID) regression 
around CEO turnover. Specifically, Rep-Leaving is a dummy variable equals one if a firm 
replaces a Republican CEO with a non-Republican CEO and 0 otherwise. Republican CEOs 
are defined using Rep_dumOnly, which is an indicator variable that equals one if all donations of 
a CEO in an election cycle are directed to the Republican Party only. After is a dummy variable 
equals 1 for the post-turnover years and 0 for the pre-turnover years. Our difference in 
difference (DID) variable Rep-Leaving*After is then calculated by multiplying Rep-Leaving 
and After. The coefficient estimates of Rep-Leaving*After is indicative of the impact of 
replacing a Republican CEO with a non-Republican CEO on MEF. Our baseline results would 
 
34 Our results remain qualitatively similar if we change the treatment and control groups based on our alternative 
measures of CEO political ideology. These results are available on the internet appendix. 
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predict a reduction in the likelihood and credibility of MEF following such turnover events. To 
avoid the impact of other confounding effects, we retain firm-year observations for the -3, +3 
years around CEO turnover events. Further, we restrict our test to turnover events where a long-
term old CEO is replaced by a long-term new CEO (long-term CEOs are those who hold their 
position for at least three years). The results of our DID test are reported in Table 7. 
[Please insert Table 7 here] 
 Consistent with our baseline results, the coefficient of Rep-Leaving*After is 
significantly negative in models of MFE Issue, Frequency, Range, Horizon, Accuracy, and 
Bad_News and significantly positive in models of Forecast_Miss, Bias, and 
Negative_Surprise.35 Overall, these results lend strong support to the causality interpretation 
of our results. CEOs' political ideologies seem to affect the frequency and properties of their 
earnings forecasts. Replacing a Republican CEO with a non-Republican CEO reduces firms' 
voluntary disclosure frequency and quality.  
5.3. Controlling for CEO characteristics, incentives, and overconfidence 
Our proxies of Republican ideology are constructed from each CEO's individual 
donations data and hence are valid measures of political orientation. However, if these proxies 
are mere reflections and/or highly correlated with other CEO characteristics that our baseline 
models do not control for, then our baseline results might suffer an endogeneity issue. To 
address these omitted variables bias, we control for a wide range of CEO characteristics. 
Specifically, we control for Ln(Tenure) and Duality because forecasting accuracy and earnings 
announcement tone are shown to be positively associated the managers’ experience and CEO 
duality (Feng, Li, and McVay (2009); Ittner and Michels (2017), DeBoskey, Luo, and Zhou 
(2019)). We also control for Ln(Age) because prior studies find a negative relation between 
CEO age and bad news hoarding (Andreou, Louca, and Petrou (2017)) and a positive relation 
between CEO age and financial reporting quality (Huang, Rose-Green, and Lee (2012)). We 
 
35 Our findings are qualitatively similar if we restrict our sample to -2, +2 years around CEO turnover events. We 
also find significant results for change in earnings forecasts on change in CEO political ideology due to CEO 
turnover. where ΔREPCEO =1 if a Republican CEO (Rep_dumOnly) replaces a Democratic CEO (Dem_dumOnly), 0 
if the political ideology is similar after a CEO turnover, and -1 if a Democratic CEO replaces a Republican CEO. 
These results are available on the internet appendix. 
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include CEO pay-performance sensitivity (Ln(Delta)) and CEO risk-taking incentive or  
(Ln(Vega)) because prior research finds a positive relationship between CEO equity 
compensation and management earnings forecasts (Nagar et al. (2003); Baginski et al. (2018); 
Kim et al. (2019)).36 We also control for measures of CEO overconfidence, such as Holder67 
and Net_buyer following (Hribar and Yang (2016)), and CEO ownership (CEO_Own) 
following (Malmendier and Tate (2005)). The results of this test are reported in Table 8. 
[Please insert Table 8 here] 
Panel A in Table 8 reports results of the association between CEO political ideology 
and Issue, Frequency, Range, Ln(Horizon), OptBias, and Forecast_Miss whereas Panel B 
reports results of the association between CEO political ideology and Accuracy, Bad_News, 
Good_News, Positive_Surprise, Negative_Surprise, and Neutral_Surprise. After controlling 
for firm and CEO characteristics, the results are quantitatively and statistically similar to those 
of the baseline models. For instance, we find a positive association between measures of CEO 
Republican ideology and forecast issue, frequency, range, horizon, accuracy, and bad news, 
while a negative association between measures of CEO Republican ideology and forecast bias, 
the likelihood of missing earnings forecasts, and negative earnings surprise. Consistent with 
prior studies, we find that Vega is positively associated with the forecast issue, frequency, 
range, horizon, accuracy, and bad news and negatively associated with the forecast bias and 
forecast miss (please insert citation here). Our results also suggest that CEO overconfidence is 
positively associated with forecast issuance and forecast frequency.  
5.4. Alternative measures of CEO political ideology. 
Our baseline models use Rep_Dum (Bhandari et al. (2018)) and Rep_Index (Hong and 
Kostovetsky (2012)) as proxies for CEO Republican ideology. The construction of these 
individual proxies can result in another source of endogeneity in our baseline results due to 
error in measurement. To address this concern, and to reduce the noise and biases in the 
 
36 Similarly, managers provide opportunistic voluntary disclosure to maximize their stock option compensation 
(Aboody and Kasznik (2000); Cheng et al. (2013)), increase disclosures activity before seasoned equity offerings 
(Lang and Lundholm (2000)) and managers forecast optimism increase as the level of stock options increases 
(Kanagaretnam, Lobo, and Mathieu (2015)). 
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baseline measures of CEO political ideology, we employ three alternative measures of CEO 
Republican ideology, namely Rep_indexcycle, Rep_dumcycle (Hutton et al., 2014), and 
Rep_dumtenure (Elnahas and Kim (2017)). The results of the tests that use these alternative 
measures are reported in Table 9. 
[Please insert Table 9 here] 
 results in Table 9 lend strong support to our baseline results and refute the possibility 
that our findings are biased to individual measures of Republican ideology. For instance, on 
average, Republican CEOs are 8% to 12 % more likely to issue forecast as compared to non-
Republican CEOs (based on the alternative Republican ideology measure used). Further, on 
average, Republican CEOs have a 9% to 11 % more forecasting frequency than non-
Republican CEOs (based on the alternative Republican ideology measure used). Similarly, 
using these alternative proxies for political ideology, Republican CEOs consistently have a 
higher likelihood to issue range forecasts, longer forecast horizon, higher forecast accuracy, 
more likelihood of issuing bad news forecasts, higher likelihood of having earnings surprises, 
less forecast bias, and a lower likelihood of missing earnings forecast.  
5.5. Republican CEOs: The authoritarian vs. the precautionary effects 
Francis et al. (1994) find that, when it is not met by actual earnings, MEF can increase 
the possibility of litigation. Further, Healy and Palepu (2001); Lee et al. (2012) find that 
missing MEF can lead to CEO turnover. Our authoritarian effect assumes that transparency 
and high-quality disclosure can represent a threat to individuals with authoritarian 
personalities. As a result, the authoritarian nature and need for closure of politically 
conservative CEOs can foster their tendency to seize on information (Jost et al. (2003)). On the 
other hand, Skinner (1994) finds that high-quality MEF can reduce the likelihood of litigation. 
Further, high-quality MEF can reduce career penalties in the form of bonus cuts, fewer stock 
grants, and forced turnover (Brochet et al. (2011); Mergenthaler et al. (2012); Lee et al. (2012)). 
As a result, our precautionary effect assumes that the ambiguity intolerance, desire for security 
(including job and financial security), and preference for threat avoidance of politically 
conservative CEOs can lead them to adopt a more transparent and higher quality disclosure 
policies.  
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Our results so far are consistent with the precautionary effect of CEO conservatism. In 
order to better establish the precautionary effect as an explanation of our results, we conduct 
cross-sectional tests using subsamples of firms with high and low levels of institutional 
ownership and litigation risk. If Republican CEOs indeed adopt the high-quality MEF policies 
as a precaution to avoid litigation and career penalties, then our results are expected to be 
stronger for firms with strong institutional monitoring and high level of litigation risk. We 
report the results of our cross-sectional tests based on institutional ownership in Table 10. 
[Please insert Table 10 here] 
Panel A1 and A2 (B1 and B2) in Table 10 report results for a subsample of firms with 
above (below) median level of institutional ownership. The impact of CEO Republican 
ideology on the likelihood and characteristics of MEF is much stronger in the high institutional 
ownership subsample. For example, using Rep_dum, Republican CEOs are 17.7% more likely 
to issue MEF than non-Republican CEOs in firms with a high level of institutional ownership, 
while they are only 9.7% more likely to do so in firms with a low level of institutional 
ownership. Similarly, Republican CEOs are 20.2% more likely to issue range forecasts than 
non-Republican CEOs in firms with a high level of institutional ownership, while they are only 
1.9% more likely to do so in firms with a low level of institutional ownership. These results 
are consistent across all other variables that capture different characteristics of MEF. Next, we 
report the results of our cross-sectional tests based on litigation risk in Table 11. 
[Please insert Table 11 here] 
Panel A1 and A2 (B1 and B2) in Table 11 report results for a subsample of firms with 
a high (low) level of litigation risk. The impact of CEO Republican ideology on the likelihood 
and characteristics of MEF is also much stronger in the high litigation risk subsample. For 
example, using Rep_dum, the Accuracy of MEF of Republican CEOs is 20.6% higher than 
non-Republican CEOs in firms with a high level of litigation risk, while it is only 5.4% higher 
in firms with the low level of litigation risk. These results are also consistent across most of the 
other characteristics of MEF. In general, these cross-sectional results lend strong support to the 
precautionary effect explanation. Republican CEOs favor a more frequent and higher quality 
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forecasts when the likelihood of disciplinary actions are elevated due to strong institutional 
owners and high litigation risk. 
6. Robustness checks 
6.1. Robustness check. CEO Democratic ideology and MEF 
 To fully understand the interlinks between CEO political ideology and MEF, in this 
section, we examine the association between CEO Democratic ideology and the likelihood as 
well as the properties of earnings forecast. Specifically, we run our models using the Dem_Dum 
and Dem_Index.37 The results of these tests are presented in Table 12. 
[Please insert Table 12 here] 
 Results in Table 12 lend strong support to the main premises of this paper. CEO 
Democratic ideology is negatively associated with forecast issue, frequency, range, horizon, 
accuracy, bad news, and positive earnings surprise and positively associated with forecast bias, 
forecast miss, and negative surprise―some of these effects are not statistically significant 
though. Specifically, these results show, on average, that Democratic CEOs are around 8.8% 
less likely to issue forecasts as compared to CEOs with other political ideologies (model 1). 
Further, on average, Democratic CEOs are 9% to 12% less likely to miss forecast, 3.6% to 
7.4% more likely to experience negative earnings surprise, 4.5% to 7.7% less likely to 
experience positive earnings surprise, and have 2.5% to 4.3% higher forecast accuracy as 
compared to non-Democratic CEOs.  
7. Conclusion 
The main premise of this paper is that a CEO’s political ideology can translate into 
her/his decisions related to voluntary disclosure. Specifically, Republican CEOs who are often 
described as more conservative might use voluntary disclosure to reduce information 
asymmetry, the likelihood of negative earnings surprises, and risk of litigation. We investigate 
this conjecture using the CEO political contributions data for the period 1993-2016. 
 
37 It is worth noting that measures of CEO Democratic ideology are not mirror images of measures of CEO 
Republican ideology due to the existence of many non-Republican/non-Democratic CEOs. 
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Specifically, we tests (i) whether CEO political orientation affects the likelihood and frequency 
of management earnings forecasts, (ii) whether CEO political orientation is associated with 
properties of MEF such as forecast range, optimism, horizon, accuracy and miss, and  (iii) 
whether CEO political orientation is associated with the nature of the forecast news (bad vs. 
good news and positive vs. negative earnings surprises).  
Our findings suggest that firms run by Republican CEOs are more likely to issue 
forecasts and have higher forecast frequency. Consistent with the conservatism characteristics 
of Republican CEOs, we find that they are more likely to issue range forecasts, have less 
forecasting bias, and less likely to miss their own forecast subsequently. Republican CEOs also 
issue forecasts in a timely fashion and with higher accuracy. Further analyses reveal that 
Republican CEOs tend to issue negative news leading to more positive earnings surprises. In 
contrast, we find that Democratic CEOs are less likely to issue forecasts, have less forecasting 
frequency, issue forecasts in a less timely fashion, have less forecasting accuracy, have more 
optimistically biased forecasts, and are more likely to miss their own forecasts. Our results are 
robust to the use of several alternative measures of CEO political ideology to address the error 
in measurement issues. Further, our results are consistent using multiple subsample analyses 
to address. For instance, to address the database coverage issue, we restrict the sample to firms 
that have issued at least one forecast within our sample period.  




Aboody, D., & Kasznik, R. (2000). CEO stock option awards and the timing of corporate 
voluntary disclosures. Journal of accounting and economics, 29(1), 73-100. 
Abramowitz, A., & Saunders, K. (2005, June). Why can't we all just get along? The reality of 
a polarized America. In The Forum (Vol. 3, No. 2). De Gruyter. 
Abramowitz, A. I., & Saunders, K. L. (2008). Is polarization a myth? The Journal of Politics, 
70(2), 542-555. 
Adorno, T. W., Frenkel-Brunswik, E., Levinson, D. J., & Sanford, R. N. (1950). The 
authoritarian personality. 
Ahern, K. R., Daminelli, D., & Fracassi, C. (2015). Lost in translation? The effect of cultural 
values on mergers around the world. Journal of Financial Economics, 117(1), 165-189. 
Ajinkya, B., Bhojraj, S., & Sengupta, P. (2005). The association between outside directors, 
institutional investors and the properties of management earnings forecasts. Journal of 
accounting research, 43(3), 343-376. 
Alford, J. R., Funk, C. L., & Hibbing, J. R. (2005). Are political orientations genetically 
transmitted? American political science review, 99(2), 153-167. 
Altemeyer, B. (1998). The other “authoritarian personality”. In Advances in experimental 
social psychology (Vol. 30, pp. 47-92). Academic Press. 
Andreou, P. C., Louca, C., & Petrou, A. P. (2017). CEO age and stock price crash risk. 
Review of Finance, 21(3), 1287-1325. 
Atieh, J. M., Brief, A. P., & Vollrath, D. A. (1987). The Protestant work ethic-conservatism 
paradox: Beliefs and values in work and life. Personality and Individual Differences, 8(4), 
577-580. 
Baginski, S. P., & Hassell, J. M. (1997). Determinants of management forecast precision. 
Accounting Review, 303-312. 
Baginski, S. P., Hassell, J. M., & Kimbrough, M. D. (2002). The effect of legal environment 
on voluntary disclosure: Evidence from management earnings forecasts issued in US and 
Canadian markets. The Accounting Review, 77(1), 25-50. 
Baginski, S. P., & Rakow, K. C. (2012). Management earnings forecast disclosure policy and 
the cost of equity capital. Review of Accounting Studies, 17(2), 279-321. 
Baginski, S. P., Campbell, J. L., Moon, J., & Warren, J. (2018). CEO Compensation Structure 
and the Accuracy of Management Earnings Forecasts. Georgia Tech Scheller College of 
Business Research Paper, (18-47). 
Baik, B. O. K., Farber, D. B., & Lee, S. A. M. (2011). CEO ability and management earnings 
forecasts. Contemporary Accounting Research, 28(5), 1645-1668. 
Bamber, L. S., & Cheon, Y. S. (1998). Discretionary management earnings forecast 
disclosures: Antecedents and outcomes associated with forecast venue and forecast 
specificity choices. Journal of Accounting Research, 36(2), 167-190. 
Bamber, L. S., Jiang, J., & Wang, I. Y. (2010). What’s my style? The influence of top 
managers on voluntary corporate financial disclosure. The accounting review, 85(4), 1131-
1162. 
Bartov, E., Givoly, D., & Hayn, C. (2002). The rewards to meeting or beating earnings 
expectations. Journal of accounting and economics, 33(2), 173-204. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3637608
35 
 
Barua, A., Legoria, J., & Moffitt, J. S. (2006). Accruals management to achieve earnings 
benchmarks: A comparison of pre‐managed profit and loss firms. Journal of Business 
Finance & Accounting, 33(5‐6), 653-670. 
Benmelech, E., & Frydman, C. (2015). Military CEOs. Journal of Financial Economics, 
117(1), 43-59. 
Bhandari, A., Golden, J., & Thevenot, M. (2018). CEO Political Ideology and Financial 
Reporting Quality. 
Biggerstaff, L., Cicero, D. C., & Puckett, A. (2015). Suspect CEOs, unethical culture, and 
corporate misbehavior. Journal of Financial Economics, 117(1), 98-121. 
Billings, M. B., Jennings, R., & Lev, B. (2015). On guidance and volatility. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, 60(2-3), 161-180. 
Blau, B. M., Brough, T. J., & Thomas, D. W. (2013). Corporate lobbying, political 
connections, and the bailout of banks. Journal of Banking & Finance, 37(8), 3007-3017. 
Bobbio, N. (1996). Left and right: The significance of a political distinction. University of 
Chicago Press. 
Boeuf, B. (2019). Political ideology and health risk perceptions of food. Social Science & 
Medicine, 236, 112405. 
Borghesi, R., & Chang, K. (2018). Political Affiliation and Pay Slice: Do Blue CEOs Accept 
Less Green? International Review of Finance, 18(3), 453-461. 
Bouchard Jr, T. J., & McGue, M. (2003). Genetic and environmental influences on human 
psychological differences. Journal of neurobiology, 54(1), 4-45. 
Boubakri, N., & Saffar, W. (2016). Culture and externally financed firm growth. Journal of 
Corporate Finance, 41, 502-520. 
Brown, L. D., Hagerman, R. L., Griffin, P. A., & Zmijewski, M. E. (1987). An evaluation of 
alternative proxies for the market's assessment of unexpected earnings. Journal of Accounting 
and Economics, 9(2), 159-193. 
Brown, S., & Hillegeist, S. A. (2007). How disclosure quality affects the level of information 
asymmetry. Review of Accounting Studies, 12(2-3), 443-477. 
Brochet, F., Faurel, L., & McVay, S. (2011). Manager‐specific effects on earnings guidance: 
An analysis of top executive turnovers. Journal of Accounting Research, 49(5), 1123-1162. 
Cain, M. D., & McKeon, S. B. (2016). CEO personal risk-taking and corporate policies. 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 51(1), 139-164. 
Cao, Z., & Narayanamoorthy, G. S. (2011). The effect of litigation risk on management 
earnings forecasts. Contemporary Accounting Research, 28(1), 125-173. 
Campbell, T. C., Gallmeyer, M., Johnson, S. A., Rutherford, J., & Stanley, B. W. (2011). 
CEO optimism and forced turnover. Journal of Financial Economics, 101(3), 695-712. 
Cheng, Q., & Lo, K. (2006). Insider trading and voluntary disclosures. Journal of Accounting 
Research, 44(5), 815-848. 
Cheng, Q., Luo, T., & Yue, H. (2013). Managerial incentives and management forecast 
precision. The Accounting Review, 88(5), 1575-1602. 
Chyz, J. A. (2013). Personally tax aggressive executives and corporate tax sheltering. Journal 
of Accounting and Economics, 56(2-3), 311-328. 
Coller, M., & Yohn, T. L. (1997). Management forecasts and information asymmetry: An 
examination of bid-ask spreads. Journal of accounting research, 35(2), 181-191. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3637608
36 
 
Conover, P. J., & Feldman, S. (1981). The origins and meaning of liberal/conservative self-
identifications. American Journal of Political Science, 617-645. 
Cooper, M. J., Gulen, H., & Ovtchinnikov, A. V. (2010). Corporate political contributions 
and stock returns. The Journal of Finance, 65(2), 687-724. 
Core, J., & Guay, W. (2002). Estimating the value of employee stock option portfolios and 
their sensitivities to price and volatility. Journal of Accounting research, 40(3), 613-630. 
Cronqvist, H., Makhija, A. K., & Yonker, S. E. (2012). Behavioral consistency in corporate 
finance: CEO personal and corporate leverage. Journal of financial economics, 103(1), 20-40. 
Davidson, R., Dey, A., & Smith, A. (2015). Executives'“off-the-job” behavior, corporate 
culture, and financial reporting risk. Journal of Financial Economics, 117(1), 5-28. 
DeBoskey, D. G., Luo, Y., & Zhou, L. (2019). CEO power, board oversight, and earnings 
announcement tone. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 52(2), 657-680. 
Deng, M., Ho, J. L., & Li, S. (2018). Does Managerial Risk Aversion Affect Earnings 
Management? Evidence from CEO Political Ideology. Baruch College Zicklin School of 
Business Research Paper, (2018-05), 06. 
Detomasi, D. A. (2008). The political roots of corporate social responsibility. Journal of 
Business Ethics, 82(4), 807-819. 
Diamond, D. W., & Verrecchia, R. E. (1991). Disclosure, liquidity, and the cost of capital. 
The journal of Finance, 46(4), 1325-1359. 
Di Giuli, A., & Kostovetsky, L. (2014). Are red or blue companies more likely to go green? 
Politics and corporate social responsibility. Journal of Financial Economics, 111(1), 158-180. 
Donnelly, R., & Mulcahy, M. (2008). Board structure, ownership, and voluntary disclosure in 
Ireland. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 16(5), 416-429. 
Dong, W., Li, S., Xie, H., & Zhang, Y. T. (2018). CEO Political Ideology and Audit Pricing. 
Available at SSRN 3246551. 
Eagleton, T. (1991). Ideology: An introduction. London: Verso. 
Elnahas, A. M., & Kim, D. (2017). CEO political ideology and mergers and acquisitions 
decisions. Journal of Corporate Finance, 45, 162-175. 
Epstein, S. (1979). The stability of behavior: I. On predicting most of the people much of the 
time. Journal of personality and social psychology, 37(7), 1097. 
Evans, J. H. (2003). Have Americans' attitudes become more polarized?—An update. Social 
Science Quarterly, 84(1), 71-90. 
Fee, C. E., Hadlock, C. J., & Pierce, J. R. (2013). Managers with and without style: Evidence 
using exogenous variation. The Review of Financial Studies, 26(3), 567-601. 
Feng, M., Li, C., & McVay, S. (2009). Internal control and management guidance. Journal of 
accounting and economics, 48(2-3), 190-209. 
Field, L., Lowry, M., & Shu, S. (2005). Does disclosure deter or trigger litigation? Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, 39(3), 487-507. 
Flannery, M. J., & Rangan, K. P. (2006). Partial adjustment toward target capital 
structures. Journal of financial economics, 79(3), 469-506. 
Foerster, S. R., Sapp, S. G., & Shi, Y. (2010, August). The impact of management earnings 
forecasts on firm risk and firm value. AAA. 
Frankel, R. M., Johnson, M. F., & Nelson, K. K. (2002). The relation between auditors' fees 
for nonaudit services and earnings management. The accounting review, 77(s-1), 71-105. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3637608
37 
 
Francis, B. B., Hasan, I., Sun, X., & Wu, Q. (2016). CEO political preference and corporate 
tax sheltering. Journal of Corporate Finance, 38, 37-53. 
Francis, J., Nanda, D., & Olsson, P. (2008). Voluntary disclosure, earnings quality, and cost 
of capital. Journal of accounting research, 46(1), 53-99. 
Francis, J., Philbrick, D., & Schipper, K. (1994). Shareholder litigation and corporate 
disclosures. Journal of accounting research, 32(2), 137-164. 
Funder, D. C., & Colvin, C. R. (1991). Explorations in behavioral consistency: properties of 
persons, situations, and behaviors. Journal of personality and social psychology, 60(5), 773. 
Gillies, J., & Campbell, S. (1985). Conservatism and poetry preferences. British Journal of 
Social Psychology. 
Glasgow, M. R., Cartier, A. M., & Wilson, G. D. (1985). Conservatism, sensation-seeking 
and music preferences. Personality and Individual Differences, 6(3), 395-396. 
Graham, J. R., Harvey, C. R., & Rajgopal, S. (2005). The economic implications of corporate 
financial reporting. Journal of accounting and economics, 40(1-3), 3-73. 
Graham, J. R., Harvey, C. R., & Puri, M. (2013). Managerial attitudes and corporate actions. 
Journal of financial economics, 109(1), 103-121. 
Green, D. P., Palmquist, B., & Schickler, E. (2004). Partisan hearts and minds: Political 
parties and the social identities of voters. Yale University Press. 
Guay, W. R. (1999). The sensitivity of CEO wealth to equity risk: an analysis of the 
magnitude and determinants. Journal of Financial Economics, 53(1), 43-71. 
Gu, F., & Wang, W. (2005). Intangible assets, information complexity, and analysts’ earnings 
forecasts. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 32(9‐10), 1673-1702. 
Gupta, A., & Wowak, A. J. (2017). The elephant (or donkey) in the boardroom: How board 
political ideology affects CEO pay. Administrative Science Quarterly, 62(1), 1-30. 
Han, S., Kang, T., Salter, S., & Yoo, Y. K. (2010). A cross-country study on the effects of 
national culture on earnings management. Journal of International Business Studies, 41(1), 
123-141. 
Harford, J., Klasa, S., & Walcott, N. (2009). Do firms have leverage targets? Evidence from 
acquisitions. Journal of Financial Economics, 93(1), 1-14. 
Hatemi, P. K., Alford, J. R., Hibbing, J. R., Martin, N. G., & Eaves, L. J. (2009). Is there a 
“party” in your genes?. Political Research Quarterly, 62(3), 584-600. 
Healy, P. M., Hutton, A. P., & Palepu, K. G. (1999). Stock performance and intermediation 
changes surrounding sustained increases in disclosure. Contemporary accounting research, 
16(3), 485-520. 
Healy, P. M., & Palepu, K. G. (2001). Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, and the 
capital markets: A review of the empirical disclosure literature. Journal of accounting and 
economics, 31(1-3), 405-440. 
Higgins, E. T. (1997). Beyond pleasure and pain. American psychologist, 52(12), 1280. 
Hilary, G., Hsu, C., & Wang, R. (2014). Management forecast consistency. Journal of 
Accounting Research, 52(1), 163-191. 
Hirshleifer, D., Low, A., & Teoh, S. H. (2012). Are overconfident CEOs better innovators? 
The journal of finance, 67(4), 1457-1498. 
Hong, H., & Kostovetsky, L. (2012). Red and blue investing: Values and finance. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 103(1), 1-19. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3637608
38 
 
Houston, J. F., Lev, B., & Tucker, J. W. (2010). To guide or not to guide? Causes and 
consequences of stopping quarterly earnings guidance. Contemporary Accounting Research, 
27(1), 143-185. 
Houston, J. F., Lin, C., Liu, S., & Wei, L. (2019). Litigation Risk and Voluntary Disclosure: 
Evidence from Legal Changes. The Accounting Review. 
Hribar, P., & Yang, H. (2016). CEO overconfidence and management forecasting. 
Contemporary Accounting Research, 33(1), 204-227. 
Hu, S., Jia, X., Zhang, X., Zheng, X., & Zhu, J. (2017). How political ideology affects 
climate perception: Moderation effects of time orientation and knowledge. Resources, 
Conservation and Recycling, 127, 124-131. 
Huang, H. W., Rose-Green, E., & Lee, C. C. (2012). CEO age and financial reporting quality. 
Accounting Horizons, 26(4), 725-740. 
Hughes, J. S., & Pae, S. (2004). Voluntary disclosure of precision information. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, 37(2), 261-289. 
Hui, K. W., Matsunaga, S., & Morse, D. (2009). The impact of conservatism on management 
earnings forecasts. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 47(3), 192-207. 
Huntington, S. P. (1957). Conservatism as an Ideology. American political science 
review, 51(2), 454-473. 
Hutton, A. P., Lee, L. F., & Shu, S. Z. (2012). Do managers always know better? The relative 
accuracy of management and analyst forecasts. Journal of Accounting Research, 50(5), 1217-
1244. 
Hutton, I., Jiang, D., & Kumar, A. (2014). Corporate policies of Republican managers. 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 49(5-6), 1279-1310. 
Hutton, I., Jiang, D., & Kumar, A. (2015). Political values, culture, and corporate litigation. 
Management Science, 61(12), 2905-2925. 
Ittner, C. D., & Michels, J. (2017). Risk-based forecasting and planning and management 
earnings forecasts. Review of Accounting Studies, 22(3), 1005-1047. 
Jia, Y. (2013). Meeting or missing earnings benchmarks: The role of CEO integrity. Journal 
of Business Finance & Accounting, 40(3-4), 373-398. 
Jiang, D., Kumar, A., & Law, K. K. (2016). Political contributions and analyst behavior. 
Review of Accounting Studies, 21(1), 37-88. 
Jones, D. A. (2007). Voluntary disclosure in R&D‐intensive industries. Contemporary 
Accounting Research, 24(2), 489-522. 
Jost, J. T., Kruglanski, A. W., & Simon, L. (1999). Effects of epistemic motivation on 
conservatism, intolerance, and other system justifying attitudes. Shared cognition in 
organizations: The management of knowledge, 91-116. 
Jost, J. T., Glaser, J., Kruglanski, A. W., & Sulloway, F. J. (2003). Political conservatism as 
motivated social cognition. Psychological bulletin, 129(3), 339. 
Jost, J. T., & Amodio, D. M. (2012). Political ideology as motivated social cognition: 
Behavioral and neuroscientific evidence. Motivation and Emotion, 36(1), 55-64. 
Kam, C. D., & Simas, E. N. (2010). Risk orientations and policy frames. The Journal of 
Politics, 72(2), 381-396. 
Kanagaretnam, K., Lim, C. Y., & Lobo, G. J. (2011). Effects of national culture on earnings 
quality of banks. Journal of International Business Studies, 42(6), 853-874. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3637608
39 
 
Kanagaretnam, K., Lobo, G. J., & Mathieu, R. (2015). CEO stock options and analysts’ 
forecast accuracy and bias. Handbook of Financial Econometrics and Statistics, 2621-2651. 
Kasznik, R., & Lev, B. (1995). To warn or not to warn: Management disclosures in the face 
of an earnings surprise. Accounting review, 113-134. 
Kasznik, R. (1999). On the association between voluntary disclosure and earnings 
management. Journal of accounting research, 37(1), 57-81. 
Kasznik, R., & McNichols, M. F. (2002). Does meeting earnings expectations matter? 
Evidence from analyst forecast revisions and share prices. Journal of Accounting research, 
40(3), 727-759. 
Khanna, V., Kim, E. H., & Lu, Y. (2015). CEO connectedness and corporate fraud. The 
Journal of Finance, 70(3), 1203-1252. 
Kim, H. T., Kwak, B., Lee, J., & Suk, I. (2019). CEO and Outside Director Equity 
Compensation: Substitutes or Complements for Management Earnings Forecasts? European 
Accounting Review, 28(2), 371-393. 
King, R., Pownall, G., & Waymire, G. (1990). Expectations adjustment via timely 
management forecasts: Review, synthesis, and suggestions for future research. Journal of 
accounting Literature, 9(1), 113-144. 
Kolko, G. (1963). The triumph of conservatism: A re-interpretation of American history, 
1900-1916. New York: Free Press of Glencoe. 
Lang, M. H., & Lundholm, R. J. (1996). Corporate disclosure policy and analyst behavior. 
Accounting review, 467-492. 
Lang, M. H., & Lundholm, R. J. (2000). Voluntary disclosure and equity offerings: reducing 
information asymmetry or hyping the stock? Contemporary accounting research, 17(4), 623-
662. 
Lee, S., Matsunaga, S. R., & Park, C. W. (2012). Management forecast accuracy and CEO 
turnover. The Accounting Review, 87(6), 2095-2122. 
Lee, J., Lee, K. J., & Nagarajan, N. J. (2014). Birds of a feather: Value implications of 
political alignment between top management and directors. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 112(2), 232-250. 
Lee, C., Jeon, J., & Seok, W. (2018). Who, Republican or Democrat CEOs, laughs last? 
Political cycles in the market for corporate directors. 
Leuz, C., & Verrecchia, R. E. (2000). The economic consequences of increased disclosure. 
Journal of accounting research, 91-124. 
Li, K., Griffin, D., Yue, H., & Zhao, L. (2013). How does culture influence corporate risk-
taking?. Journal of Corporate Finance, 23, 1-22. 
Lo, C. Y., & Schwartz, M. (Eds.). (1998). Social policy and the conservative agenda. 
Blackwell. 
Malmendier, U., & Tate, G. (2005). CEO overconfidence and corporate investment. The 
journal of finance, 60(6), 2661-2700. 
Mande, V., & Son, M. (2012). CEO centrality and meeting or beating analysts’ earnings 
forecasts. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 39(1‐2), 82-112. 
Matsumoto, D. A. (2002). Management's incentives to avoid negative earnings surprises. The 
accounting review, 77(3), 483-514. 
McAllister, P. O., & Anderson, A. (1991). Conservatism and the comprehension of 
implausible text. European Journal of Social Psychology, 21(2), 147-164. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3637608
40 
 
McClosky, H., & Zaller, J. (1984). The American ethos: Public attitudes toward capitalism 
and democracy. Harvard Univ Pr. 
Mergenthaler, R., Rajgopal, S., & Srinivasan, S. (2012). CEO and CFO career penalties to 
missing quarterly analysts forecasts. Available at SSRN 1152421. 
Miller, G. S. (2002). Earnings performance and discretionary disclosure. Journal of 
accounting research, 40(1), 173-204. 
Murtha, T. P., & Lenway, S. A. (1994). Country capabilities and the strategic state: How 
national political institutions affect multinational corporations' strategies. Strategic 
management journal, 15(S2), 113-129. 
Nagar, V., Nanda, D., & Wysocki, P. (2003). Discretionary disclosure and stock-based 
incentives. Journal of accounting and economics, 34(1-3), 283-309. 
Newport, F. (2019). The Impact of Increased Political Polarization. 
https://news.gallup.com/opinion/polling-matters/268982/impact-increased-political-
polarization.aspx//. Last accessed on April 09, 2020. 
Pae, S., Song, C. J., & Yi, A. C. (2016). Career concerns and management earnings guidance. 
Contemporary Accounting Research, 33(3), 1172-1198. 
Peterson, B. E., Doty, R. M., & Winter, D. G. (1993). Authoritarianism and attitudes toward 
contemporary social issues. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 19(2), 174-184. 
Roe, M. J. (2003). Political determinants of corporate governance: Political context. 
Corporate Impact, 53. 
Rogers, J. L., & Stocken, P. C. (2005). Credibility of management forecasts. The Accounting 
Review, 80(4), 1233-1260. 
Rogers, J. L., Skinner, D. J., & Van Buskirk, A. (2009). Earnings guidance and market 
uncertainty. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 48(1), 90-109. 
Rogers, J. L., & Van Buskirk, A. (2013). Bundled forecasts in empirical accounting research. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics, 55(1), 43-65. 
Sengupta, P. (1998). Corporate disclosure quality and the cost of debt. Accounting review, 
459-474. 
Sherman, R. A., Nave, C. S., & Funder, D. C. (2010). Situational similarity and personality 
predict behavioral consistency. Journal of personality and social psychology, 99(2), 330. 
Sidanius, J., & Pratto, F. (1999). Social dominance: An intergroup theory of social hierarchy 
and oppression. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Skinner, D. J. (1994). Why firms voluntarily disclose bad news. Journal of accounting 
research, 32(1), 38-60. 
Skinner, D. J. (1997). Earnings disclosures and stockholder lawsuits. Journal of accounting 
and economics, 23(3), 249-282. 
Skinner, D. J., & Sloan, R. G. (2002). Earnings surprises, growth expectations, and stock 
returns or don't let an earnings torpedo sink your portfolio. Review of accounting studies, 
7(2-3), 289-312. 
Skitka, L. J., & Tetlock, P. E. (1993). Providing public assistance: Cognitive and 
motivational processes underlying liberal and conservative policy preferences. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 65(6), 1205. 
Trueman, B. (1986). Why do managers voluntarily release earnings forecasts?. Journal of 
accounting and economics, 8(1), 53-71. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3637608
41 
 
Unsal, O., Hassan, M. K., & Zirek, D. (2016). Corporate lobbying, CEO political ideology 
and firm performance. Journal of Corporate Finance, 38, 126-149. 
Verrecchia, R. E. (2001). Essays on disclosure. Journal of accounting and economics, 32(1-
3), 97-180. 
Wang, I. Y. (2007). Private earnings guidance and its implications for disclosure regulation. 
The Accounting Review, 82(5), 1299-1332. 
Waymire, G. (1985). Earnings volatility and voluntary management forecast disclosure. 
Journal of Accounting Research, 268-295. 
Wilson, G. D. (1973). The psychology of conservatism. London: Academic Press. 
Williams, P. A. (1996). The relation between a prior earnings forecast by management and 
analyst response to a current management forecast. Accounting Review, 103-115. 
Wintoki, M. B., & Xi, Y. (2019). Partisan Bias in Fund Portfolios. Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis, 1-61. 
  
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3637608
42 
 
Appendix A. Variable definition 
Variable Definition 
CEO political ideology (baseline) 
Rep_dum An indicator variable that equals one if a CEO donated more to the Republican 
party than to the Democratic party during her/his tenure [Bhandari et al. 2018]. 
Rep_Index Percentage of a CEO’s support for the Republican Party calculated as the 
number of cycles in which a CEO donates exclusively to the Republican party 
divided by her/his number of donation cycles in the sample period [Hong and 
Kostovetsky, 2012]. 
CEO political ideology (Robustness) 
Dem_dum An indicator variable that equals one if a CEO donated more to the Democratic 
party than to the Republican party during her/his tenure. 
Dem_Index Percentage of a CEO’s support for the Democratic Party calculated as the 
number of cycles in which a CEO donates exclusively to the Democratic party 
divided by her/his number of donation cycles in the sample period. 
Rep_dumcycle An indicator variable that equals one if all donations of a CEO in an election 
cycle are directed to the Republican Party [Hutton et al. 2014]. 
Rep_dumtenure An indicator variable that equals one if all donations of a CEO during her/his 
tenure are directed to the Republican Party [Elnahas and Kim, 2017]. 
Rep_indexcycle An index calculated as total donations to the Republican party minus total 
donations to the Democratic party divided by total donations to both parties in 
each election cycle. This index ranges between -1 (strong Democrat) and 1 
(strong Republican) [Hutton et al. 2014]. 
Rep_dumOnly An indicator variable that equals one if all donations of a CEO in an election 
cycle are directed to the Republican Party only (neither Democratic nor others). 
Voluntary disclosure 
Issue An indicator variable that equals one if a firm makes annual earnings forecasts 
in a fiscal year. 
Frequency The total number of annual earnings forecasts made by a firm in a fiscal year. 
Ln(Horizon) The natural logarithm of one plus the average horizon of annual earnings 
forecasts made by a firm in a fiscal year. For each forecast, the horizon is 
defined as the number of calendar days between the forecast announcement date 
and the corresponding period end date. We assign a value of 0 when a firm 
makes no forecasts in a fiscal year.  
Range An indicator variable of range estimates. For each forecast, we first assign 1 for 
range estimates, and 0 otherwise. This indicator variable is then averaged for 
each firm-year. The range is then defined as an indicator variable that equals 
one if the average range is greater than 0.5, and 0 otherwise. 
Forecast_Miss An indicator variable that equals one if a firm misses at least one forecast in a 
year, and zero otherwise. Where Miss equals one if the actual earning is less 
than the management earnings forecasts, and zero otherwise for open-ended 
and point forecasts, and equals one if the actual earnings are less than the lower 
bound of the range forecast for range estimates.  
OptBias An indicator variable that equals one if the average Bias in a year is positive, 
and 0 otherwise. Where, for each estimate, Bias is the difference between 
management earnings forecasts and actual earnings scaled by the stock price at 
the end of the month prior to the forecast.  
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Appendix A. Variable definition. Cont’d  
Accuracy The average Forecast accuracy for all annual earnings forecasts made by a firm 
in a fiscal year. For each estimate, we first calculate the absolute difference 
between management earnings forecasts and actual earnings scaled by the stock 
price at the end of the month prior to the forecast. Next, we identify forecast 
accuracy as the quintile ranking of the scaled difference, where one is assigned 
for the top quintile (largest error), and five is assigned for the bottom quintile 
(lowest error), and zero if no forecasts are made.  
Bad_News An indicator variable that equals one if forecast news is negative, and 0 
otherwise. Where forecast news is the difference between the management 
earnings forecasts and the most recent mean analyst estimate deflated by the 
stock price one trading day prior to the management forecast release date. 
Good_News An indicator variable equals one if forecast news is non-negative, and zero 
otherwise. Forecast news is the difference between the management earnings 
forecasts and the most recent mean analyst estimate scaled by the stock price 
one trading day prior to the management forecast release date. 
Positive_Surprise An indicator variable that equals one if an earnings surprise is greater than 
0.0001, and zero otherwise. Earnings surprise is calculated as the difference 
between the actual earnings and the mean analyst estimate scaled by the stock 
price three trading days prior to an earnings announcement. 
Negative_Surprise An indicator variable that equals one if an earnings surprise is less than -0.0001, 
and zero otherwise. Earnings surprise is calculated as the difference between 
the actual earnings and the mean analyst estimate scaled by the stock price three 
trading days prior to an earnings announcement. 
Neutral_Surprise An indicator variable that equals one if an earnings surprise is between 0.0001 
and -0.0001, and zero otherwise. Earnings surprise is calculated as the 
difference between the actual earnings and the mean analyst estimate scaled by 
the stock price three trading days prior to an earnings announcement. 
Firm Characteristics 
Ln(assets) The natural logarithm of total assets (at). 
MB The ratio of market to book value of equity. [(prcc_f*csho) / ceq]. 
Leverage The ratio of total debt divided by market value of total assets. [(Dltt+Dlc) / (at-
ceq+csho*prcc_f)]. 
RD Expenditures on research and development scaled by total assets. [xrd/at] 
ROA Return on assets measured as income before extraordinary items scaled by total 
assets. [ib/at] 
Volatility The standard deviation of daily stock return (CRSP variable ret) of a firm over 
the last fiscal year. 
Ln(Analyst) The natural logarithm of the number of analysts following a firm. 
Instit_Own The percentage of shares owned by institutional investors. 
Litigation An indicator variable that equals one if a firm's SIC code is in industries subject 
to increased litigation (2833-2836, 3570-3577, 3600-3674, and 7370-7374), 
and zero otherwise. 
News An indicator variable that equals one if the current period EPS is greater than 
or equal to the previous-period EPS, and 0 otherwise. 
Equity_Issue An indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm issued shares in a year. 
Acquisition An indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm's annual acquisitions or merger-
related costs exceeded five percent of net income (loss) in year t, and zero 
otherwise. [aqc/ni] 
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Appendix A. Variable definition. Cont’d 
Industry_Conc A firm's industry concentration, measured as the sum of sales of the top five 
firms in its two-digit SIC code scaled by total sales of all firms in its two-digit 
SIC code in year t.  [∑ 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖.𝑗
5




Ln(Tenure) The natural logarithm of CEO tenure, where tenure is defined as the length of 
a CEO's tenure with her/his current firm (measured as fiscal year minus year 
joined as CEO). 
Ln(Age) The natural logarithm of the age of a CEO as of the year in which a management 
earnings forecast was released.  
Duality An indicator variable that equals 1 if a CEO is also the chairman, and 0 
otherwise. 
Ln(Delta) The natural logarithm of the expected dollar changes in CEO wealth for a 1% 
change in stock price computed as in Core and Guay (2002).  
Ln(Vega) The natural logarithm of the expected dollar changes in CEO wealth for a 1% 
change in stock return volatility computed as in Guay (1999). 
CEO_Own The percentage of shares outstanding owned by a CEO. 
[SHROWN_EXCL_OPTS / (CSHO*1000)] 
Overconfidence  An indicator variable that equals one if a CEO holds vested options with 
average moneyness greater than 67 percent. Starting in the first year when a 
CEO displays this behavior. Option moneyness is calculated as follows: first, 
we calculate the realizable value per option as the total realizable value of the 
exercisable options divided by the number of exercisable options 
[Value_Per_option = (OPT_UNEX_EXER_EST_VAL / 
OPT_UNEX_EXER_NUM)]. Second, we compute the estimate of the average 
exercise price of the options by subtracting the per-option realizable value from 
the stock price at the fiscal year-end [avg_exercise_price = (prccf - 
Value_Per_option)]. Lastly, the average percent moneyness of an option equals 
the per-option realizable value divided by the estimated average exercise price 
[avg_pctg_moneyness_opt = (Value_Per_option / avg_exercise_price)]. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics. 
This table reports descriptive statistics for measures of CEO political ideology, voluntary disclosure, 
and control variables for our sample covering the period 1993-2016. Rep_Dum is an indicator variable 
that equals one if a CEO donated more to the Republican party than to the Democratic party during 
her/his tenure.  Rep_Index is the percentage of a CEO’s support for the Republican Party calculated 
as the number of cycles in which a CEO donates exclusively to the Republican party divided by 
her/his number of donation cycles in the sample period. All other variables are defined in Appendix 
A.  
variable No. Mean Std Dev 25th Perc Median 75th Perc 
CEO political ideology 
Rep_Dum 33,951 0.229 0.420 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Rep_Index 33,951 0.169 0.337 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Voluntary Disclosure 
Issue 33,951 0.353 0.478 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Frequency 33,951 1.550 2.619 0.000 0.000 3.000 
Ln(Horizon) 33,951 1.828 2.493 0.000 0.000 5.141 
Range 33,951 0.266 0.442 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Forecast_Miss 33,951 0.190 0.392 0.000 0.000 0.000 
OptBias 33,951 0.143 0.350 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Accuracy  33,951 1.035 1.592 0.000 0.000 2.000 
Bad_news 33,951 0.278 0.448 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Good_News 33,951 0.192 0.394 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Positive_Surprise 33,951 0.530 0.499 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Negative_Surprise 33,951 0.368 0.482 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Neutral_Surprise 33,951 0.102 0.302 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Firm Characteristics 
Ln(Assets) 33,951 7.181 1.597 6.023 7.047 8.211 
MB 33,951 3.235 4.049 1.488 2.352 3.844 
Leverage 33,951 0.147 0.144 0.020 0.114 0.225 
RD 33,951 0.034 0.059 0.000 0.003 0.044 
ROA 33,951 0.037 0.114 0.015 0.052 0.090 
Volatility 33,951 0.027 0.014 0.018 0.024 0.034 
Ln(Analyst) 33,951 2.116 0.805 1.609 2.197 2.708 
Instit_Own 33,951 0.542 0.360 0.150 0.647 0.837 
Litigation 33,951 0.240 0.427 0.000 0.000 0.000 
News 33,951 0.631 0.482 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Equity_Issue 33,951 0.203 0.402 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Acquisition 33,951 0.411 0.492 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Industry_Conc 33,951 0.475 0.151 0.356 0.447 0.539 
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Table 2. Pearson correlations 
This table reports Pearson correlation coefficients. Rep_Dum and is an indicator variable that equals one if a CEO donated more to the Republican party than 
to the Democratic party during her/his tenure. Rep_Index is the percentage of a CEO’s support for the Republican Party calculated as the number of cycles 
in which a CEO donates exclusively to the Republican party divided by her/his number of donation cycles in the sample period. All other variables are defined 
in Appendix A.  
Variables   A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U 
Rep_Dum A 1                     
Rep_Index B 0.86                     
Issue C 0.03 0.04                    
Frequency D 0.04 0.05 0.80                   
Ln(Horizon) E 0.03 0.04 0.99 0.80                  
Range F 0.02 0.03 0.85 0.74 0.85                 
Forecast_Miss G -0.03 -0.03 -0.60 -0.42 -0.59 -0.53                
OptBias H -0.03 -0.04 -0.70 -0.59 -0.69 -0.63 0.85               
Accuracy I 0.04 0.05 0.88 0.73 0.87 0.75 -0.58 -0.69              
Ln(Assets) J 0.15 0.21 0.20 0.24 0.20 0.17 -0.13 -0.16 0.22             
MB K 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.03 -0.07 -0.08 0.10 0.00            
Leverage L 0.06 0.07 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 0.08 0.08 -0.09 0.28 -0.22           
RD M -0.10 -0.10 -0.08 -0.07 -0.08 -0.09 0.04 0.05 -0.08 -0.27 0.13 -0.30          
ROA N 0.05 0.06 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.11 -0.15 -0.17 0.18 0.14 0.17 -0.25 -0.29         
Volatility O -0.08 -0.09 -0.13 -0.17 -0.13 -0.13 0.10 0.12 -0.18 -0.35 -0.06 0.00 0.25 -0.29        
Ln(Analyst) P 0.11 0.14 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.15 -0.13 -0.16 0.23 0.59 0.16 -0.04 -0.02 0.20 -0.20       
Instit_Own Q 0.03 0.02 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.11 -0.07 -0.10 0.12 0.13 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.09 -0.07 0.20      
Litigation R -0.10 -0.11 -0.02 -0.00 -0.02 -0.03 -0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.15 0.11 -0.27 0.55 -0.10 0.20 0.04 0.06     
News S 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 -0.16 -0.17 0.07 -0.00 0.12 -0.14 -0.05 0.33 -0.06 0.05 0.00 -0.00    
Equity_Issue T -0.06 -0.07 -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 -0.08 0.03 0.03 -0.05 -0.23 0.11 -0.17 0.25 -0.06 0.24 0.00 0.02 0.21 0.08   
Acquisition U 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.12 -0.07 -0.09 0.14 0.12 -0.03 0.05 -0.07 0.07 -0.13 0.06 0.11 0.00 -0.03 -0.00  
Industry_Conc V 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.05 -0.03 -0.04 0.04 0.06 -0.02 0.05 -0.04 0.02 -0.07 -0.07 0.03 -0.16 -0.00 -0.07 0.02 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3637608
47 
 
Table 3. CEO political ideology and the Likelihood, Frequency, Range, and Horizon of MEF. 
This table presents tests of the association between CEO political ideology and the likelihood and frequency of 
earnings forecasts as well as the likelihood of issuing range forecasts and forecast horizon. In the Logistic 
regressions in columns (1) and (2), the dependent variable is Issue which is an indicator variable that equals 
one if a firm makes annual earnings forecasts in a fiscal year, and zero otherwise. In the OLS regressions in 
columns (3) and (4), the dependent variable is Frequency which is the total number of annual earnings forecasts 
made by a firm in a fiscal year. In the Logistic regression in columns (5) and (6), the dependent variable is 
Range, which is an indicator variable of range estimates. In the OLS regressions in columns (7) and (8), the 
dependent variable is Ln(Horizon), which is the natural logarithm of one plus the average horizon of annual 
earnings forecasts made by a firm in a fiscal year. Measures of CEO political ideology, Rep_Dum and 
Rep_Index, and all other independent variables are defined in Appendix A. All models include year and 
industry fixed effects. T-statistics are computed using robust standard errors and reported in parentheses. †, ** 
and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Issue Frequency Range Ln(Horizon) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Rep_Dum 0.128†  0.165
†  0.127
†  0.111†  
 (3.86)  (5.26)  (3.62)  (3.86)  
Rep_Index  0.126
†  0.117
†  0.144†  0.100† 
  (3.08)  (3.04)  (3.34)  (2.82) 
Ln(assets) 0.018 0.021 0.121† 0.126† -0.025* -0.022 0.022* 0.024** 
 (1.28) (1.51) (9.72) (10.09) (-1.71) (-1.53) (1.85) (2.09) 
MB 0.002 0.002 0.015† 0.015† 0.000 0.000 0.008** 0.008** 
 (0.44) (0.49) (4.12) (4.20) (0.01) (0.06) (2.37) (2.42) 
Leverage 0.450† 0.449† 0.364† 0.362† 0.380† 0.380† 0.246** 0.244** 
 (3.66) (3.65) (3.68) (3.66) (2.90) (2.90) (2.48) (2.46) 
RD -3.649† -3.637† -1.935† -1.925† -4.655† -4.638† -2.600† -2.591† 
 (-9.74) (-9.71) (-7.14) (-7.10) (-11.01) (-10.97) (-9.62) (-9.58) 
ROA 1.406† 1.413† 0.790† 0.796† 1.242† 1.247† 0.778† 0.782† 
 (7.97) (8.01) (7.26) (7.31) (6.48) (6.51) (6.51) (6.54) 
Volatility -23.445† -23.389† -17.674† -17.654† -23.294† -23.230† -18.934† -18.917† 
 (-16.69) (-16.66) (-17.64) (-17.62) (-15.47) (-15.44) (-17.43) (-17.42) 
Ln(Analyst) 0.671† 0.671† 0.467† 0.469† 0.546† 0.546† 0.542† 0.543† 
 (26.76) (26.78) (23.32) (23.40) (20.66) (20.66) (27.38) (27.42) 
Instit_Own 0.251† 0.248† 0.184† 0.180† 0.216† 0.213† 0.185† 0.182† 
 (6.06) (5.99) (4.54) (4.45) (4.96) (4.88) (4.82) (4.75) 
Litigation 0.209† 0.210† 0.289† 0.289† 0.186† 0.189† 0.205† 0.205† 
 (3.67) (3.69) (5.48) (5.46) (3.16) (3.21) (4.11) (4.12) 
News -0.115† -0.115† 0.013 0.013 -0.101† -0.101† -0.083† -0.082† 
 (-3.82) (-3.81) (0.47) (0.50) (-3.17) (-3.17) (-3.19) (-3.17) 
Equity_Issue -0.094** -0.095** -0.025 -0.026 -0.134† -0.134† -0.080† -0.081† 
 (-2.46) (-2.48) (-0.79) (-0.82) (-3.22) (-3.23) (-2.58) (-2.60) 
Acquisition 0.353† 0.353† 0.302† 0.302† 0.334† 0.334† 0.321† 0.321† 
 (12.27) (12.28) (11.17) (11.17) (10.93) (10.95) (12.49) (12.49) 
Industry_Conc 0.704† 0.705† 0.554† 0.549† 0.290* 0.294* 0.552† 0.550† 
 (4.99) (4.99) (4.56) (4.51) (1.92) (1.94) (4.72) (4.71) 
Year & Ind. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 33,951 33,951 33,951 33,951 33,951 33,951 33,951 33,951 
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Table 4. CEO Political Ideology and MF Bias, Miss, and Accuracy 
This table presents tests of the association between CEO political ideology and management earnings forecast’s 
optimism, miss incidences, and accuracy. In the Logistic regressions in columns (1) and (2), the dependent 
variable is OptBias, which is an indicator variable that equals one if the average bias in a year is positive, and 
0 otherwise. In the Logistic regressions in columns (3) and (4), the dependent variable is Forecast_Miss which 
is an indicator variable that equals one if a firm misses at least one forecast in a year, and zero otherwise. In the 
OLS regressions in columns (5) and (6), the dependent variable is Accuracy, which is the average Forecast 
accuracy for all annual earnings forecasts made by a firm in a fiscal year. Measures of CEO political ideology, 
Rep_Dum, and Rep_Index, and all other independent variables are defined in Appendix A. All models include 
year and industry fixed effects. T-statistics are computed using robust standard errors and reported in 
parentheses. †, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  OptBias Forecast_Miss Accuracy 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Rep_Dum -0.143†  -0.142
†  0.087†  
 (-3.92)  (-3.64)  (4.58)  
Rep_Index  -0.158
†  -0.194†  0.084† 
  (-3.50)  (-4.09)  (3.60) 
Ln(assets) -0.069† -0.073† -0.038** -0.041** 0.020† 0.022† 
 (-4.61) (-4.84) (-2.40) (-2.57) (2.72) (3.00) 
MB -0.007** -0.008** -0.005 -0.006 0.014† 0.014† 
 (-1.96) (-2.02) (-1.39) (-1.44) (6.66) (6.71) 
Leverage 0.333** 0.331** 0.311** 0.312** -0.297† -0.297† 
 (2.29) (2.28) (2.00) (2.00) (-5.24) (-5.25) 
RD 2.555† 2.532† 1.827† 1.797† -1.433† -1.424† 
 (5.80) (5.75) (3.99) (3.93) (-8.84) (-8.78) 
ROA -2.777† -2.786† -2.620† -2.625† 0.675† 0.678† 
 (-11.87) (-11.91) (-10.87) (-10.90) (10.53) (10.57) 
Volatility 17.410† 17.350† 15.227† 15.160† -15.288† -15.274† 
 (11.20) (11.17) (9.38) (9.34) (-23.44) (-23.41) 
Ln(Analyst) -0.458† -0.459† -0.409† -0.409† 0.383† 0.384† 
 (-16.63) (-16.66) (-13.92) (-13.92) (31.87) (31.90) 
Instit_Own -0.196† -0.193† -0.068 -0.065 0.086† 0.084† 
 (-4.21) (-4.13) (-1.38) (-1.30) (3.52) (3.43) 
Litigation -0.228† -0.231† -0.146** -0.151** 0.062* 0.062* 
 (-3.72) (-3.78) (-2.30) (-2.38) (1.93) (1.94) 
News -0.849† -0.849† -0.886† -0.886† 0.108† 0.108† 
 (-23.27) (-23.27) (-22.08) (-22.09) (6.69) (6.70) 
Equity_Issue -0.046 -0.046 0.025 0.024 -0.027 -0.028 
 (-1.08) (-1.08) (0.54) (0.53) (-1.37) (-1.39) 
Acquisition -0.279† -0.280† -0.206† -0.207† 0.226† 0.226† 
 (-8.68) (-8.70) (-6.01) (-6.03) (13.74) (13.75) 
Industry_Conc -0.568† -0.572† -0.549† -0.557† 0.458† 0.457† 
 (-3.55) (-3.57) (-3.24) (-3.29) (6.13) (6.11) 
Year & Ind. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 33,951 33,951 33,951 33,951 33,951 33,951 
Pseudo / Adj. R2 0.220 0.220 0.176 0.176 0.266 0.266 
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Table 5. CEO Political Ideology: Bad news, Good news and Earnings Surprise. 
This table presents the results of the logistic regression models of the association between CEO political 
ideology and the credibility of the management earnings forecasts news. The dependent variable in models (1) 
and (2) is Bad_News which is an indicator variable that equals one if forecast news is negative, and 0 otherwise. 
The dependent variable in models (3) and (4) is Good_News which is an indicator variable equals one if forecast 
news is non-negative, and zero otherwise. Where forecast news is the difference between the management 
earnings forecasts and the most recent mean analyst estimate deflated by the stock price one trading day prior 
to the management forecast release date. The dependent variable in models (5) and (6) is Positive_Surprise 
which is an indicator variable that equals one if an earnings surprise is greater than 0.0001, and zero otherwise. 
The dependent variable in models (7) and (8) is Negative_Surprise, which is an indicator variable that equals 
one if an earnings surprise is less than -0.0001, and zero otherwise. The dependent variable in models (9) and 
(10) is Neutral_Surprise, which is an indicator variable that equals one if an earnings surprise is between 0.0001 
and -0.0001, and zero otherwise.  Earnings surprise is calculated as the difference between the actual earnings 
and the mean analyst estimate scaled by the stock price three trading days prior to an earnings announcement. 
Measures of CEO political ideology, Rep_Dum, and Rep_Index, and all other independent variables are defined 
in Appendix A. All models include year and industry fixed effects. T-statistics are computed using robust 
standard errors and reported in parentheses. †, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 Bad_News Good_News Positive_Surprise Negative_Surprise Neutral_Surprise 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Rep_Dum 0.133†  0.052  0.058**  -0.090†  0.029  
 (3.84)  (1.40)  (2.07)  (-2.97)  (0.64)  
Rep_Index  0.144†  0.011  0.052  -0.094**  0.065 
  (3.35)  (0.23)  (1.51)  (-2.54)  (1.18) 
Ln(assets) 0.052† 0.055† -0.016 -0.014 -0.023** -0.022* 0.042† 0.040† -0.077† -0.077† 
 (3.56) (3.78) (-1.07) (-0.93) (-2.04) (-1.92) (3.32) (3.19) (-4.07) (-4.09) 
MB 0.006 0.006* -0.010** -0.009** -0.009† -0.009† -0.011† -0.011† 0.030† 0.030† 
 (1.60) (1.65) (-2.29) (-2.26) (-2.86) (-2.84) (-3.20) (-3.22) (7.05) (7.05) 
Leverage 0.184 0.184 0.799† 0.801† -0.409† -0.410† 0.837† 0.838† -1.304† -1.304† 
 (1.38) (1.39) (5.99) (6.00) (-4.07) (-4.08) (7.91) (7.92) (-6.51) (-6.51) 
RD -3.800† -3.781† -3.119† -3.120† 1.951† 1.955† -1.751† -1.760† -1.264† -1.253† 
 (-9.16) (-9.12) (-7.12) (-7.12) (6.79) (6.81) (-5.62) (-5.65) (-2.67) (-2.64) 
ROA 2.503† 2.511† 0.454** 0.459** 1.392† 1.394† -1.849† -1.851† 1.036† 1.036† 
 (12.05) (12.08) (2.44) (2.46) (10.58) (10.59) (-13.18) (-13.19) (4.27) (4.27) 
Volatility -21.817† -21.758† -18.305† -18.294† -0.466 -0.458 2.559** 2.550** -9.098† -9.080† 
 (-14.51) (-14.48) (-11.75) (-11.75) (-0.42) (-0.42) (2.19) (2.18) (-4.88) (-4.87) 
Ln(Analyst) 0.582† 0.583† 0.563† 0.563† 0.353† 0.353† -0.595† -0.595† 0.614† 0.614† 
 (21.80) (21.81) (19.58) (19.62) (17.57) (17.59) (-27.71) (-27.73) (16.87) (16.85) 
Instit_Own 0.252† 0.249† 0.323† 0.322† 0.295† 0.294† -0.313† -0.311† 0.046 0.044 
 (5.74) (5.66) (6.78) (6.77) (8.25) (8.22) (-8.28) (-8.22) (0.76) (0.74) 
Litigation 0.277† 0.279† 0.059 0.058 -0.010 -0.010 -0.054 -0.055 0.055 0.057 
 (4.73) (4.77) (0.92) (0.90) (-0.21) (-0.20) (-1.07) (-1.08) (0.74) (0.77) 
News 0.290† 0.290† -0.782† -0.782† 0.505† 0.505† -0.663† -0.664† 0.260† 0.260† 
 (8.99) (8.99) (-23.43) (-23.42) (20.14) (20.15) (-25.04) (-25.04) (5.86) (5.86) 
Equity_Issue 0.022 0.022 -0.109** -0.109** -0.019 -0.019 0.006 0.006 0.038 0.038 
 (0.55) (0.54) (-2.49) (-2.51) (-0.62) (-0.62) (0.17) (0.17) (0.77) (0.78) 
Acquisition 0.316† 0.317† 0.279† 0.279† 0.030 0.030 -0.098† -0.098† 0.195† 0.195† 
 (10.40) (10.42) (8.57) (8.58) (1.24) (1.24) (-3.76) (-3.77) (4.93) (4.93) 
Industry_Conc 0.835† 0.838† 0.354** 0.350** -0.370† -0.371† 0.181 0.182 0.444** 0.447** 
 (5.59) (5.61) (2.17) (2.14) (-3.29) (-3.30) (1.52) (1.53) (2.43) (2.45) 
Year & Ind. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 33,951 33,951 33,951 33,951 33,951 33,951 33,951 33,951 33,951 33,951 
Pseudo R2 0.257 0.257 0.180 0.180 0.052 0.052 0.102 0.102 0.077 0.077 
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Table 6. Propensity Score Matching 
This table presents the test of management earnings forecasts between Republican and matching 
samples of control firm-years with non-Republican CEOs matched primarily on the firm 
characteristics, year, and industry. Panel A presents results for the diagnostic- differences in means 
of firm characteristics where Treatment denotes Rep_dumcycle which is an indicator variable that 
equals one if all donations of a CEO in an election cycle are directed to the Republican Party and 
controls refers to matching sample of CEOs who donated to other parties or never donated.  
Difference represents the difference between treated and control groups. Panel B & C presents the 
results for the models of the association between management earnings forecasts and CEO political 
ideology from matched firm-years. All other variables are defined in Appendix A.  †, ** and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
Panel A: Diagnostic- differences in means of variables 
Variable Treatment Control Difference T-stat 
Ln(assets) 7.620 7.604 0.015 0.48 
MB 3.209 3.250 -0.041 -0.53 
Leverage 0.164 0.160 0.004 1.55 
RD 0.023 0.023 0.000 -0.31 
ROA 0.049 0.051 -0.002 -1.09 
Return_Volatility 0.025 0.025 0.000 0.40 
Ln(Analyst) 2.268 2.264 0.004 0.25 
Instit_Own 0.558 0.550 0.009 1.20 
Litigation 0.157 0.151 0.005 0.74 
News 0.650 0.649 0.001 0.15 
Equity_Issue 0.156 0.160 -0.004 -0.53 
Acquisition 0.416 0.412 0.004 0.39 
Industry_Conc 0.482 0.480 0.002 0.59 
Panel B. CEO Political ideology and management earnings forecast (1) 
  Issue Frequency Range Ln(Horizon) OptBias 
Forecast_
Miss  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Rep_dumcycle     0.103** 0.091* 0.104* 0.083* -0.134** -0.218† 
 (2.03) (1.94) (1.91) (1.88) (-2.39) (-3.68) 
Pseudo / Adj. R2 0.254 0.301 0.269 0.279 0.221 0.176 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year & Ind. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 9,578 9,578 9,578 9,578 9,578 9,578 
Panel C. CEO Political ideology and management earnings forecast. (2) 











  (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Rep_dumcycle     0.071** 0.090* -0.031 0.071* -0.096** 0.017 
 (2.48) (1.68) (-0.55) (1.68) (-2.12) (0.24) 
Pseudo / Adj. R2 0.279 0.265 0.168 0.046 0.093 0.093 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year & Ind. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 9,578 9,578 9,578 9,578 9,578 9,578 
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Table 7. MEF around CEO turnover. Difference in Difference (DID) test. 
This table presents estimates from the Difference-in-Difference (DID) regressions of the association between CEO political ideology and management 
earnings forecasts around CEO turnover event (-3, +3). Rep-Leaving is a dummy variable equals one if a firm replaces a Rep CEO with a non-Rep CEO, 0 
otherwise. Republican CEOs are defined as Rep_dumOnly, which is an indicator variable that equals one if all donations of a CEO in an election cycle are 
directed to the Republican Party only. After is a dummy variable equals 1 for the years after the CEO turnover, 0 for the pre-tenure period where CEO 
turnover equals one if a CEO in the current year is different from the CEO in the previous year. We only consider turnover events where long-term old CEOs 
are replaced by long-term new CEOs (long-term old and long-term new CEOs are those who hold their position for at least three years). All models include 
control variables, year, and industry fixed effects. All other independent variables are defined in Appendix A. T-statistics are computed using robust standard 
errors and reported in parentheses. †, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.      
  

















  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Rep-Leaving*After -0.274** -0.080 -0.230* -0.246* 0.410† 0.369** -0.188** -0.292** -0.054 -0.150 0.208* -0.134 
 (-2.03) (-0.62) (-1.67) (-1.92) (2.84) (2.47) (-2.24) (-2.12) (-0.37) (-1.31) (1.68) (-0.73) 
Rep-Leaving 0.105 -0.028 -0.026 0.113 -0.177 -0.229* 0.139** 0.121 -0.058 -0.062 0.034 0.077 
 (0.96) (-0.30) (-0.23) (1.12) (-1.51) (-1.90) (2.09) (1.09) (-0.48) (-0.67) (0.34) (0.53) 
After 0.100 0.155** 0.178** 0.114* -0.275† -0.243† 0.050 0.187** -0.103 -0.043 0.072 -0.043 
 (1.44) (2.43) (2.34) (1.72) (-3.51) (-2.94) (1.14) (2.53) (-1.36) (-0.71) (1.10) (-0.44) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year & Ind. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo / Adj. R2 0.216 0.299 0.214 0.253 0.200 0.147 0.271 0.225 0.150 0.054 0.106 0.081 
Observations 8,722 8,722 8,722 8,722 8,722 8,722 8,722 8,722 8,722 8,722 8,722 8,722 
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Table 8. Controlling for CEO characteristics, incentives, and overconfidence 
This table presents tests of the association between CEO political ideology and management earnings forecast controlling for CEO characteristics (Ln(Tenure), Ln(Age), 
Duality, Ln(Delta), Ln(Vega), CEO_Own, and Overconfidence) in addition to the baseline control variables. Panel A reports results for Issue, Frequency, Range, Ln(Horizon), 
OptBias, and Forecast_Miss, in turn. Panel B reports results for Accuracy, Bad_News, Good_News, Positive_Surprise, Negative_Surprise, and Neutral_Surprise, in turn. 
Measures of CEO political ideology, Rep_Dum and Rep_Index, and all other independent variables are defined in Appendix A. All models include year and industry fixed 
effects. T-statistics are computed using robust standard errors and reported in parentheses. †, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A. CEO Political ideology and MEF: Controlling for CEO characteristic, incentives, and overconfidence (1) 
 Issue Frequency Range Ln(Horizon) OptBias Miss 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 














  (2.59)  (2.88)  (2.71)  (2.58)  (-2.84)  (-3.56) 
Ln(Tenure) -0.027 -0.025 -0.092† -0.088† -0.021 -0.020 -0.053** -0.051** 0.095† 0.093† 0.089† 0.088† 
 (-1.07) (-0.98) (-4.34) (-4.16) (-0.78) (-0.71) (-2.53) (-2.42) (3.32) (3.24) (2.92) (2.88) 
Ln(Age) -0.138 -0.138 -0.392† -0.387† -0.094 -0.095 -0.144 -0.143 0.145 0.146 -0.082 -0.076 
 (-1.06) (-1.06) (-3.41) (-3.36) (-0.68) (-0.69) (-1.30) (-1.29) (1.00) (1.00) (-0.54) (-0.49) 
Duality 0.215† 0.217† 0.182† 0.187† 0.210† 0.212† 0.171† 0.173† -0.156† -0.158† -0.140† -0.141† 
 (6.37) (6.43) (5.72) (5.87) (5.97) (6.01) (5.81) (5.88) (-4.22) (-4.28) (-3.56) (-3.57) 
Ln(Delta) 0.035 0.035 0.071† 0.073† 0.005 0.005 0.042** 0.043** -0.123† -0.123† -0.111† -0.111† 
 (1.61) (1.62) (3.88) (3.96) (0.24) (0.24) (2.32) (2.35) (-5.09) (-5.11) (-4.33) (-4.31) 
Ln(Vega) 0.084† 0.084† 0.096† 0.095† 0.077† 0.077† 0.092† 0.092† -0.049† -0.049† -0.044† -0.044† 
 (6.60) (6.58) (7.50) (7.46) (5.87) (5.85) (7.94) (7.92) (-3.60) (-3.57) (-3.03) (-3.03) 
CEO_Own -2.680† -2.654† -2.198† -2.186† -2.796† -2.765† -2.107† -2.093† 3.457† 3.420† 3.556† 3.508† 
 (-5.65) (-5.60) (-6.02) (-5.98) (-5.29) (-5.23) (-5.66) (-5.62) (6.06) (6.00) (5.69) (5.61) 
Overconfidence 0.100† 0.101† 0.174† 0.176† 0.086** 0.087** 0.115† 0.116† -0.062 -0.063 -0.056 -0.057 
 (2.72) (2.75) (5.37) (5.41) (2.21) (2.24) (3.66) (3.69) (-1.49) (-1.52) (-1.27) (-1.31) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year & Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 27,912 27,912 27,912 27,912 27,912 27,912 27,912 27,912 27,912 27,912 27,912 27,912 
Pseudo /Adj. R2 0.259 0.258 0.291 0.291 0.254 0.254 0.276 0.276 0.224 0.224 0.178 0.178 
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Table 8. Controlling for CEO characteristics, incentives, and overconfidence. Cont’d 
Panel B. CEO Political ideology and MEF: Controlling for CEO characteristic, incentives, and overconfidence (2) 
 Accuracy Bad_News Good_News Positive_Surprise Negative_Surprise Neutral_Surprise 
  (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) 
Rep_Dum 0.077†  0.112
†  0.055  0.046  -0.065
*  0.009  
 (3.68)  (2.95)  (1.38)  (1.47)  (-1.94)  (0.19)  
Rep_Index  0.070
†  0.111
**  0.015  0.011  -0.048  0.068 
  (2.73)  (2.38)  (0.31)  (0.29)  (-1.15)  (1.12) 
Ln(Tenure) -0.040† -0.038† -0.051* -0.049* 0.034 0.035 -0.088† -0.086† 0.087† 0.086† 0.018 0.018 
 (-3.00) (-2.89) (-1.87) (-1.80) (1.18) (1.23) (-4.25) (-4.19) (3.96) (3.89) (0.54) (0.52) 
Ln(Age) -0.124* -0.124* -0.096 -0.096 -0.197 -0.193 -0.250** -0.246** 0.340† 0.338† -0.112 -0.119 
 (-1.79) (-1.78) (-0.70) (-0.70) (-1.38) (-1.35) (-2.33) (-2.30) (2.96) (2.94) (-0.65) (-0.69) 
Duality 0.098† 0.099† 0.205† 0.207† 0.162† 0.164† 0.056* 0.058** -0.042 -0.043 -0.049 -0.052 
 (5.22) (5.30) (5.84) (5.89) (4.41) (4.49) (1.95) (2.03) (-1.36) (-1.41) (-1.06) (-1.11) 
Ln(Delta) 0.066† 0.066† 0.084† 0.084† -0.047** -0.046** 0.098† 0.099† -0.178† -0.178† 0.159† 0.158† 
 (5.72) (5.75) (3.71) (3.72) (-2.00) (-1.97) (5.54) (5.58) (-9.31) (-9.34) (5.37) (5.34) 
Ln(Vega) 0.053† 0.053† 0.065† 0.065† 0.071† 0.071† -0.002 -0.002 0.015 0.015 -0.023 -0.022 
 (7.04) (7.02) (5.00) (4.98) (4.86) (4.84) (-0.14) (-0.16) (1.26) (1.27) (-1.34) (-1.31) 
CEO_Own -1.846† -1.837† -3.243† -3.215† -0.710 -0.706 -1.219† -1.220† 2.312† 2.307† -2.194† -2.179† 
 (-7.91) (-7.86) (-6.12) (-6.07) (-1.39) (-1.38) (-3.30) (-3.30) (5.96) (5.94) (-3.40) (-3.37) 
Overconfidence 0.088† 0.089† 0.106† 0.107† 0.076* 0.077* 0.045 0.045 -0.050 -0.051 -0.009 -0.008 
 (4.48) (4.51) (2.73) (2.76) (1.85) (1.86) (1.48) (1.49) (-1.56) (-1.57) (-0.17) (-0.16) 
 Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year & Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 27,912 27,912 27,912 27,912 27,912 27,912 27,912 27,912 27,912 27,912 27,912 27,912 
Pseudo /Adj. R2 0.278 0.278 0.259 0.259 0.176 0.176 0.054 0.054 0.103 0.103 0.075 0.075 
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Table 9. Alternative measures of CEO Republican Ideology. 
This table presents tests of the association between CEO political ideology and management earnings forecast using alternative measures of CEO political ideology. 
Rep_indexcycle is an index calculated as total donations to the Republican party minus total donations to the Democratic party divided by total donations to both parties in 
each election cycle. Rep_dumcycle is an indicator variable that equals one if all donations of a CEO in an election cycle are directed to the Republican Party. Rep_dumtenure is 
an indicator variable that equals one if all donations of a CEO during her/his tenure are directed to the Republican Party. Panel A reports results for Issue, Frequency, Range, 
Ln(Horizon), OptBias, and Forecast_Miss, in turn. Panel B reports results for Accuracy, Bad_News, Good_News, Positive_Surprise, Negative_Surprise, and 
Neutral_Surprise, in turn. All models include control variables, year, and industry fixed effects. All other independent variables are defined in Appendix A. T-statistics are 
computed using robust standard errors and reported in parentheses. †, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A. CEO Political ideology and MEF: alternative measures of CEO Republican Ideology (1)  
 Issue Frequency Range  Ln(Horizon) OptBias Forecast_Miss 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
Rep_indexcycle 0.078†  
 0.088†   0.104†   0.069†   -0.081**   -0.100†   
 (2.73)   (3.16)   (3.42)   (2.71)   (-2.56)   (-2.94)   
Rep_dumcycle     
 0.112†   0.099†   0.101**   0.087**   -0.120†   -0.161†  
  (2.88)   (2.69)   (2.47)   (2.55)   (-2.80)   (-3.55)  
Rep_dumtenure 
  0.122†   0.110†   0.108**   0.087**   -0.097**   -0.141† 
   (2.76)   (2.65)   (2.33)   (2.29)   (-2.00)   (-2.75) 
Pseudo / Adj. R2 0.257 0.257 0.257 0.279 0.279 0.279 0.253 0.253 0.253 0.268 0.268 0.268 0.220 0.220 0.220 0.176 0.176 0.176 
Panel B. CEO Political ideology and MEF: alternative measures of CEO Republican Ideology (2)  
 Accuracy Bad_News Good_News Positive_Surprise Negative_Surprise Neutral_Surprise 
Rep_indexcycle 0.046†  
 0.060**   0.007   0.048**   -0.048*   -0.015   
 (2.76)   (1.98)   (0.20)   (1.96)   (-1.81)   (-0.38)   
Rep_dumcycle     
 0.069†   0.111†   0.009   0.039   -0.055   0.019  
  (3.08)   (2.73)   (0.20)   (1.18)   (-1.54)   (0.35)  
Rep_dumtenure 
  0.070†   0.128†   0.057   0.039   -0.068*   0.058 
   (2.82)   (2.77)   (1.15)   (1.05)   (-1.70)   (0.97) 
Pseudo / Adj. R2 0.266 0.266 0.266 0.257 0.257 0.257 0.180 0.180 0.180 0.052 0.052 0.052 0.102 0.102 0.102 0.077 0.077 0.077 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year & Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 33,951 33,951 33,951 33,951 33,951 33,951 33,951 33,951 33,951 33,951 33,951 33,951 33,951 33,951 33,951 33,951 33,951 33,951 
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Table 10. Cross-sectional test: High vs. low institutional ownership. 
This table presents results for firms with high (above median) level of institutional ownership (Panel A) and firms with low (below median) level of institutional ownership 
(Panel B). Panel A reports results for Issue, Frequency, Range, Ln(Horizon), OptBias, and Forecast_Miss, in turn. Panel B reports results for Accuracy, Bad_News, 
Good_News, Positive_Surprise, Negative_Surprise, and Neutral_Surprise, in turn. Measures of CEO political ideology, Rep_Dum and Rep_Index, and all other independent 
variables are defined in Appendix A. All models include control variables, year, and industry fixed effects. T-statistics are computed using robust standard errors and reported 
in parentheses. †, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A1. CEO Political ideology and management earnings forecast (High institutional ownership 1)  
 Issue  Frequency Range Ln(Horizon) OptBias Forecast_Miss 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Rep_Dum 0.177†  0.245†  0.202†  0.162†  -0.185†  -0.170†  
 (3.94)  (4.97)  (4.40)  (3.83)  (-3.84)  (-3.32)  
Rep_Index  0.138**  0.192†  0.182†  0.134†  -0.166†  -0.213† 
  (2.54)  (3.21)  (3.28)  (2.62)  (-2.84)  (-3.47) 
Observations 16,975 16,975 16,975 16,975 16,975 16,975 16,975 16,975 16,971 16,971 16,971 16,971 
Pseudo R2/Adj. R2 0.221 0.220 0.269 0.268 0.207 0.206 0.251 0.251 0.193 0.193 0.151 0.151 
Panel A2. CEO Political ideology and management earnings forecast (High institutional ownership 2)  
  Accuracy Bad_News Good_News Positive_Surprise Negative_Surprise Neutral_Surprise 
Rep_Dum 0.141†  0.194†  0.091*  0.077*  -0.058  -0.092  
 (4.98)  (4.19)  (1.87)  (1.93)  (-1.35)  (-1.42)  
Rep_Index  0.138†  0.163†  0.016  0.044  -0.030  -0.072 
  (4.02)  (2.89)  (0.27)  (0.92)  (-0.59)  (-0.90) 
Observations 16,975 16,975 16,975 16,975 16,975 16,975 16,975 16,975 16,975 16,975 16,971 16,971 
Pseudo R2/Adj. R2 0.263 0.262 0.223 0.223 0.140 0.139 0.036 0.036 0.074 0.074 0.075 0.075 
Panel B1. CEO Political ideology and management earnings forecast (Low institutional ownership 1)  
 Issue  Frequency Range Ln(Horizon) OptBias Forecast_Miss 
Rep_Dum 0.091*  0.073




 (1.78)  (1.95)  (0.33)  (1.71)  (-1.68)  (-2.31)  
Rep_Index  0.147
**  0.022  0.106  0.073  -0.157
**  -0.201
† 
  (2.25)  (0.49)  (1.48)  (1.50)  (-2.13)  (-2.58) 
Observations 16,970 16,970 16,976 16,976 16,970 16,970 16,976 16,976 16,915 16,915 16,915 16,915 
Pseudo R2/Adj. R2 0.291 0.291 0.293 0.293 0.302 0.303 0.279 0.279 0.245 0.245 0.208 0.208 
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Table 10. Cross-sectional test: High vs. low institutional ownership. Cont’d 
Panel B2. CEO Political ideology and management earnings forecast (Low institutional ownership 2)  
  Accuracy Bad_News Good_News Positive_Surprise Negative_Surprise Neutral_Surprise 
Rep_Dum 0.037  0.076  -0.000  0.052  -0.126
†  0.128
**  
 (1.49)  (1.39)  (-0.00)  (1.27)  (-2.90)  (2.02)  
Rep_Index  0.028  0.167
**  0.032  0.067  -0.166
†  0.205
† 
  (0.91)  (2.40)  (0.42)  (1.32)  (-3.05)  (2.62) 
Observations 16,976 16,976 16,927 16,927 16,970 16,970 16,976 16,976 16,976 16,976 16,970 16,970 
Pseudo R2/Adj. R2 0.266 0.266 0.281 0.281 0.226 0.226 0.067 0.067 0.125 0.126 0.09 0.091 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year & Ind. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 11. Cross-sectional test: High vs. low litigation risk. 
This table presents results for firms in industries with high litigation environment (Panel A) and firms in industries with low litigation environment (Panel B). Panel A reports 
results for Issue, Frequency, Range, Ln(Horizon), OptBias, and Forecast_Miss, in turn. Panel B reports results for Accuracy, Bad_News, Good_News, Positive_Surprise, 
Negative_Surprise, and Neutral_Surprise, in turn. Measures of CEO political ideology, Rep_Dum and Rep_Index, and all other independent variables are defined in Appendix 
A. All models include control variables, year, and industry fixed effects. T-statistics are computed using robust standard errors and reported in parentheses. †, ** and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A1. CEO Political ideology and management earnings forecast (High litigation environment 1)  
 Issue  Frequency Range Ln(Horizon) OptBias Forecast_Miss 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Rep_Dum 0.220†  0.325†  0.343†  0.215†  -0.227†  -0.063  
 (2.79)  (4.03)  (4.14)  (3.11)  (-2.67)  (-0.67)  
Rep_Index  0.261†  0.318†  0.354†  0.225†  -0.184*  -0.129 
  (2.76)  (3.37)  (3.53)  (2.69)  (-1.74)  (-1.11) 
Observations 8,120 8,120 8,144 8,144 8,120 8,120 8,144 8,144 8,120 8,120 8,120 8,120 
Pseudo R2/Adj. R2 0.253 0.253 0.288 0.287 0.223 0.222 0.269 0.269 0.219 0.219 0.181 0.181 
Panel A2. CEO Political ideology and management earnings forecast (High litigation environment 2)  
  Accuracy Bad_News Good_News Positive_Surprise Negative_Surprise Neutral_Surprise 
Rep_Dum 0.206†  0.194**  0.149*  0.035  -0.075  0.024  
 (4.35)  (2.37)  (1.68)  (0.50)  (-0.94)  (0.26)  
Rep_Index  0.229†  0.170*  0.183*  0.095  -0.129  0.030 
  (4.00)  (1.71)  (1.68)  (1.11)  (-1.35)  (0.24) 
Observations 8,144 8,144 8,120 8,120 8,120 8,120 8,144 8,144 8,144 8,144 8,144 8,144 
Pseudo R2/Adj. R2 0.272 0.272 0.252 0.252 0.143 0.143 0.048 0.049 0.100 0.100 0.061 0.061 
Panel B1. CEO Political ideology and management earnings forecast (Low litigation environment 1)  
 Issue  Frequency Range Ln(Horizon) OptBias Forecast_Miss 
Rep_Dum 0.097†  0.112†  0.071*  0.075**  -0.116†  -0.151†  
 (2.63)  (3.33)  (1.83)  (2.38)  (-2.87)  (-3.53)  
Rep_Index  0.075*  0.042  0.080*  0.048  -0.130†  -0.189† 
  (1.65)  (1.01)  (1.65)  (1.23)  (-2.61)  (-3.61) 
Observations 25,807 25,807 25,807 25,807 25,807 25,807 25,807 25,807 25,807 25,807 25,807 25,807 
Pseudo R2/Adj. R2 0.266 0.266 0.290 0.290 0.268 0.268 0.281 0.280 0.223 0.223 0.178 0.178 
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Table 11. Cross-sectional test: High vs. low litigation risk. Cont’d 
Panel B2. CEO Political ideology and management earnings forecast (Low litigation environment 2)  
  Accuracy Bad_News Good_News Positive_Surprise Negative_Surprise Neutral_Surprise 
Rep_Dum 0.054†  0.107†  0.022  0.068**  -0.097†  0.021  
 (2.62)  (2.79)  (0.54)  (2.19)  (-2.95)  (0.41)  
Rep_Index  0.038  0.114**  -0.037  0.046  -0.092**  0.066 
  (1.50)  (2.38)  (-0.72)  (1.19)  (-2.26)  (1.05) 
Observations 25,807 25,807 25,807 25,807 25,807 25,807 25,807 25,807 25,807 25,807 25,807 25,807 
Pseudo R2/Adj. R2 0.275 0.275 0.262 0.262 0.190 0.190 0.053 0.053 0.099 0.099 0.083 0.083 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 12. Robustness check. CEO Democratic ideology and MEF 
This table presents tests of the association between CEO political ideology and management earnings forecast using the measure of a CEO’s political ideology that 
captures Democratic affiliation. Dem_Dum is an indicator variable that equals one if a CEO donated more to the Democratic party than to the Republican party during 
her/his tenure. Dem_Index is the percentage of a CEO’s support for the Democratic Party calculated as the number of cycles in which a CEO  donates exclusively to 
the Democratic party divided by her/his number of donation cycles in the sample period. Panel A reports results for the models of the association between CEO 
political ideology on one hand and Issue, Frequency, Range, Ln(Horizon), OptBias, and Forecast_Miss, on the other hand. Panel B reports results for the models of 
the association between CEO political ideology on one hand and Accuracy, Bad_News, Good_News, Positive_Surprise, Negative_Surprise, and Neutral_Surprise on 
the other hand. All other independent variables are defined in Appendix A. All models include year and industry fixed effects. T-statistics are computed using robust 
standard errors and reported in parentheses. †, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A. CEO Political ideology and MEF: measures of CEO Democratic ideology (1) 
 Issue Frequency Range Ln(Horizon) OptBias  Forecast_Miss  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Dem_Dum -0.088**  -0.008  -0.069  -0.063*  0.068  0.092*  
 (-2.18)  (-0.20)  (-1.61)  (-1.72)  (1.54)  (1.95)  
Dem_Index  -0.085  -0.006  -0.142**  -0.076  0.066  0.121* 
  (-1.40)  (-0.10)  (-2.23)  (-1.38)  (0.98)  (1.69) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year & Ind. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 33,951 33,951 33,951 33,951 33,951 33,951 33,951 33,951 33,951 33,951 33,951 33,951 
Pseudo / Adj. R2 0.257 0.257 0.279 0279 0.253 0.253 0.268 0.268 0.220 0.220 0.176 0.176 
Panel B. CEO Political ideology and MEF: measures of CEO Democratic ideology (2) 
 Accuracy Bad_News Good_News Positive_Surprise Negative_Surprise Neutral_Surprise 
Dem_Dum -0.025  -0.038  0.032  -0.077**  0.036  0.031  
 (-0.70)  (-0.59)  (0.48)  (-2.20)  (0.65)  (0.57)  
Dem_Index  -0.043*  -0.056  -0.016  -0.045  0.074**  0.014 
  (-1.79)  (-1.33)  (-0.36)  (-0.86)  (2.00)  (0.18) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year & Ind. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 33,951 33,951 33,951 33,951 33,951 33,951 33,951 33,951 33,951 33,951 33,951 33,951 
Pseudo / Adj. R2 0.259 0.259 0.257 0.257 0.180 0.180 0.052 0.052 0.102 0.102 0.077 0.077 





This online supplementary material complements and extends our main analysis in 
"CEO political ideology and management earnings forecast" in multiple ways. First, we use 
alternative measures of CEO political ideology and management earnings forecasts to mitigate 
measurement error. Second, we conduct a range of robustness tests to address various 
specification issues that could otherwise confound our main results. Lastly, we conduct 
additional tests to address further the endogeneity issues that could arise from measurement 
error, selection bias, and/or omitted variable bias. 
1. Alternative measures of CEO political ideology and overconfidence 
Table A1 presents the results using two alternative measures of Republican ideology, 
Rep_indexyear which is an index calculated as total donations to the Republican party minus 
total donations to the Democratic party divided by total donations to both parties in each fiscal 
year, and Rep_indextenure which is an index calculated as total donations to the Republican party 
minus total donations to the Democratic party divided by total donations to both parties in a 
CEO's entire tenure. In Table A2, we use alternative measures of Democratic ideology and 
Other ideology. Results are similar to our main findings, which mitigate the concerns that our 
findings are sensitive to our baseline measures of Republican ideology. Further, Table A3 uses 
Net_buyer as an alternative measure of CEO overconfidence in addition to other CEO and firm 
characteristics. 
2. Controlling for variations in CEO donation  
Political ideology data includes a significant variation in CEO donation. While some CEOs 
consistently donate in each election cycle, others never make any political donations. To make 
sure that such variation does not affect our baseline results, we run a subsample analysis after 
excluding CEOs who never donated during the sample period (Table A4, Panels A & B). 
Further, we run a subsample analysis by restricting the sample to CEO donation years only 
(Table A4, Panels C & D). Results using these restrictive subsamples are similar to our baseline 
results.  
3. Propensity score matching. Using alternative measures of CEO political 
ideology.38 
We run our propensity score matching (PSM) using alternative measures of CEO political 
ideology. First, we identify Treatment using Rep_dumonly which is an indicator variable that 
equals one if all donations of a CEO in an election cycle are directed to the Republican Party 
only (neither Democratic nor others) and control refer to matching sample of CEOs who 
donated to other parties or never donated (Table A5, Panel A). Next, we identify Treatment 
using Rep_dumcycle which is an indicator variable that equals 1 if all donations of a CEO in an 
election cycle are directed to the Republican Party and control refers to matching sample if the 
donations of a CEO in an election cycle are all directed toward the Democratic party (Table 
 
38 We do not report the diagnostic tests for the difference in mean matching variables between treatment and 
control groups for brevity. These tests are available upon request. 
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A5, Panel B). Lastly, we identify Treatment using Rep_dumtenure which is an indicator variable 
that equals 1 if all donations of a CEO during her/his entire tenure are directed to the 
Republican Party and control refers to matching sample if all donations of a CEO during her/his 
entire tenure are directed to the Democratic Party (Table A5, Panel C). We carefully match the 
Treatment and Control groups on multiple firm characteristics as well as year and industry to 
mitigate the endogeneity issue. The results of these tests are similar to our baseline PSM results. 
4. Management earnings forecasts around CEO turnover. 
Our baseline DID test uses a -3, +3 window around CEO turnover events. To address the 
possibility that our DID results are affected by the window selection, we repeat our DID test 
using a -2, +2 window, and report results in Table A6. After is a dummy variable equals 1 for 
the years after the CEO turnover. We only consider turnover events where long-term old CEOs 
are replaced by long-term new CEOs (long-term is defined as holding the position for at least 
two years). Rep_Leaving is a dummy variable equals one if a firm replaces a Rep CEO with a 
non-Rep CEO, 0 otherwise. Republican CEOs are defined using Rep_dumOnly, which is an 
indicator variable that equals one if all donations of a CEO in an election cycle are directed to 
the Republican Party only (neither Democratic nor others). Consistent with our baseline results, 
the coefficient of After*Rep_Leaving is significantly negative in models of MFE Issue, 
Frequency, Range, Horizon, Accuracy, Bad_News, and Positive_Surprise and significantly 
positive in models of Forecast_Miss, Bias, and Negative_Surprise.  
Next, we examine the effect of change in CEO political ideology due to CEO turnover on 
change on earnings forecasts (Table A7). Specifically, Δdependent is the difference between 
the first full fiscal year under the new CEO and the last full fiscal year under the old CEO. 
ΔREPCEO is defined as the changes in CEO political ideology due to CEO turnover, where 
ΔREPCEO =1 if a Republican CEO replaces a Democratic CEO, 0 if CEO political ideology 
does not change with turnover, and -1 if a Democratic CEO replaces a Republican CEO.39 Even 
though this test uses a significantly smaller sample size, results are similar to our baseline 
results.  
5. Additional robustness checks. 
To rule out the possibility that our results are not persistent beyond CEO turnover years, 
we exclude firm-years in which CEO turnover occurred (Table A8, Panel A). To further check 
the persistency of our baseline results, we exclude the first three years of CEO tenure (Table 
A8, Panel B). Following Chava, Livdan, and Purnanandam (2009), we use change-on-change 
regressions to examine the active managerial influence on management earnings forecasts. 
Specifically, we estimate annual changes in all management earnings forecasts variables, key 
republican measures, and control variables similar to our baseline regressions. Following 
Hutton, Jiang, and Kumar (2014), we restrict our sample to those firm-years where annual 
changes in both Republican measures and management earnings forecast variables are non-
zero. The results of this test are presented in Table A9. Further, Baik, Farber, and Lee (2011) 
find that CEO ability is positively associated with likelihood, frequency, and accuracy of 
 
39 Due to this restrictive definition of changes in CEO political ideology measures around CEO turnover event, 
our sample size is reduced significantly.  
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earnings forecasts. Republican CEOs may have higher ability compared to non-Republican 
CEOs driving our main findings. Thus, following Demerjian, Lev, and McVay (2012), we 
control for managerial ability and find similar results to our baseline regression.40 The results 
of this test are presented in Table A10.  
To capture the state-level variations in CEO political ideology and management earnings 
forecasts, we control for state fixed effects (headquarters) (table A11, Panel A & B). Moreover, 
our results continue to hold if we cluster the standard error at the firm level (Table A11, Panel 
C & D).  
 Our baseline results suggest a positive association between CEOs' conservative political 
ideology (Republican) and the quality of earnings forecast. However, political activism can 
represent an alternative explanation of our ideology interpretation of the results. To address 
this issue, we estimate models that concurrently control for CEO's Republican as well as 
Democratic ideologies. (Table A12). Coefficient estimates of measures of Republican and 
Democratic ideologies are opposite, which is consistent with the ideology rather than the 
activism explanation of our results. 
 Moreover, we restrict our samples to firms that appear at least once in the I/B/E/S to 
address the database coverage issue (Chuk, Matsumoto, and Miller (2013); Houston et al. 
(2019)). Specifically, we exclude those firms that have never issued any earnings forecast 
during our sample period. This setting should eliminate the possible bias in our results caused 
by the effect of firms that have never issued any EPS forecasting in our sample period. The 
results of this test are presented in Table A13.  
Lastly, Table A14 presents our results for subsamples of firms with a high and low level 
of institutional ownership. Table A15 presents our results for a subsample of pre-crisis 
observations (1993-2007) and a subsample of post-crisis observations (2010-2016). 
  
 
40 Thank you Demerjian, Lev, and McVay (2012) for sharing their data. Managerial ability data is available at: 
ht tps://faculty.washington.edu/pdemerj/data.html. Last accessed on May 24, 2020. 
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Appendix A. Variable definition 
Variable Definition 
CEO political ideology (Baseline) 
Rep_dum An indicator variable that equals one if a CEO donated more to the Republican 
party than to the Democratic party during her/his entire tenure [Bhandari et al. 
2018]. 
Rep_Index Percentage of a CEO's support for the Republican Party calculated as the 
number of cycles in which a CEO donates exclusively to the Republican party 
divided by her/his number of donation cycles in the sample period [Hong and 
Kostovetsky, 2012]. 
CEO political ideology (Robustness)  
Dem_dum An indicator variable that equals one if a CEO donated more to the Democratic 
party than to the Republican party during her/his entire tenure. 
Dem_Index Percentage of a CEO's support for the Democratic Party calculated as the 
number of cycles in which a CEO donates exclusively to the Democratic party 
divided by her/his number of donation cycles in the sample period. 
Rep_dumcycle An indicator variable that equals one if all donations of a CEO in an election 
cycle are directed to the Republican Party [Hutton et al. 2014]. 
Rep_dumtenure An indicator variable that equals one if all donations of a CEO during her/his 
entire tenure are directed to the Republican Party [Elnahas and Kim, 2017]. 
Rep_indexcycle An index calculated as total donations to the Republican party minus total 
donations to the Democratic party divided by total donations to both parties in 
each election cycle. This index ranges between -1 (strong Democrat) and 1 
(strong Republican) [Hutton et al. 2014]. 
Rep_dumOnly An indicator variable that equals one if all donations of a CEO in an election 
cycle are directed to the Republican Party only (neither Democratic nor others). 
CEO political ideology (Internet appendix)  
Rep_indexyear An index calculated as total donations to the Republican party minus total 
donations to the Democratic party divided by total donations to both parties in 
each fiscal year. This index ranges between -1 (strong democrat) and 1 (strong 
Republican). 
Rep_indextenure An index calculated as total donations to the Republican party minus total 
donations to the Democratic party divided by total donations to both parties in 
a CEO's entire tenure. This index ranges between -1 (strong democrat) and 1 
(strong Republican). 
Dem_dumcycle An indicator variable that equals one if the donations of a CEO in an election 
cycle are all directed toward the Democratic party.  
Dem_dumtenure An indicator variable that equals one if all donations of a CEO during her/his 
entire tenure are directed to the Democratic Party. 
Dem_dumcycle2 An indicator variable that equals one if the donations of a CEO in an election 
cycle are all directed toward the Democratic party but not the Republican party. 
Other_Index Percentage of a CEO's support for other Parties calculated as the number of 
cycles in which a CEO donates exclusively to other parties divided by her/his 
total number of donation cycles in the sample period. 
Other_dumcycle An indicator variable that equals one if the donations of a CEO in an election 
cycle are all directed toward the other parties (neither Republican nor 
Democratic). 
All_dumcycle An indicator variable that equals one if the donations of a CEO in an election 
cycle are directed toward all parties (republican, democratic, and other parties). 
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Appendix A. Variable definition- Cont'd 
Voluntary disclosure 
Issue An indicator variable that equals one if a firm makes annual earnings forecasts 
in a fiscal year. 
Frequency The total number of annual earnings forecasts made by a firm in a fiscal year. 
Ln(Horizon) The natural logarithm of one plus the average horizon of annual earnings 
forecasts made by a firm in a fiscal year. For each forecast, the horizon is 
defined as the number of calendar days between the forecast announcement date 
and the corresponding period end date. We assign a value of zero when a firm 
makes no forecasts in a fiscal year.  
Range An indicator variable of range estimates. For each forecast, we first assign 1 for 
range estimates and zero otherwise. This indicator variable is then averaged for 
each firm-year. The Range is then defined as an indicator variable that equals 
one if the average range is greater than 0.5, and zero otherwise. 
Forecast_Miss An indicator variable that equals one if a firm misses at least one forecast in a 
year, and zero otherwise. Where Miss equals one if the actual earning is less 
than the management earnings forecasts, and zero otherwise for open-ended 
and point forecasts, and equals one if the actual earnings are less than the lower 
bound of the range forecast for range estimates.  
OptBias An indicator variable that equals one if the average Bias in a year is positive, 
and zero otherwise. Where, for each estimate, Bias is the difference between 
management earnings forecasts and actual earnings scaled by the stock price at 
the end of the month prior to the forecast.  
Accuracy The average Forecast accuracy for all annual earnings forecasts made by a firm 
in a fiscal year. For each estimate, we first calculate the absolute difference 
between management earnings forecasts and actual earnings scaled by the stock 
price at the end of the month prior to the forecast. Next, we identify forecast 
accuracy as the quintile ranking of the scaled difference, where one is assigned 
for the top quintile (largest error), and five is assigned for the bottom quintile 
(lowest error), and zero if no forecasts are made.  
Bad_News An indicator variable that equals one if forecast news is negative, and zero 
otherwise. Where forecast news is the difference between the management 
earnings forecasts and the most recent mean analyst estimate deflated by the 
stock price one trading day prior to the management forecast release date. 
Good_News An indicator variable equals one if forecast news is non-negative, and zero 
otherwise. Forecast news is the difference between the management earnings 
forecasts and the most recent mean analyst estimate scaled by the stock price 
one trading day prior to the management forecast release date. 
Positive_Surprise An indicator variable that equals one if an earnings surprise is greater than 
0.0001, and zero otherwise. Earnings surprise is calculated as the difference 
between the actual earnings and the mean analyst estimate scaled by the stock 
price three trading days prior to an earnings announcement. 
Negative_Surprise An indicator variable that equals one if an earnings surprise is less than -0.0001, 
and zero otherwise. Earnings surprise is calculated as the difference between 
the actual earnings and the mean analyst estimate scaled by the stock price three 
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Appendix A. Variable definition- Cont'd 
Neutral_Surprise An indicator variable that equals one if an earnings surprise is between 0.0001 
and -0.0001, and zero otherwise. Earnings surprise is calculated as the 
difference between the actual earnings and the mean analyst estimate scaled by 
the stock price three trading days prior to an earnings announcement. 
Firm Characteristics 
Ln(assets) The natural logarithm of total assets (at). 
MB The ratio of market to book value of equity. [(prcc_f*csho) / ceq]. 
Leverage The ratio of total debt divided by market value of total assets. [(Dltt+Dlc) / (at-
ceq+csho*prcc_f)]. 
RD Expenditures on research and development scaled by total assets. [xrd/at] 
ROA Return on assets measured as income before extraordinary items scaled by total 
assets. [ib/at] 
Volatility The standard deviation of daily stock return (CRSP variable ret) of a firm over 
the last fiscal year. 
Ln(Analyst) The natural logarithm of the number of analysts following a firm. 
Institutional_Own The percentage of shares owned by institutional investors. 
Litigation An indicator variable that equals one if a firm's SIC code is in industries subject 
to increased litigation (2833-2836, 3570-3577, 3600-3674, and 7370-7374), 
and zero otherwise. 
News An indicator variable that equals one if the current period EPS is greater than 
or equal to the previous-period EPS, and zero otherwise. 
Equity_Issue An indicator variable that equals one if a firm issued shares in a year. 
Acquisition An indicator variable that equals one if a firm's annual acquisitions or merger-
related costs exceeded five percent of net income (loss) in year t, and zero 
otherwise. [aqc/ni] 
Industry_Conc A firm's industry concentration, measured as the sum of sales of the top five 
firms in its two-digit SIC code scaled by total sales of all firms in its two-digit 
SIC code in year t.  [∑ 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖.𝑗
5




Ln(Tenure) The natural logarithm of CEO tenure, where tenure is defined as the length of 
a CEO's tenure with her/his current firm (measured as fiscal year minus year 
joined as CEO). 
Ln(Age) The natural logarithm of the age of a CEO as of the year in which a management 
earnings forecast was released.  
Duality An indicator variable that equals one if a CEO is also the chairman, and zero 
otherwise. 
Ln(Delta) The natural logarithm of the expected dollar changes in CEO wealth for a 1% 
change in stock price computed as in Core and Guay (2002).  
Ln(Vega) The natural logarithm of the expected dollar changes in CEO wealth for a 1% 
change in stock return volatility computed as in Guay (1999). 
CEO_Own The percentage of shares outstanding owned by a CEO. 
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Appendix A. Variable definition- Cont'd 
Overconfidence  An indicator variable that equals one if a CEO holds vested options with 
average moneyness greater than 67 percent starting in the first year a CEO 
displays this behavior. Option moneyness is calculated as follows: first, we 
calculate the realizable value per option as the total realizable value of the 
exercisable options divided by the number of exercisable options 
[Value_Per_option = (OPT_UNEX_EXER_EST_VAL / 
OPT_UNEX_EXER_NUM)]. Second, we compute the estimate of the average 
exercise price of the options by subtracting the per-option realizable value from 
the stock price at the fiscal year-end [avg_exercise_price = (prccf - 
Value_Per_option)]. Lastly, the average percent moneyness of an option equals 
the per-option realizable value divided by the estimated average exercise price 
[avg_pctg_moneyness_opt = (Value_Per_option / avg_exercise_price)]. 
[Malmendier and Tate, 2005; Campbell et al. 2011; Hirshleifer et al. 2012] 
Net_buyer An indicator variable that equals one if the number of years at which a CEO is 
a net-buyer is higher than those at which she/he is a net seller. Net_buyer is 
calculated as follows: first, we compute the net stock purchases by a CEO as 
purchases minus sales, both in units of shares [net_purchase = ( 
SHROWN_EXCL_OPTSt - SHROWN_EXCL_OPTSt-1)], then we calculate the 
number of years at which a CEO has bought more shares than he/she sold. 
[Malmendier and Tate, 2005; Campbell et al. 2011]  
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Table A1. Alternative measures of CEO political Ideology (Republican) 
This table presents tests of the association between CEO political ideology and management earnings forecast using alternative measures of CEO Republican ideology (Panel 
A & B), measures of CEO Democratic ideology (Panel C & D) as well as Other ideologies (Panel E & F). All models include control variables, year, and industry fixed 
effects. All variables are defined in Appendix A. T-statistics are computed using robust standard errors and reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A. CEO Political ideology and management earnings forecast (Republican 1)  
 Issue Frequency Range Ln(Horizon) OptBias Forecast_Miss 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Rep_indexyear 0.102*** 
 0.080***  0.109***  0.087***  -0.092***  -0.106***  
 (3.52)  (2.83)  (3.56)  (3.42)  (-2.88)  (-3.10)  
Rep_indextenure 
 0.142***  0.126***  0.141***  0.119***  -0.134***  -0.157*** 
  (4.72)  (4.23)  (4.45)  (4.49)  (-4.03)  (-4.43) 
Pseudo / Adj. R2 0.257 0.257 0.279 0.280 0.253 0.253 0.268 0.269 0.220 0.220 0.176 0.176 
Panel B. CEO Political ideology and management earnings forecast (Republican 1)  
 Accuracy Bad_News Good_News Positive_Surprise Negative_Surprise Neutral_Surprise 
Rep_indexyear 0.057*** 
 0.072**  0.038  0.058**  -0.067**  0.003  
 (3.40)  (2.38)  (1.17)  (2.35)  (-2.53)  (0.08)  
Rep_indextenure 
 0.082***  0.126***  0.041  0.051**  -0.076***  0.032 
  (4.65)  (4.01)  (1.19)  (1.98)  (-2.75)  (0.77) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year & Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 33,951 33,951 33,951 33,951 33,951 33,951 33,951 33,951 33,951 33,951 33,951 33,951 
Pseudo / Adj. R2 0.266 0.266 0.257 0.257 0.180 0.180 0.052 0.052 0.102 0.102 0.077 0.077 
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Table A2. Alternative measures of CEO political Ideology (Democratic & Other) 
This table presents tests of the association between CEO political ideology and management earnings forecast using measures of CEO Democratic ideology (Panel A & B) 
as well as Other ideologies (Panel C & D). All models include control variables, year, and industry fixed effects. All variables are defined in Appendix A. T-statistics are 
computed using robust standard errors and reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. n = 33,951 
Panel A. CEO Political ideology and management earnings forecast (Democratic 1)  
 Issue Frequency Range Ln(Horizon) OptBias Forecast_Miss 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
Dem_dumcycle 0.115 
  0.121   0.046   0.078   -0.197**   -0.193*   
 (1.26)   (1.33)   (0.47)   (0.94)   (-2.02)   (-1.88)   
Dem_dumcycle2 
 0.007   -0.008   -0.082   -0.015   -0.022   -0.002  
  (0.12)   (-0.15)   (-1.40)   (-0.30)   (-0.37)   (-0.03)  
Dem_dumtenure 
  -0.044   -0.007   -0.065   -0.059   0.018   0.136 
   (-0.61)   (-0.10)   (-0.86)   (-0.89)   (0.22)   (1.59) 
Pseudo/Adj.R2 0.257 0.257 0.257 0.279 0.279 0.279 0.253 0.253 0.253 0.268 0.268 0.268 0.220 0.220 0.220 0.176 0.176 0.176 
Panel B. CEO Political ideology and management earnings forecast (Democratic 2) 
 Accuracy Bad_News Good_News Positive_Surprise Negative_Surprise Neutral_Surprise 
Dem_dumcycle 0.073 
  0.161*   0.020   -0.020   -0.030   0.079   
 (1.34)   (1.71)   (0.20)   (-0.25)   (-0.36)   (0.68)   
Dem_dumcycle2 
 0.016   0.055   0.051   -0.050   0.020   0.053  
  (0.48)   (0.94)   (0.82)   (-1.05)   (0.40)   (0.73)  
Dem_dumtenure 
  -0.022   -0.039   0.116   0.012   0.049   -0.156 
   (-0.50)   (-0.51)   (1.49)   (0.20)   (0.74)   (-1.53) 
Pseudo/Adj. R2 0.258 0.258 0.258 0.257 0.257 0.257 0.180 0.180 0.180 0.052 0.052 0.052 0.102 0.102 0.102 0.077 0.077 0.077 
Panel C. CEO Political ideology and management earnings forecast (1)  
 Issue Frequency Range Ln(Horizon) OptBias Forecast_Miss 
Other_Index  0.043   0.265***   0.035   0.093   -0.027   0.031   
 (0.67)   (4.03)   (0.52)   (1.62)   (-0.39)   (0.41)   
Other_dumcycle  
 0.015   0.188***   0.042   0.056   -0.012   0.053  
  (0.28)   (3.49)   (0.77)   (1.19)   (-0.22)   (0.85)  
All_dumcycle 
  0.014   0.112**   0.070   0.039   -0.010   0.021 
   (0.27)   (2.13)   (1.26)   (0.85)   (-0.17)   (0.34) 
Pseudo /Adj. R2 0.257 0.257 0.257 0.280 0.279 0.279 0.253 0.253 0.253 0.268 0.268 0.268 0.220 0.220 0.220 0.176 0.176 0.176 
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Table A2. Alternative measures of CEO political Ideology (Democratic & Other). Cont'd 
Panel D. CEO Political ideology and management earnings forecast (2)  
  Accuracy Bad_News Good_News Positive_Surprise Negative_Surprise Neutral_Surprise 
Other_Index  0.064*   0.078   0.088   0.029   0.005   -0.061   
 (1.70)   (1.18)   (1.23)   (0.53)   (0.08)   (-0.67)   
Other_dumcycle   0.038   0.055   0.048   0.005   -0.011   0.032  
  (1.24)   (1.00)   (0.81)   (0.11)   (-0.23)   (0.44)  
All_dumcycle 
  0.005   -0.003   0.063   0.021   -0.030   -0.033 
   (0.17)   (-0.05)   (1.08)   (0.47)   (-0.62)   (-0.46) 
Pseudo /Adj. R2 0.258 0.258 0.259 0.257 0.256 0.257 0.180 0.180 0.180 0.052 0.052 0.052 0.102 0.102 0.102 0.077 0.077 0.077 
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Table A3. Alternative measures of CEO overconfidence 
This table presents tests of the association between CEO political ideology and management earnings forecast using Net_buyer as an alternative measure of CEO 
overconfidence and controlling for CEO characteristics (Ln(Tenure), Ln(Age), Duality, Ln(Delta), Ln(Vega), and CEO_Own, in addition to baseline control variables. All 
variables are defined in Appendix A. All models include year and industry fixed effects. T-statistics are computed using robust standard errors and reported in parentheses. 
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A. CEO Political ideology and management earnings forecast (1) 
 Issue Frequency Range Ln(Horizon) OptBias Miss 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Rep_Dum 0.120***  0.181***  0.123***  0.112***  -0.134***  -0.123***  
 (3.23)  (5.00)  (3.15)  (3.41)  (-3.30)  (-2.84)  
Rep_Index  0.107**  0.122***  0.130***  0.093**  -0.142***  -0.172*** 
  (2.32)  (2.74)  (2.71)  (2.28)  (-2.85)  (-3.26) 
Net_buyer 0.009 0.011 0.024 0.027 0.046 0.049 -0.005 -0.003 -0.034 -0.037 -0.044 -0.046 
 (0.22) (0.28) (0.72) (0.79) (1.13) (1.18) (-0.15) (-0.10) (-0.79) (-0.85) (-0.95) (-1.00) 
CEO controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year & Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 25,562 25,562 25,562 25,562 25,562 25,562 25,562 25,562 25,562 25,562 25,562 25,562 
Pseudo /Adj. R2 0.250 0.249 0.289 0.289 0.248 0.248 0.273 0.273 0.216 0.216 0.174 0.174 
Panel B. CEO Political ideology and management earnings forecast (2) 
 Accuracy Bad_News Good_News Positive_Surprise Negative_Surprise Neutral_Surprise 
Rep_Dum 0.080***  0.124***  0.041  0.060*  -0.088**  0.024  
 (3.69)  (3.19)  (1.00)  (1.86)  (-2.55)  (0.47)  
Rep_Index  0.075***  0.119**  -0.011  0.026  -0.073*  0.083 
  (2.78)  (2.47)  (-0.22)  (0.65)  (-1.73)  (1.34) 
Net_buyer -0.002 -0.000 0.030 0.033 -0.058 -0.057 0.061* 0.061* -0.052 -0.054 -0.057 -0.057 
 (-0.08) (-0.02) (0.75) (0.80) (-1.37) (-1.35) (1.86) (1.89) (-1.51) (-1.54) (-1.12) (-1.10) 
CEO controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year & Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 25,562 25,562 25,562 25,562 25,562 25,562 25,562 25,562 25,562 25,562 25,562 25,562 
Pseudo /Adj. R2 0.274 0.274 0.252 0.252 0.168 0.168 0.052 0.052 0.102 0.102 0.078 0.078 
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Table A4. Subsamples based on CEO donation activity. 
This table presents results using a restricted sample of firms in which CEOs make at least one donation during the sample period (Panels A & B) and a restricted sample of 
donation years (Panel C & D). All variables are defined in Appendix A. All models include control variables, year, and industry fixed effects. T-statistics are computed using 
robust standard errors and reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. n=21,042 in Panel A and 12,258 in Panel B 
Panel A. CEO Political ideology and management earnings forecast (subsample 1) 
  Issue Frequency Range Ln(Horizon) OptBias  Forecast_Miss  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Rep_Dum 0.099***  0.119***  0.093**  0.077**  -0.092**  -0.118***  
 (2.68)  (3.43)  (2.42)  (2.40)  (-2.30)  (-2.77)  
Rep_Index  0.082*  0.046  0.101**  0.053  -0.091*  -0.165*** 
  (1.84)  (1.10)  (2.14)  (1.37)  (-1.88)  (-3.23) 
Pseudo / Adj. R2 0.263 0.263 0.297 0.296 0.256 0.256 0.281 0.281 0.221 0.221 0.175 0.175 
 Accuracy Bad_News Good_News Positive_Surprise Negative_Surprise Neutral_Surprise 
Rep_Dum 0.068***  0.085**  0.028  0.061*  -0.088***  0.012  
 (3.25)  (2.21)  (0.70)  (1.96)  (-2.64)  (0.24)  
Rep_Index  0.056**  0.083*  -0.025  0.046  -0.084**  0.051 
  (2.22)  (1.77)  (-0.50)  (1.22)  (-2.08)  (0.85) 
Pseudo / Adj. R2 0.279 0.279 0.265 0.265 0.175 0.175 0.045 0.045 0.096 0.095 0.083 0.083 
Panel B. CEO Political ideology and management earnings forecast (subsample 2) 
 Issue Frequency Range Ln(Horizon) OptBias Forecast_Miss 
Rep_Dum 0.161***  0.155***  0.156***  0.144***  -0.141***  -0.166***  
 (3.32)  (3.20)  (3.05)  (3.39)  (-2.68)  (-3.01)  
Rep_Index  0.124**  0.021  0.150**  0.099**  -0.115*  -0.215*** 
  (2.18)  (0.37)  (2.49)  (2.03)  (-1.87)  (-3.32) 
Pseudo / Adj. R2 0.272 0.272 0.305 0.304 0.270 0.270 0.291 0.291 0.231 0.231 0.183 0.184 
 Accuracy Bad_News Good_News Positive_Surprise Negative_Surprise Neutral_Surprise 
Rep_Dum 0.109***  0.134***  0.032  0.084**  -0.101**  -0.023  
 (3.85)  (2.68)  (0.61)  (2.06)  (-2.27)  (-0.36)  
Rep_Index  0.080**  0.110*  -0.052  0.042  -0.077  0.045 
  (2.45)  (1.85)  (-0.84)  (0.87)  (-1.49)  (0.58) 
Pseudo / Adj. R2 0.292 0.292 0.272 0.272 0.170 0.170 0.045 0.045 0.097 0.097 0.102 0.102 
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Table A5. PSM. Alternative measures of CEO political ideology. 
This table presents the test of the difference in management earnings forecast between firms with Republican CEOs and a sample of control firms with non-Republican 
CEOs matched primarily on firm characteristics, year, and industry. Panel A, B, and present results using Rep_dumonly Rep_dumcycle, and Rep_dumtenure, respectively. In panel 
A, treatment denotes Rep_dumonly, which is an indicator variable that equals 1 if all donations of a CEO in an election cycle are directed to the Republican Party only (neither 
Democratic nor others) and control refer to matching sample of CEOs who donated to other parties or never donated. In panel B, treatment denotes Rep_dumcycle, which is 
an indicator variable that equals one if all donations of a CEO in an election cycle are directed to the Republican Party and control refers to matching sample if the donations 
of a CEO in an election cycle are all directed toward the Democratic party. In panel C, treatment denotes Rep_dumtenure which is an indicator variable that equals one if all 
donations of a CEO during her/his entire tenure are directed to the Republican Party and control refers to matching sample if all donations of a CEO during her/his entire 
tenure are directed to the Democratic Party. All variables are defined in Appendix A.  ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
Panel A. CEO Political ideology and management earnings forecast. CEO ideology is measured using Rep_dumonly 














  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Rep_dumonly  0.132 0.133* 0.190** 0.133* -0.222** -0.198** 0.122** 0.133 0.004 0.111 -0.177** 0.138 
 (1.58) (1.79) (2.08) (1.78) (-2.35) (-1.99) (2.55) (1.47) (0.04) (1.53) (-2.25) (1.16) 
Year & Ind. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,426 3,426 3,426 3,426 3,426 3,426 3,426 3,426 3,426 3,426 3,426 3,426 
Pseudo / Adj. R2 0.231 0.249 0.259 0.237 0.220 0.185 0.244 0.254 0.171 0.0719 0.131 0.111 
Panel B. CEO Political ideology and management earnings forecast. CEO ideology is measured using Rep_dumcycle  
Rep_dumcycle 0.132* 0.187** 0.208** 0.156** -0.059 -0.112 0.090** 0.112 -0.008 0.131** -0.120* -0.061 
 (1.67) (2.41) (2.55) (2.32) (-0.71) (-1.27) (1.98) (1.40) (-0.09) (1.98) (-1.66) (-0.59) 
Year & Ind. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,172 4,172 4,172 4,172 4,172 4,172 4,172 4,172 4,172 4,172 4,172 4,172 
Pseudo /Adj. R2 0.298 0.307 0.271 0.325 0.244 0.190 0.312 0.285 0.179 0.0591 0.116 0.114 
Panel C. CEO Political ideology and management earnings forecast. CEO ideology is measured using Rep_dumtenure  
Rep_dumtenure  0.199* 0.210** 0.196* 0.211** 0.007 -0.155 0.188*** 0.111 0.031 0.043 -0.072 0.104 
 (1.87) (2.00) (1.81) (2.33) (0.06) (-1.33) (3.05) (1.04) (0.28) (0.49) (-0.75) (0.70) 
Year & Ind. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,422 2,422 2,422 2,422 2,422 2,422 2,422 2,422 2,422 2,422 2,422 2,422 
Pseudo / Adj. R2 0.302 0.302 0.279 0.320 0.242 0.191 0.310 0.275 0.186 0.07 0.134 0.109 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3637608
74 
 
Table A6. Management earnings forecasts around CEO turnover. A DID test 
This table presents estimates from the Difference-in-Difference (DID) regressions of the association between CEO political ideology and management earnings forecasts 
around CEO turnover event (-2, +2). After is a dummy variable equals one for the years after the CEO turnover. We only consider turnover events where long-term old CEOs 
are replaced by long-term new CEOs (long-term is defined as holding the position for at least two years). Rep_Leaving is a dummy variable equals 1 if a firm replaces a Rep 
CEO with a non-Rep CEO, 0 otherwise. Republican CEOs are defined using Rep_dumOnly, which is an indicator variable that equals 1 if all donations of a CEO in an election 
cycle are directed to the Republican Party only (neither Democratic nor others). All models include control variables, year, and industry fixed effects. All control variables 
are defined in Appendix A. T-statistics are computed using robust standard errors and reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively.      
  

















  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
After*  Rep_Leaving -0.215* -0.012 -0.119 -0.150 0.406*** 0.432*** -0.135* -0.207* 0.010 -0.191* 0.261** -0.149 
 (-1.83) (-0.11) (-0.98) (-1.35) (3.21) (3.27) (-1.89) (-1.71) (0.08) (-1.90) (2.41) (-0.90) 
Rep_Leaving 0.109 0.017 -0.033 0.071 -0.199* -0.285*** 0.107* 0.109 -0.051 -0.000 -0.021 0.049 
 (1.15) (0.20) (-0.33) (0.81) (-1.95) (-2.70) (1.88) (1.12) (-0.48) (-0.00) (-0.24) (0.38) 
After 0.109* 0.130** 0.184*** 0.085 -0.250*** -0.216*** 0.040 0.174*** -0.050 -0.033 0.047 -0.020 
 (1.87) (2.50) (2.85) (1.58) (-3.74) (-3.05) (1.15) (2.78) (-0.77) (-0.65) (0.87) (-0.24) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year & Ind. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo / Adj. R2 0.224 0.292 0.228 0.256 0.205 0.155 0.270 0.232 0.151 0.054 0.101 0.073 
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Table A7. The effect of change in CEO political ideology due to CEO turnover on Change in management earnings forecasts.  
This table presents tests of the association between changes in CEO political ideology due to CEO turnover and changes in management earnings forecasts. Δdependent is 
the difference between the first full fiscal year under the new CEO and the last full fiscal year under the old CEO. ΔREPCEO is defined as the changes in CEO political 
ideology due to CEO turnover, where ΔREPCEO =1 if a Republican CEO (Rep_dumOnly) replaces a Democratic CEO (Dem_dumOnly), 0 if the political ideology is similar after 
a CEO turnover,  and -1 if a Democratic CEO replaces a Republican minded CEO. Panel A reports results for all CEO turnover events. Panel B reports results only when an 
old CEO is in position for at least three years. All models include control variables, year, and industry fixed effects. All variables are defined in Appendix A. T-statistics are 
computed using robust standard errors and reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.    
Panel A. CEO turnover sample 

















 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
ΔREPCEO 0.201** 0.199 0.247** 0.883* -0.307** -0.365*** 0.782** 0.193 0.002 -0.059 0.012 0.047 
 (2.28) (0.49) (2.36) (1.88) (-2.26) (-3.01) (2.26) (1.59) (0.02) (-0.37) (0.08) (0.49) 
ΔControls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year & Ind. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo/Adj. R2 0.489 0.483 0.463 0.458 0.437 0.474 0.418 0.438 0.369 0.451 0.431 0.533 
Observations 172 172 172 172 172 172 172 172 172 172 172 172 
Panel B. Long-term old CEO turnover sample 

















ΔREPCEO 0.158* -0.228 0.274** 0.633 -0.240* -0.413*** 0.719* 0.174 -0.104 -0.004 -0.049 0.054 
 (1.79) (-0.56) (2.48) (1.39) (-1.75) (-2.95) (1.76) (1.43) (-0.98) (-0.03) (-0.28) (0.46) 
ΔControls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year & Ind. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo/Adj. R2 0.534 0.504 0.476 0.521 0.469 0.493 0.421 0.457 0.404 0.500 0.485 0.547 
Observations 162 162 162 162 162 162 162 162 162 162 162 162 
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Table A8. Controlling for CEO turnover and tenure. 
This table presents results when excluding CEO turnover years (Panels A & B), and the first three years of CEO tenure (Panels C & D). All models include control variables, 
year, and industry fixed effects. All variables are defined in Appendix A. T-statistics are computed using robust standard errors and reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. n = 30,319 in Panels A & B and 20,681 in Panels C & D. 
Panel A. CEO Political ideology and management earnings forecast (1) 
  Issue Frequency Range Ln(Horizon) OptBias Forecast_Miss 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
Rep_Dum 0.140***   0.166***   0.133***   0.118***   -0.152***   -0.149***   
 (4.02)   (5.07)   (3.63)   (3.94)   (-3.98)   (-3.66)   
Rep_Index  0.139***   0.121***   0.161***   0.106***   -0.178***   -0.205***  
  (3.22)   (3.01)   (3.54)   (2.88)   (-3.77)   (-4.11)  
Rep_indexyear 
  0.111***   0.090***   0.115***   0.095***   -0.099***   -0.110*** 
   (3.68)   (3.05)   (3.61)   (3.60)   (-2.98)   (-3.10) 
Pseudo / Adj. R2 0.260 0.260 0.260 0.282 0.281 0.281 0.257 0.257 0.257 0.271 0.271 0.271 0.222 0.222 0.221 0.179 0.179 0.178 
Panel B. CEO Political ideology and management earnings forecast (2) 
  Accuracy Bad_News Good_News Positive_Surprise Negative_Surprise Neutral_Surprise 
Rep_Dum 0.088***   0.150***   0.052   0.064**   -0.097***   0.028   
 (4.44)   (4.14)   (1.33)   (2.16)   (-3.06)   (0.59)   
Rep_Index  0.088***   0.169***   0.005   0.045   -0.095**   0.080  
  (3.59)   (3.74)   (0.10)   (1.23)   (-2.43)   (1.38)  
Rep_indexyear 
  0.064***   0.083***   0.046   0.056**   -0.071**   0.014 
   (3.66)   (2.61)   (1.33)   (2.18)   (-2.56)   (0.35) 
Pseudo/Adj. R2 0.266 0.266 0.266 0.259 0.259 0.259 0.173 0.173 0.173 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.099 0.099 0.099 0.077 0.077 0.077 
Panel C. CEO Political ideology and management earnings forecast (1)  
  Issue Frequency Range Ln(Horizon) OptBias Forecast_Miss  
Rep_Dum 0.107***   0.147***   0.102**   0.095***   -0.124***   -0.109**   
 (2.61)   (3.83)   (2.36)   (2.67)   (-2.74)   (-2.26)   
Rep_Index  0.101*   0.094*   0.131**   0.079*   -0.144**   -0.170***  
  (1.94)   (1.96)   (2.38)   (1.78)   (-2.53)   (-2.83)  
Rep_indexyear 
  0.095***   0.077**   0.112***   0.079***   -0.094**   -0.097** 
   (2.72)   (2.28)   (3.02)   (2.58)   (-2.43)   (-2.37) 
Pseud /Adj. R2 0.262 0.262 0.262 0.283 0.282 0.282 0.258 0.258 0.259 0.275 0.275 0.275 0.221 0.221 0.221 0.180 0.180 0.180 
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Table A8. Controlling for CEO turnover and tenure. Cont'd 
Panel D. CEO Political ideology and management earnings forecast (2) 
  Accuracy Bad_News Good_News Positive_Surprise Negative_Surprise Neutral_Surprise 
Rep_Dum 0.067***   0.101**   0.039   0.102***   -0.122***   -0.013   
 (2.89)   (2.35)   (0.84)   (2.95)   (-3.24)   (-0.24)   
Rep_Index  0.063**   0.112**   -0.018   0.076*   -0.121***   0.058  
  (2.18)   (2.05)   (-0.29)   (1.75)   (-2.57)   (0.85)  
Rep_indexyear 
  0.050**   0.069*   0.025   0.075**   -0.092***   0.013 
   (2.47)   (1.90)   (0.62)   (2.52)   (-2.87)   (0.27) 
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Table A9. Change-on-change regression 
This table presents tests of the association between CEO political ideology and management earnings forecast where all dependent and independent variables are annual 
changes. We exclude the firm-years with 0 changes in either dependent or independent variables. All models include control variables, firm, and year fixed effects. All 
control variables are defined in Appendix A. T-statistics are computed using robust standard errors and reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively.   
Panel A. CEO Political ideology and management earnings forecast (1) 
  ΔIssue ΔFrequency ΔRange ΔLn(Horizon) ΔOptBias ΔForecast_Miss 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
ΔRep_indexyear 0.168*** 
 0.036  0.059  0.152***  -0.045  -0.025  
 (2.80)  (0.60)  (0.89)  (3.29)  (-1.24)  (-0.70)  
ΔRep_dumOnly 
 0.382*  0.300*  0.292  0.399***  -0.282**  -0.270** 
  (1.73)  (1.94)  (0.67)  (3.63)  (-2.43)  (-2.15) 
Δcontrols Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm & Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo/Adj. R2 0.518 0.814 0.240 0.523 0.459 0.846 0.298 0.535 0.414 0.777 0.373 0.723 
Observations 1,118 315 3,203 794 1,013 266 3,857 973 1,594 409 1,594 393 
Panel B. CEO Political ideology and management earnings forecast (2) 
  ΔAccuracy ΔBad_News ΔGood_News ΔPositive_Surprise ΔNegative_Surprise ΔNeutral_Surprise 
ΔRep_indexyear 0.126*** 
 0.050  0.061*  0.047**  -0.055**  0.010  
 (3.46)  (1.04)  (1.81)  (1.99)  (-2.15)  (0.22)  
ΔRep_dumOnly 
 0.335***  -0.040  0.165  -0.028  0.039  0.308 
  (3.49)  (-0.19)  (1.28)  (-0.40)  (0.50)  (1.63) 
Δcontrols Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm & Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo/Adj. R2 0.252 0.498 0.437 0.795 0.429 0.758 0.281 0.534 0.327 0.578 0.368 0.779 
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Table A10. Controlling for CEO characteristics, incentives, and managerial ability 
This table presents results of tests that control for managerial ability, MA_Score, controlling for CEO characteristics (Ln(Tenure), Ln(Age), Duality, Ln(Delta), Ln(Vega), 
CEO_Own, and managerial ability) in addition to the baseline control variables. All variables are defined in Appendix A. All models include year and industry fixed effects. 
T-statistics are computed using robust standard errors and reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A. CEO Political ideology and management earnings forecast. Controlling for managerial ability (1)  
 Issue Frequency Range  Ln(Horizon) OptBias Forecast_Miss 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
Rep_Dum 0.121***   0.173
***   0.121
***   0.114
***   -0.128
***   -0.122
***   
 (3.44)   (5.17)   (3.27)   (3.75)   (-3.34)   (-2.99)   
Rep_Index  0.102
**   0.111
***   0.116
**   0.090
**   -0.123
***   -0.161
***  
  (2.36)   (2.73)   (2.57)   (2.39)   (-2.60)   (-3.23)  
Rep_indexyear   0.109
***   0.089
***   0.107
***   0.100
***   -0.094
***   -0.105
*** 
   (3.60)   (2.99)   (3.35)   (3.76)   (-2.83)   (-2.97) 
MA_Score -0.581*** -0.584*** -0.579*** -0.361*** -0.366*** -0.360*** -0.680*** -0.685*** -0.679*** -0.654*** -0.657*** -0.653*** 0.535*** 0.538*** 0.532*** 0.580*** 0.583*** 0.576*** 
 (-4.63) (-4.65) (-4.62) (-2.94) (-2.98) (-2.93) (-5.08) (-5.11) (-5.08) (-6.01) (-6.04) (-6.00) (3.95) (3.97) (3.93) (4.04) (4.06) (4.02) 
Observations 30,638 30,638 30,638 30,638 30,638 30,638 30,638 30,638 30,638 30,638 30,638 30,638 30,638 30,638 30,638 30,638 30,638 30,638 
Pseudo / Adj. R2 0.262 0.262 0.262 0.290 0.290 0.290 0.255 0.255 0.255 0.277 0.277 0.277 0.223 0.223 0.223 0.178 0.178 0.178 
Panel B. CEO Political ideology and management earnings forecast Controlling for managerial ability (2) 
  Accuracy Bad_News Good_News Positive_Surprise Negative_Surprise Neutral_Surprise 
Rep_Dum 0.079***   0.112
***   0.061   0.043   -0.071
**   0.027   
 (3.94)   (3.07)   (1.56)   (1.42)   (-2.21)   (0.58)   
Rep_Index  0.064
***   0.100
**   0.013   0.021   -0.062   0.072  
  (2.61)   (2.20)   (0.27)   (0.58)   (-1.57)   (1.24)  
Rep_indexyear   0.060
***   0.071
**   0.049   0.053
**   -0.069
**   0.021 
   (3.41)   (2.25)   (1.44)   (2.06)   (-2.46)   (0.53) 
MA_Score -0.481*** -0.483*** -0.480*** -0.531*** -0.534*** -0.530*** -0.317** -0.319** -0.317** -0.291*** -0.292*** -0.290*** 0.271** 0.272** 0.270** -0.139 -0.140 -0.137 
 (-6.69) (-6.71) (-6.68) (-4.02) (-4.04) (-4.01) (-2.27) (-2.29) (-2.27) (-2.71) (-2.72) (-2.70) (2.33) (2.34) (2.32) (-0.85) (-0.86) (-0.84) 
CEO controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year & Ind. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 30,638 30,638 30,638 30,638 30,638 30,638 30,638 30,638 30,638 30,638 30,638 30,638 30,638 30,638 30,638 30,638 30,638 30,638 
Pseudo / Adj. R2 0.277 0.277 0.277 0.262 0.262 0.262 0.179 0.179 0.179 0.054 0.054 0.054 0.104 0.104 0.104 0.076 0.076 0.076 
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Table A11. Additional statistical specifications. 
This table presents results using state fixed effects (Panel A & B), and standard errors clustered at the firm level (Panel C & D). All models include control variables, year, 
and industry fixed effects. All variables are defined in Appendix A. T-statistics are computed using robust standard errors and reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
Panel A. CEO Political ideology and management earnings forecast (state fixed effects1)  
  Issue Frequency Range Ln(Horizon) OptBias Forecast_Miss  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
Rep_Dum 0.079**   0.160***   0.059   0.078***   -0.093**   -0.084**   
 (2.28)   (5.04)   (1.61)   (2.67)   (-2.45)   (-2.08)   
Rep_Index  0.058   0.098**   0.047   0.053   -0.082*   -0.119**  
  (1.35)   (2.52)   (1.03)   (1.46)   (-1.73)   (-2.38)  
Rep_indexyear 
  0.068**   0.069**   0.056*   0.063**   -0.055*   -0.069** 
   (2.27)   (2.45)   (1.79)   (2.46)   (-1.68)   (-1.96) 
Pseudo/Adj. R2 0.269 0.269 0.269 0.289 0.288 0.288 0.266 0.266 0.266 0.278 0.278 0.278 0.228 0.228 0.228 0.183 0.183 0.183 
Observations 33,316 33,316 33,316 33,348 33,348 33,348 33,309 33,309 33,309 33,348 33,348 33,348 33,251 33,251 33,251 33,255 33,255 33,255 
Panel B. CEO Political ideology and management earnings forecast (state fixed effects2) 
  Accuracy Bad_News Good_News Positive_Surprise Negative_Surprise Neutral_Surprise 
Rep_Dum 0.067***   0.080**   0.026   0.058**   -0.084***   0.012   
 (3.53)   (2.23)   (0.67)   (1.99)   (-2.69)   (0.26)   
Rep_Index  0.056**   0.066   -0.025   0.045   -0.080**   0.044  
  (2.38)   (1.47)   (-0.53)   (1.26)   (-2.10)   (0.76)  
Rep_indexyear   0.042**   0.033   0.016   0.060**   -0.069**   -0.002 
   (2.46)   (1.06)   (0.47)   (2.36)   (-2.55)   (-0.06) 
Pseudo/Adj. R2 0.277 0.277 0.277 0.268 0.268 0.268 0.188 0.188 0.188 0.054 0.054 0.054 0.104 0.104 0.104 0.082 0.082 0.082 
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Table A11. Additional statistical specifications. Cont'd 
Panel C. CEO Political ideology and management earnings forecast (standard errors clustered at the firm level 1)  
  Issue Frequency Range  Ln(Horizon) OptBias Forecast_Miss 
Rep_Dum 0.128**   0.165
**   0.127
*   0.111
**   -0.143
**   -0.142
**   
 (2.07)   (2.58)   (1.95)   (2.04)   (-2.53)   (-2.49)   
Rep_Index  0.126
*   0.117   0.144
*   0.100   -0.158
**   -0.194
***  
  (1.74)   (1.55)   (1.86)   (1.56)   (-2.35)   (-2.88)  
Rep_indexyear   0.102
**   0.080
*   0.109
**   0.087
**   -0.092
**   -0.106
** 
   (2.37)   (1.73)   (2.33)   (2.26)   (-2.18)   (-2.47) 
Pseudo / Adj. R2 0.257 0.257 0.257 0.279 0.280 0.279 0.253 0.253 0.253 0.268 0.269 0.268 0.220 0.220 0.220 0.176 0.176 0.176 
Observations 33,951 33,951 33,951 33,951 33,951 33,951 33,951 33,951 33,951 33,951 33,951 33,951 33,951 33,951 33,951 33,951 33,951 33,951 
Panel D. CEO Political ideology and management earnings forecast (standard errors clustered at the firm level 2) 
  Accuracy Bad_News Good_News Positive_Surprise Negative_Surprise Neutral_Surprise 
Rep_Dum 0.087**   0.133
**   0.052   0.058
*   -0.090
***   0.029   
 (2.52)   (2.15)   (0.96)   (1.87)   (-2.75)   (0.58)   
Rep_Index  0.084
**   0.144
**   0.011   0.052   -0.094
**   0.065  
  (2.07)   (1.98)   (0.16)   (1.37)   (-2.36)   (1.04)  
Rep_indexyear   0.057
**   0.072
*   0.038   0.058
**   -0.067
**   0.003 
   (2.21)   (1.67)   (0.93)   (2.28)   (-2.48)   (0.07) 
Pseudo / Adj. R2 0.266 0.266 0.266 0.257 0.257 0.257 0.180 0.180 0.180 0.052 0.052 0.052 0.102 0.102 0.102 0.077 0.077 0.077 
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Table A12. Political ideology vs. Political activism.  
This table presents tests that attempt to differentiate between the political ideology and the political activism explanation of our baseline results. Panel A reports results for 
Issue, Frequency, Range, Ln(Horizon), OptBias, and Forecast_Miss, on the other hand. Panel B reports results for the models of the association between CEO political 
ideology on one hand and Accuracy, Bad_News, Good_News, Positive_Surprise, Negative_Surprise, and Neutral_Surprise on the other hand. All models include control 
variables, year, and industry fixed effects. All other independent variables are defined in Appendix A. T-statistics are computed using robust standard errors and reported in 
parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
Panel A. CEO Political ideology and management earnings forecast (Ideology vs. activism 1) 
  Issue Frequency Range Ln(Horizon) OptBias Miss 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Rep_dum 0.117***  0.174***  0.120***  0.105***  -0.138***  -0.130***  
 (3.41)  (5.47)  (3.31)  (3.55)  (-3.63)  (-3.22)  
Dem_dum -0.053  0.044  -0.031  -0.031  0.024  0.049  
 (-1.26)  (1.07)  (-0.71)  (-0.83)  (0.52)  (1.00)  
Rep_dumtenure 
 0.120***  0.110***  0.106**  0.085**  -0.097**  -0.136*** 
  (2.72)  (2.65)  (2.28)  (2.23)  (-1.98)  (-2.64) 
Dem_dumtenure 
 -0.032  0.004  -0.054  -0.050  0.008  0.121 
  (-0.44)  (0.06)  (-0.72)  (-0.76)  (0.10)  (1.42) 
Pseudo R2/Adj. R2 0.257 0.257 0.280 0.279 0.253 0.253 0.269 0.268 0.220 0.220 0.176 0.176 
Panel B. CEO Political ideology and management earnings forecast (Ideology vs. activism 2) 
  Accuracy Bad_News Good_News Positive_Surprise Negative_Surprise Neutral_Surprise 
Rep_dum 0.083***  0.130***  0.052  0.046  -0.080***  0.038  
 (4.29)  (3.61)  (1.36)  (1.58)  (-2.58)  (0.81)  
Dem_dum -0.018  -0.016  0.001  -0.063*  0.051  0.043  
 (-0.72)  (-0.36)  (0.01)  (-1.75)  (1.32)  (0.76)  
Rep_dumtenure 
 0.069***  0.127***  0.062  0.040  -0.066*  0.052 
  (2.79)  (2.74)  (1.25)  (1.06)  (-1.66)  (0.87) 
Dem_dumtenure 
 -0.014  -0.026  0.122  0.017  0.042  -0.150 
  (-0.33)  (-0.34)  (1.57)  (0.27)  (0.64)  (-1.47) 
Pseudo R2/Adj. R2 0.266 0.266 0.257 0.257 0.180 0.180 0.052 0.052 0.102 0.102 0.077 0.077 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year & Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 33,951 33,951 33,951 33,951 33,951 33,951 33,951 33,951 33,951 33,951 33,951 33,951 
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Table A13. Robustness check. Active earnings forecast subsample 
This table presents tests of the association between CEO political ideology and management earnings forecast using a subsample of the firm that have at least one 
earnings forecast during our sample period. All models include year and industry fixed effects. All other independent variables are defined in Appendix A. T-
statistics are computed using robust standard errors and reported in parentheses. †, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A. CEO Political ideology and MEF: Active earnings forecast subsample (1) 
 Issue Frequency Range Ln(Horizon) OptBias  Forecast_Miss  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Rep_Dum 0.123†  0.180
†  0.122
†  0.110†  -0.137†  -0.136†  
 (3.39)  (4.66)  (3.30)  (3.18)  (-3.60)  (-3.40)  
Rep_Index  0.126
†  0.139
†  0.150†  0.108**  -0.157†  -0.192† 
  (2.85)  (2.96)  (3.31)  (2.56)  (-3.38)  (-3.95) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year & Ind. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 25,437 25,437 25,437 25,437 25,437 25,437 25,437 25,437 25,437 25,437 25,437 25,437 
Pseudo / Adj. R2 0.222 0.222 0.295 0.294 0.226 0.226 0.261 0.261 0.192 0.192 0.149 0.149 
Panel B. CEO Political ideology and MEF: Active earnings forecast subsample (2) 
 Accuracy Bad_News Good_News Positive_Surprise Negative_Surprise Neutral_Surprise 
Rep_Dum 0.088†  0.125†  0.046  0.070**  -0.105†  0.020  
 (3.82)  (3.39)  (1.19)  (2.17)  (-2.97)  (0.41)  
Rep_Index  0.093†  0.148†  0.005  0.072*  -0.107**  0.024 
  (3.29)  (3.26)  (0.10)  (1.81)  (-2.48)  (0.40) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year & Ind. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 25,437 25,437 25,437 25,437 25,437 25,437 25,437 25,437 25,437 25,437 25,437 25,437 
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Table A14. Cross-sectional test: High vs. low analyst coverage. 
This table presents results for firms with high (above median) analyst coverage (Panel A) and firms with low (below median) analyst coverage (Panel B). All variables are 
defined in Appendix A. All models include year and industry fixed effects. T-statistics are computed using robust standard errors and reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively 
Panel A1. CEO Political ideology and management earnings forecast (High analyst coverage 1)  
 Issue  Frequency Range Ln(Horizon) OptBias Forecast_Miss 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Rep_Dum 0.147***  0.215***  0.109**  0.117***  -0.164***  -0.165***  
 (3.20)  (4.71)  (2.28)  (3.04)  (-3.43)  (-3.28)  
Rep_Index  0.107*  0.106*  0.096  0.061  -0.145**  -0.223*** 
  (1.87)  (1.86)  (1.62)  (1.29)  (-2.46)  (-3.63) 
Observations 16,003 16,003 16,006 16,006 16,006 16,006 16,006 16,006 16,003 16,003 16,003 16,003 
Pseudo R2/Adj. R2 0.291 0.290 0.325 0.324 0.285 0.285 0.319 0.319 0.235 0.235 0.186 0.186 
Panel A2. CEO Political ideology and management earnings forecast (High analyst coverage 2)  
  Accuracy Bad_News Good_News Positive_Surprise Negative_Surprise Neutral_Surprise 
Rep_Dum 0.094***  0.135***  0.031  0.027  -0.054  0.018  
 (3.52)  (2.85)  (0.64)  (0.72)  (-1.28)  (0.32)  
Rep_Index  0.061*  0.105*  -0.065  -0.013  -0.031  0.065 
  (1.85)  (1.79)  (-1.06)  (-0.27)  (-0.60)  (0.91) 
Observations 16,006 16,006 16,003 16,003 15,955 15,955 16,002 16,002 16,002 16,002 16,002 16,002 
Pseudo R2/Adj. R2 0.305 0.305 0.286 0.286 0.179 0.179 0.032 0.032 0.072 0.072 0.079 0.079 
Panel B1. CEO Political ideology and management earnings forecast (Low analyst coverage 1)  
 Issue  Frequency Range Ln(Horizon) OptBias Forecast_Miss 
Rep_Dum 0.126**  0.094**  0.185***  0.099**  -0.131**  -0.124*  
 (2.50)  (2.33)  (3.42)  (2.33)  (-2.22)  (-1.96)  
Rep_Index  0.166***  0.100**  0.226***  0.124**  -0.174**  -0.154** 
  (2.71)  (2.05)  (3.45)  (2.40)  (-2.42)  (-2.00) 
Observations 17,945 17,945 17,945 17,945 17,945 17,945 17,945 17,945 17,898 17,898 17,877 17,877 
Pseudo R2/Adj. R2 0.226 0.227 0.227 0.227 0.239 0.239 0.224 0.224 0.206 0.206 0.172 0.172 
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Table A14. Cross-sectional test: High vs. low analyst coverage. Cont’d 
Panel B2. CEO Political ideology and management earnings forecast (Low analyst coverage 2)  
  Accuracy Bad_News Good_News Positive_Surprise Negative_Surprise Neutral_Surprise 
Rep_Dum 0.076***  0.144***  0.103*  0.125***  -0.147***  0.044  
 (2.91)  (2.67)  (1.75)  (2.90)  (-3.29)  (0.56)  
Rep_Index  0.098***  0.198***  0.133*  0.130**  -0.162***  0.075 
  (3.09)  (3.01)  (1.85)  (2.50)  (-2.99)  (0.81) 
Observations 17,945 17,945 17,898 17,898 17,945 17,945 17,945 17,945 17,945 17,945 17,945 17,945 
Pseudo R2/Adj. R2 0.209 0.209 0.224 0.225 0.184 0.184 0.085 0.085 0.123 0.123 0.064 0.064 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year & Ind. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table A15. Pre- and post- the financial crisis. 
This table presents results for the pre-financial crisis subsample (1993-2007) in Panel A, and the post-financial crisis subsample (2010-2016) in Panel B. All variables are 
defined in Appendix A. All models include year and industry fixed effects. T-statistics are computed using robust standard errors and reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively 
Panel A1. CEO Political ideology and management earnings forecast (pre-crisis 1)  
 Issue  Frequency Range Ln(Horizon) OptBias Forecast_Miss 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Rep_Dum 0.109**  0.112***  0.086*  0.086**  -0.123**  -0.098*  
 (2.50)  (3.26)  (1.78)  (2.47)  (-2.49)  (-1.85)  
Rep_Index  0.137**  0.096**  0.140**  0.099**  -0.157**  -0.157** 
  (2.48)  (2.27)  (2.31)  (2.30)  (-2.54)  (-2.39) 
Observations 21,046 21,046 21,046 21,046 21,046 21,046 21,046 21,046 21,046 21,046 21,046 21,046 
Pseudo R2/Adj. R2 0.280 0.280 0.303 0.302 0.271 0.271 0.282 0.282 0.233 0.233 0.173 0.173 
Panel A2. CEO Political ideology and management earnings forecast (pre-crisis 2)  
  Accuracy Bad_News Good_News Positive_Surprise Negative_Surprise Neutral_Surprise 
Rep_Dum 0.065***  0.068  0.093*  0.092***  -0.144***  0.043  
 (2.77)  (1.44)  (1.91)  (2.61)  (-3.76)  (0.80)  
Rep_Index  0.063**  0.122**  0.080  0.105**  -0.167***  0.075 
  (2.17)  (2.06)  (1.29)  (2.39)  (-3.51)  (1.13) 
Observations 21,046 21,046 21,046 21,046 21,046 21,046 21,046 21,046 21,046 21,046 21,046 21,046 
Pseudo R2/Adj. R2 0.258 0.258 0.275 0.275 0.218 0.218 0.0514 0.0514 0.111 0.111 0.0805 0.0805 
Panel B1. CEO Political ideology and management earnings forecast (post-crisis 1)  
 Issue  Frequency Range Ln(Horizon) OptBias Forecast_Miss 
Rep_Dum 0.127**  0.201***  0.166***  0.118**  -0.183***  -0.207***  
 (2.11)  (2.94)  (2.78)  (2.08)  (-2.92)  (-3.16)  
Rep_Index  0.057  0.089  0.130*  0.052  -0.171**  -0.215*** 
  (0.81)  (1.12)  (1.83)  (0.78)  (-2.28)  (-2.75) 
Observations 9,840 9,840 9,840 9,840 9,840 9,840 9,840 9,840 9,840 9,840 9,840 9,840 
Pseudo R2/Adj. R2 0.225 0.224 0.252 0.251 0.200 0.199 0.256 0.256 0.186 0.186 0.161 0.160 
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Table A15. Pre- and post- the financial crisis. Cont’d 
Panel B2. CEO Political ideology and management earnings forecast (post-crisis 2)  
  Accuracy Bad_News Good_News Positive_Surprise Negative_Surprise Neutral_Surprise 
Rep_Dum 0.103***  0.207***  -0.044  0.034  0.006  -0.124  
 (2.81)  (3.40)  (-0.64)  (0.63)  (0.10)  (-1.28)  
Rep_Index  0.085*  0.162**  -0.128  -0.002  0.015  -0.030 
  (1.93)  (2.23)  (-1.53)  (-0.04)  (0.22)  (-0.26) 
Observations 9,840 9,840 9,840 9,840 9,840 9,840 9,840 9,840 9,840 9,840 9,840 9,840 
Pseudo R2/Adj. R2 0.282 0.281 0.221 0.220 0.128 0.128 0.05 0.05 0.089 0.089 0.069 0.068 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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